Van Wyk, Inc. v. Fruitrade Intern., Inc.
| Decision Date | 01 September 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 489,489 |
| Parties | , Fed. Carr. Cas. P 83,886 VAN WYK, INC. v. FRUITRADE INTERNATIONAL, INC. , |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Rick A. Rude, Falls Church, VA (Robert B. Suder, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant.
James D. Skeen (Wright, Constable & Skeen, on the brief), Baltimore, for appellee.
Argued before WILNER, C.J., and BISHOP and FISCHER, JJ.
Appellee, Fruitrade International, Inc. ("Fruitrade"), filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against appellant, Van Wyk, Inc. ("Van Wyk"), Hoover Trucking Service, Inc. ("Hoover"), and James J. Maloney trading as Coastal Transportation Co., for damages to a shipment of raspberries. Van Wyk filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, alleging that Fruitrade violated the statutory time period set forth in 49 U.S.C. § 11706(c)(2). The chambers judge dismissed Fruitrade's complaint with prejudice, whereupon, Fruitrade requested an en banc review of the dismissal. The en banc panel vacated the order granting Van Wyk's motion to dismiss. The case was tried without a jury, and the trial judge found Van Wyk liable to Fruitrade in the amount of $23,807.65. Van Wyk filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court. Neither Hoover nor Maloney are parties to this appeal.
Van Wyk raises several issues, which we rephrase and reorder as follows:
1. Whether the en banc panel erred when it ruled that Fruitrade's complaint was not time barred under 49 U.S.C. § 11707(e). (An appeal from a decision of an en banc panel is permitted pursuant to Md.Rule 2-551(h)).
2. Whether the trial court erred when it found Van Wyk liable under 49 U.S.C. § 11707 for the damage to Fruitrade's cargo.
3. Whether the trial court erred in its application of the legal and factual burdens set forth in 49 U.S.C. § 11707.
4. Whether the factual findings made by the trial court were arbitrary, capricious, and clearly erroneous.
5. Whether the trial court erred when it premised liability against Van Wyk upon a factual basis which Fruitrade did not plead and that had no causal relation to the alleged damages.
Fruitrade, a Canadian trading company that buys and sells frozen fruits, frozen vegetables, and juice concentrates, arranged for the shipment and sale of two containers of individually quick frozen ("IQF") raspberries from a supplier in Chile to Big Valley Marketing, a purchaser in Decatur, Michigan. The raspberries were transported from Valparaiso, Chile, on a Chilean steamship and, on June 15, 1988, at approximately 5:30 p.m., arrived at Hoover, a trucking terminal/warehouse located in Baltimore, Maryland. Fruitrade hired Hoover to transload the shipment of raspberries from the Chilean steamship to Van Wyk's refrigerated trailer. Two Hoover employees began unloading the raspberries at 7:00 p.m. and completed the transfer of the cargo at approximately 11:00 p.m. Van Wyk's driver, Robert Hamilton, was present at the terminal and observed the transfer. The shipment ultimately was received by the purchaser in Decatur, Michigan.
Mr. Hamilton testified that the Hoover employees backed the Van Wyk trailer into an unsealed dry dock and up against one of the shipment containers. One employee hand stacked the cartons of raspberries onto pallets and another employee loaded the pallets into the trailer. Mr. Hamilton also testified that, when he closed the trailer doors, he noticed that the boxes in the rear of the trailer had started to accumulate "a dew like it was starting to melt" and that the "cardboard [was] starting to collapse from the moisture." Hoover was responsible for loading the shipment into Van Wyk's trailer; Mr. Hamilton was responsible only for closing the doors of the trailer. Before departing the terminal that evening, Mr. Hamilton signed the bill of lading for the delivery of the raspberries. The bill of lading indicated that Mr. Hamilton received the cargo in "good order."
Emma Jean Stambek, a general manager for Big Valley Storage Company, Inc., a public freezer warehouse in Decatur, Michigan, testified that, on June 17, 1988, she went to the loading dock and received the shipment of raspberries. Ms. Stambek checked the cargo and noted on the bill of lading:
When Ms. Stambek notified Big Valley Marketing and Fruitrade of the condition of the raspberries, Fruitrade sent Kenneth Wojcik, a surveyor, to the cold storage warehouse. In his report, Mr. Wojcik recorded:
(b) Condition of interior (b) Lower palletized boxes collapsing, evidence
and exterior packing of wetting from defrosting. refrozen at time
of survey.
