Vance v. Speakman

Citation409 A.2d 1307
PartiesF. R. VANCE et al. v. Willard A. SPEAKMAN et al.
Decision Date31 December 1979
CourtSupreme Judicial Court of Maine (US)

Gail S. Marshall (orally), Portland, for F. R. Vance.

Michael P. Asen (orally), Portland, for Goodwin, Brousseau and Rodrique.

Murray, Plumb & Murray, Clark C. Hambley, Jr. (orally), Ellyn C. Ballou, Portland, for defendants.

Peter B. Bickerman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Augusta, for Maine Human Rights Com'n, amicus curiae.

Before McKUSICK, C. J., and WERNICK, ARCHIBALD, GODFREY, NICHOLS and GLASSMAN, JJ.

McKUSICK, Chief Justice.

The four plaintiffs, F. R. Vance, Michael Goodwin, Gare Brousseau, and Paul Rodrique, brought this action seeking to enjoin defendant Willard Speakman, their landlord, and his agents, including defendant Robert Nielsen, Jr., from evicting them from their apartment. Plaintiffs alleged that their eviction would violate 5 M.R.S.A. § 4582 (1979) 1 in that defendants were taking the eviction action "solely because" plaintiffs Vance and Goodwin were welfare recipients. The Superior Court granted plaintiffs' prayer for a permanent injunction but denied their request for attorneys' fees. On appeal, defendants contend that the Superior Court erroneously construed the word "solely." We agree and therefore sustain the appeal. We must, however, remand the case to the Superior Court for further factfinding necessary to the ultimate determination of defendants' motives in deciding to evict. Plaintiffs' cross-appeal from the Superior Court's refusal to award them attorneys' fees is denied.

I.

The four plaintiffs had been living in an apartment on Neal Street in Portland as tenants at will for over two years when defendant Speakman purchased the apartment building on January 15, 1979. In late January or early February, defendant Nielsen, the owner's managing agent, spoke with the tenants who lived in the apartment located above that of plaintiffs. They complained to Nielsen about the noise caused by plaintiffs' stereo and about a pile of paint cans and broken furniture in the basement belonging to plaintiff Vance. Nielsen did not tell plaintiffs of these complaints, nor did he ask them to correct the situation.

Plaintiffs' first rent payment to the new owner was due on February 1. On February 6 or 7, the agent Nielsen received two checks from plaintiffs Brousseau and Rodrique totaling one-half of the rent owed. Nielsen then spoke to plaintiff Goodwin, who said that his share of the rent would be paid by the city of Portland through its general assistance program. After speaking with a caseworker for the city's welfare department, Nielsen received a guarantee letter confirming that Goodwin's share of the rent would be paid later in the month by the city.

Plaintiff Vance's share of the rent was also unpaid. In January Vance had received public assistance because he had had a medical operation. For February, however, because he was no longer medically disabled, Vance could receive public assistance for his rent only if he had unsuccessfully searched for work throughout the month and had reported weekly his progress to his caseworker. Under the rules of the welfare department, a guarantee letter could not be issued until the end of the month; Nielsen learned of this situation between February 10 and 15 when he called Vance's caseworker.

Nielsen, however, did not wait to receive Vance's and Goodwin's rent payments from the city; on February 28, eviction notices were served on plaintiffs. Plaintiffs then brought the present injunctive proceeding. After hearing testimony the Superior Court ruled from the bench that Nielsen's decision to evict was prompted by the late payment of rent by Brousseau and Rodrique and by the complaints of plaintiffs' neighbors, as well as by the welfare status of Vance and Goodwin. Turning to the issue of construing the term "solely" in section 4582, the court said:

(T)his Court is satisfied that if the Court were to find that there were more than one reason for any action taken . . . the statute requires the Court to satisfy itself as a factual matter that the public assistance was a determinative factor in that but for the public assistance in issue the eviction would not have occurred, and that is the Court's construction of the statute.

The Superior Court concluded "that although the public assistance and the attendant circumstances was not independently the only reason, it was in fact the decisive reason, and without that no action would have been taken to evict these tenants." The court permanently enjoined defendants from seeking to evict "upon these grounds."

II.

