Vance v. Ball State Univ.

• Citation: 133 S.Ct. 2434,570 U.S. 421,186 L.Ed.2d 565
• Decision Date: 24 June 2013
• Docket Number: No. 11–556.,11–556.
• Parties: Maetta VANCE, Petitioner v. BALL STATE UNIVERSITY.
• Court: United States Supreme Court

570 U.S. 421

133 S.Ct. 2434

186 L.Ed.2d 565

Maetta VANCE, Petitioner

v.BALL STATE UNIVERSITY.

No. 11–556.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued Nov. 26, 2012.

Decided June 24, 2013.

Daniel R. Ortiz, Charlottesville, VA, for Petitioner.

Sri Srinivasan, for the United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting neither party.

Gregory G. Garre, Washington, DC, for Respondents.

David T. Goldberg, Donahue & Goldberg, LLP, New York, NY, Daniel R. Ortiz, Counsel of Record, University of Virginia School of Law, Supreme Court Litigation Clinic, Charlottesville, VA, for Petitioner.

Scott E. Shockley, Lester H. Cohen, Shawn A. Neal, Defur Voran LLP, Muncie, IN, Gregory G. Garre, Counsel of Record, Jessica E. Phillips, Roman Martinez, Latham & Watkins LLP, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Justice ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case, we decide a question left open in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998), and Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998), namely, who qualifies as a "supervisor" in a case in which an employee asserts a Title VII claim for workplace harassment?

Under Title VII, an employer's liability for such harassment may depend on the status of the harasser. If the harassing employee is the victim's co-worker, the employer is liable only if it was negligent in controlling working conditions. In cases in which the harasser is a "supervisor," however, different rules apply. If the supervisor's harassment culminates in a tangible employment action, the employer is strictly liable. But if no tangible employment action is taken, the employer may escape liability by establishing, as an affirmative defense, that (1) the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct any harassing behavior and (2) that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of the preventive or corrective opportunities that the employer provided. Id., at 807, 118 S.Ct. 2275; Ellerth, supra, at 765, 118 S.Ct. 2257. Under this framework, therefore, it matters whether a harasser is a "supervisor" or simply a co-worker.

We hold that an employee is a "supervisor" for purposes of vicarious liability under Title VII if he or she is empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions against the victim, and we therefore affirm the judgment of the Seventh Circuit.

I

Maetta Vance, an African–American woman, began working for Ball State University (BSU) in 1989 as a substitute server in the University Banquet and Catering division of Dining Services. In 1991, BSU promoted Vance to a part-time catering assistant position, and in 2007 she applied and was selected for a position as a full-time catering assistant.

Over the course of her employment with BSU, Vance lodged numerous complaints of racial discrimination and retaliation, but most of those incidents are not at issue here. For present purposes, the only relevant incidents concern Vance's interactions with a fellow BSU employee, Saundra Davis.

During the time in question, Davis, a white woman, was employed as a catering specialist in the Banquet and Catering division. The parties vigorously dispute the precise nature and scope of Davis' duties, but they agree that Davis did not have the power to hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline Vance. See No. 1:06–cv–1452–SEB–JMS, 2008 WL 4247836, at *12 (S.D.Ind., Sept. 10, 2008) ("Vance makes no allegations that Ms. Davis possessed any such power"); Brief for Petitioner 9–11 (describing Davis' authority over Vance); Brief for Respondent 39 ("[A]ll agree that Davis lacked the authority to take tangible employments [sic ] actions against petitioner").

In late 2005 and early 2006, Vance filed internal complaints with BSU and charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging racial harassment and discrimination, and many of these complaints and charges pertained to Davis. 646 F.3d 461, 467 (C.A.7 2011). Vance complained that Davis "gave her a hard time at work by glaring at her, slamming pots and pans around her, and intimidating her." Ibid. She alleged that she was "left alone in the kitchen with Davis, who smiled at her"; that Davis "blocked" her on an elevator and "stood there with her cart smiling"; and that Davis often gave her "weird" looks. Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Vance's workplace strife persisted despite BSU's attempts to address the problem. As a result, Vance filed this lawsuit in 2006 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, claiming, among other things, that she had been subjected to a racially hostile work environment in violation of Title VII. In her complaint, she alleged that Davis was her supervisor and that BSU was liable for Davis' creation of a racially hostile work environment. Complaint in No. 1:06–cv–01452–SEB–TAB (SD Ind., Oct. 3, 2006), Dkt. No. 1, pp. 5–6.

Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the District Court entered summary judgment in favor of BSU. 2008 WL 4247836, at *1. The court explained that BSU could not be held vicariously liable for Davis' alleged racial harassment because Davis could not " ‘hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline’ " Vance and, as a result, was not Vance's supervisor under the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of that concept. See id., at *12 (quoting Hall v. Bodine Elect. Co., 276 F.3d 345, 355 (C.A.7 2002) ). The court further held that BSU could not be liable in negligence because it responded reasonably to the incidents of which it was aware. 2008 WL 4247836, *15.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed. 646 F.3d 461. It explained that, under its settled precedent, supervisor status requires " ‘the power to hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline an employee.’ " Id., at 470 (quoting Hall,supra, at 355 ). The court concluded that Davis was not Vance's supervisor and thus that Vance could not recover from BSU unless she could prove negligence. Finding that BSU was not negligent with respect to Davis' conduct, the court affirmed. 646 F.3d, at 470–473.

II

A

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it "an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1). This provision obviously prohibits discrimination with respect to employment decisions that have direct economic consequences, such as termination, demotion, and pay cuts. But not long after Title VII was enacted, the lower courts held that Title VII also reaches the creation or perpetuation of a discriminatory work environment.

In the leading case of Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (1971), the Fifth Circuit recognized a cause of action based on this theory. See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65–66, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (describing development of hostile environment claims based on race). The Rogers court reasoned that "the phrase ‘terms, conditions, or privileges of employment’ in [Title VII] is an expansive concept which sweeps within its protective ambit the practice of creating a working environment heavily charged with ethnic or racial discrimination." 454 F.2d, at 238. The court observed that "[o]ne can readily envision working environments so heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional and psychological stability of minority group workers." Ibid. Following this decision, the lower courts generally held that an employer was liable for a racially hostile work environment if the employer was negligent, i.e., if the employer knew or reasonably should have known about the harassment but failed to take remedial action. See Ellerth, 524 U.S., at 768–769, 118 S.Ct. 2257 (THOMAS, J., dissenting) (citing cases).

When the issue eventually reached this Court, we agreed that Title VII prohibits the creation of a hostile work environment. See Meritor, supra, at 64–67, 106 S.Ct. 2399. In such cases, we have held, the plaintiff must show that the work environment was so pervaded by discrimination that the terms and conditions of employment were altered. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993).

B

Consistent with Rogers, we have held that an employer is directly liable for an employee's unlawful harassment if the employer was negligent with respect to the offensive behavior. Faragher, 524 U.S., at 789, 118 S.Ct. 2275. Courts have generally applied this rule to evaluate employer liability when a co-worker harasses the plaintiff.¹

In Ellerth and Faragher, however, we held that different rules apply where the harassing employee is the plaintiff's "supervisor." In those instances, an employer may be vicariously liable for its employees' creation of a hostile work environment. And in identifying the situations in which such vicarious liability is appropriate, we looked to the Restatement of Agency for guidance. See, e.g., Meritor, supra, at 72, 106 S.Ct. 2399; Ellerth, supra, at 755, 118 S.Ct. 2257.

Under the Restatement, "masters" are generally not liable for the torts of their "servants" when the torts are committed outside the scope of the servants' employment. See 1 Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219(2), p. 481 (1957) (Restatement). And because racial and sexual harassment are unlikely to fall within the scope of a servant's duties, application of this rule would generally preclude employer liability for employee harassment. See Faragher, supra, at 793–796, 118 S.Ct. 2275; Ellerth, supra, at 757, 118 S.Ct. 2257. But in Ellerth and Faragher, we held that a provision of the Restatement provided the basis for an exception. Section 219(2)(d) of that Restatement recognizes an exception to the general rule just noted for situations in which the servant was "aided in...