* * *
loss/damage.
attributed by surveyor[.] transference to standard trailer in hot humid
weather conditions.
Wojcik also stated in his report that:
[Mr. Hamilton] left the warehouse and then returned at about 7:00 p.m. Only one skid had been loaded, and the doors of both the container and trailer were open. The load was transferred one pallet at a time. Two men in the container hand palletized the load. The driver estimated the outside temperature 85 degrees, and stated that the temperature inside the trailer was at least 55 degrees. The transference was not completed until about midnight.
When the driver left Hoover Transportation warehouse, he stopped at a truck stop to weigh the truck. At this time he took a temperature reading in the trailer with a probe meter. The meter registered between 28 and 32 degrees.
We further inquired of Van Wyk as to why the driver had signed the bill of lading without taking exceptions, as the conditions under which the load was transferred were less than advantageous, and the driver knew the load was perishable. Van Wyk's response was that this was an error.
As a result of the damage to the shipment, Fruitrade was unable to sell the raspberries as IQF, and instead, sold them as "block frozen," a considerably less valuable form of the product. Fruitrade claimed a loss of nearly $24,000, and sent a letter to Van Wyk claiming that Van Wyk was responsible for the damage to the raspberries. On February 1, 1989, Van Wyk denied Fruitrade's claim, and Fruitrade subsequently filed suit against Van Wyk in January 1991.
I. Statutory Time Period
We shall address first Van Wyk's contention that Fruitrade's complaint is time barred under 49 U.S.C. § 11706(c)(2) (1979 & Supp.1993), which provides:
A person must begin a civil action to recover damages under section 11705(b)(3) of this title within 2 years after the claim accrues.
Initially, the trial court found that the statutory time period barred Fruitrade's claim against Van Wyk and granted Van Wyk's motion to dismiss. The en banc panel, however, concluded:
[I]t seems clear that the basis for the Chambers Judge's ruling as to both defendants was his erroneous conclusion that the statute of limitations in 49 U.S.C. § 11706(c)(2) applied to plaintiff's claim against these defendants. Section 11706(c)(2) provides for a two-year period of limitations from date of delivery or tender of delivery by the carrier for actions "for damages resulting from the imposition of rates for transportation or service...." See 49 U.S.C. 11705(b)(3). Plaintiff's claims are for damage to cargo and are not in any way related to "rates for transportation or service."
We agree with the en banc panel that the chambers judge improvidently granted Van Wyk's motion to dismiss. Section 11706(c)(2) clearly states that "a person must begin a civil action to recover damages under § 11705(b)(3) of this title within 2 years after the claim accrues." 49 U.S.C. § 11705(b)(3) provides:
A common carrier providing transportation or service ... is liable for damages resulting from the imposition of rates for transportation or service the Commission finds to be in violation of this subtitle.
(Emphasis added). Fruitrade's claim arises from damage to its cargo and not from damages resulting from the imposition of illegal transportation or service rates.
Section 11707 of Title 49 U.S.C. generally covers "liability for actual loss or injury to the property." Subsection (e) of that section specifically provides:
Although 49 U.S.C. § 11707(e) does not constitute a statute of limitations, it does limit the ability of a carrier to reduce, by contract or otherwise, the time for a shipper to commence an action against the carrier. This section clearly states that, at the very least, a shipper has two years within which to bring a civil action against a carrier. Van Wyk, a common carrier subject to the provisions of 49 U.S.C. § 11707, denied Fruitrade's claim for damage to the raspberries on February 1, 1989. Fruitrade filed suit against Van Wyk in January 1991, within two years from the date of Van Wyk's notice denying Fruitrade's claim; therefore, Fruitrade's complaint against Van Wyk is not time barred.
Van Wyk next contends that the trial court erred in its application of the legal and factual burdens in 49 U.S.C. § 11707 (1979 & Supp.1993), and that its factual findings were clearly erroneous. Van Wyk maintains that the trial court (a) erroneously held Van Wyk liable for damage to the raspberries that existed at the time Hoover tendered the shipment, (b) incorrectly assessed Van Wyk's duties and obligations to Fruitrade at the time Hoover tendered the...
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