The issue on appeal is whether the Superior Court properly construed the statutory prohibition of rental discrimination "solely because of" welfare status. The last paragraph of 5 M.R.S.A. § 4582, the provision controlling this case, was enacted as an amendment to the Maine Human Rights Act by P.L.1975, ch. 151, § 1. When first proposed in the 1975 session, the last paragraph only prohibited the refusal to rent or the imposition of different terms of tenancy Because of the individual's status as a recipient of public assistance. 2 The restricting adverb "solely" was added on the floor of the House during debate. See 1 Leg.Rec. B162 (March 13, 1975). Except for that last paragraph of 5 M.R.S.A. § 4582 (discrimination against welfare recipients) and 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 4595-96 (1979) (credit discrimination), all of the provisions of the Human Rights Act prohibit discrimination that is merely "because of" not "solely because of" factors such as age, race, or sex. Landlords and extenders of credit have gained from the legislature a more restrictive test than that prevailing for employment and other forms of prohibited discrimination.

It is impossible, in view of the statutory language and the legislative history, to give the word "solely" any meaning other than its straightforward dictionary definition:

Sole ly (solele) Adv. 1. without another or others; alone (to be Solely to blame) 2. only, exclusively, merely, or altogether (to be read Solely for pleasure)

Webster's New World Dictionary, Second College Edition (1976). As this court has repeatedly declared,

An elementary rule of statutory construction is that words must be given their common meaning unless the act discloses a legislative intent otherwise.

Hurricane Island Outward Bound v. Town of Vinalhaven, Me., 372 A.2d 1043, 1046 (1977). Interpreting the last paragraph of 5 M.R.S.A. § 4582 by that standard leaves no doubt of its intended meaning: To be guilty of unlawful discrimination the landlord must have refused to rent "alone" or "exclusively" or "altogether" because of the tenant's welfare status.

The applicable statute, fact circumstances, and decision in Wells v. Franklin Broadcasting Corp., Me., 403 A.2d 771 (1979), provide an instructive counterpoint to the case at bar. Wells, which was decided after the Superior Court decision in this case, had been brought pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. § 4572 for employment discrimination "because of . . . age." In Wells we held that phrase to mean that age is A determining factor in the defendant's action. Id. at 773. See also Maine Human Rights Comm'n v. City of Auburn, Me., 408 A.2d 1253, at p. 1268 (1979) (alleged discrimination "because of . . . sex"). Here, we are led necessarily to the conclusion, on the basis of Wells and the statutory addition of the word "solely," that the phrase "solely because of such individual's (welfare) status" means that such status is The only determining factor in the defendant's action.

Plaintiffs' counsel argue persuasively that the "solely" test imposes an unintendedly difficult burden of proof upon the welfare recipients meant to be protected by this remedial provision of the Human Rights Act. They would have this court construe the "solely" provision to set a standard of proof higher than "a determining factor" (the test of Wells ) but less than "the only determining factor." They urge that "solely because of" welfare status requires merely that such status be "the primary" or "the predominant" factor. However mindful this court is of the difficulty in many situations of proving that welfare status was the sole reason for the landlord's refusal to rent, the legislature has left no room for the statutory construction urged by plaintiffs. The legislature said, "solely because of," and not "primarily because of." The legislature, and not this court, is the appropriate institution of government to make the change that plaintiffs now urge should be made in the statute.

Landlords, however, must be warned that the mere presence of other facially plausible factors for refusing to rent, such as complaints by other tenants, will not end the investigation whether unlawful discrimination against welfare recipients has in fact occurred. The question is always open whether those other factors pointed to by the landlord are genuine ones in that they in fact made a difference in his decision to evict, or whether they are used after the fact as mere pretext or coverup. Cf. Maine Human Rights Comm'n v. City of Auburn, supra, at pp. 1262, 1267-1268; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) (in employment discrimination actions, the plaintiff may adduce evidence that the defendant's articulated nondiscriminatory reason is pretext, or the trial justice may reject that reason based on his assessment of the witnesses' credibility). Evidence of pretext as applied to this case might include the fact that no action, not even the transmittal of the other tenants' complaint to plaintiffs, was taken, nor any action taken or complaint made regarding the late payment by plaintiffs not receiving public assistance. 3

We must remand this case to the Superior Court because the justice made his decision, announced from the bench immediately at the end of the evidentiary hearing, prior to the issuance by this court of its opinions in...

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