Vance v. Union Planters Corp., 99-60289

• Decision Date: 25 April 2000
• Docket Number: No. 99-60289,99-60289
• Citation: 209 F.3d 438
• Parties: (5th Cir. 2000) YVONNE E. VANCE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. UNION PLANTERS CORPORATION, ET AL., Defendants, UNION PLANTERS BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Defendant-Appellant
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 438

209 F.3d 438 (5th Cir. 2000)

YVONNE E. VANCE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. UNION PLANTERS CORPORATION, ET AL., Defendants, UNION PLANTERS BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 99-60289

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

April 25, 2000

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi

Before DAVIS, CYNTHIA HOLCOMB HALL, ^* and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

Yvonne Vance sued Union Planters Bank, N.A. ("Union Planters"), under title VII, alleging discriminatory failure to promote on the basis of sex. A jury awarded $30,000 for lost wages and benefits, $20,000 for emotional distress, and $390,000 in punitive damages. The district court later reduced the total amount awarded to $330,000 because of title VII's statutory limits on employer liability. Union Planters appealed, asserting that (1) no reasonable jury could have found sex discrimination, (2) the court erred in allowing the jury to hear evidence that Union Planters had previously been found to have violated the Equal Pay Act, and (3) the district court erroneously determined Union Planters's size for purposes of the statutory liability limits. We affirm with regard to the first two issues and vacate and remand on the third issue.

I.

Vance had been president of the Oxford, Mississippi, branch of Grenada Sunburst Bank for seven years when the cause of action arose. She performed energetically and successfully in her capacity as branch president and was familiar with the Oxford financial market. Union Planters Corporation, which owned, inter alia, First National Bank of New Albany and United Southern Bank, agreed in July 1994 to purchase Grenada Sunburst Bank effective December 31, 1994.

Pursuant to a reorganization plan, Union Planters Corporation announced that it would consolidate its area banks into Union Planters Bank of Northeast Mississippi, N.A. The new bank would be headed by Pat Davis, who previously had been president of First National Bank. Because United Southern and Grenada Sunburst had bank branches in Oxford, the two branches were to be consolidated. Davis was charged with hiring a president for the newly consolidated bank branch.

Vance promptly applied for the job, as did Hardy Farris, the president of the United Southern branch in Oxford. Farris, though, had opted to participate in an early retirement scheme from which Union Planters Corporation refused to release him, making Vance the only viable candidate. Davis met with Vance and asked for hiring recommendations from people in the banking community. Vance's supervisor, Jimmy Brown, gave her a glowing recommendation and told Davis he should immediately hire her to lead the new bank.

Instead, Davis approached Ed Neelly, who was now working for the Grenada Sunburst branch in Tupelo, and offered him the job. Neelly declined and recommended that Davis hire Vance, with whom Neelly had worked for years. Davis told Neelly that he was looking to hire a "mature man." In response, Neelly recommended Tom Carroll as an effective second-in-command at the new bank. Brown also recommended Vance over Carroll. Davis then offered the branch presidency to Butch Collums, who had worked under Davis at First National Bank; Collums rejected the offer.

Davis claims then to have contacted Pete Boone, the former CEO of Grenada Sunburst Bank. Boone denies he was ever contacted, and testified that had he been, he strongly would have recommended Vance over Carroll. Davis contacted Boone's successor, Don Ayres, who, though he testified that he barely knew Vance, recommended hiring Carroll over Vance. Davis then interviewed Carroll, whose job at Grenada Sunburst had been eliminated during that bank's reorganization; Carroll expressed interest in the branch presidency. Davis hired Carroll on March 15, 1995, and offered Vance the number two position, which she declined. Vance resigned and accepted the number two job at the Bank of Mississippi branch in Oxford, where she soon rose to the position of branch president.

Vance testified that, as a result of her failure to receive the Union Planters branch presidency, she lost between $7,500 and $8,000 in bonuses and $4,050 in 401(k) contributions. She claimed also to have lost $3,500 in annual pay in her new job and incurred $15,000 to $16,000 in health expenses because of an inability to obtain insurance upon transferring firms. A psychologist who examined Vance and interviewed her friends, testified that her failure to receive the promotion caused her to suffer from depression, agitation, sadness, and shock.

At trial, Vance's counsel asked Davis why he continued to solicit male candidates for the branch presidency when it appeared that Vance was the only qualified applicant. Davis replied that he wanted to hire the "the best guy, the best person, and I saying [sic] that generically." Also at trial, the court denied Union Planters's motion in limine to prevent Vance from asking Davis any questions about previous adjudications in which he was determined to have unlawfully discriminated against women by paying them less than men. The court told Vance's counsel: "You may ask him if he had ever been found to have discriminated against women in this work place as far as pay is concerned without going into the details or the name of a case or anything." Vance asked such a question of Davis, and he responded in the affirmative.

II.

This court has explained that

[i]n a Title VII action that has been fully tried on the merits, such that the district court has before it all the necessary evidence to make the ultimate finding of discrimination, the factual inquiry is whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff. On review, this court must therefore decide whether the ultimate finding of discrimination by the district court was clearly erroneous. A finding is clearly erroneous when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.

Davis v. Yazoo Co. Welfare Dep't, 942 F.2d 884, 886 (5th Cir. 1991) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). We review a verdict under the "reasonable juror" standard. The standard is that

[t]he court should consider all of the evidence--not just that evidence which supports the nonmover's case--but in a light and with all reasonable inferences most favorable to the party opposed to the motion [to overturn the jury verdict]. If the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one party that the [c]ourt believes that reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary verdict, granting of a motion is proper.

Merwine v. Board of Trustees, 754 F.2d 631, 636-37 (5th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added).

A court should grant a FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a) motion not only when the non-movant presents no evidence, but also when there is not a sufficient conflict in substantial evidence to create a jury question. ¹ Importantly, this articulation of the standard of review does not require a showing of substantial evidence in support of the jury verdict (in the manner that this court looks for substantial evidence in support of certain decisions by administrative agencies). Rather, the standard requires merely a finding of a sufficient conflict in substantial (meant as a synonym for "material") evidence. This can be restated as requiring "sufficient material evidence to support the jury's verdict"--the reasonable-juror standard.

Evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Jon-T Chems., Inc., 704 F.2d 1412, 1417 (5th Cir. 1983). The district court's interpretation of title VII's limits on liability is reviewed de novo. See United States v. Santos-Riviera, 183 F.3d 367, 369 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 597 (1999).

III.

In reviewing a finding of sex discrimination in a case tried to a jury, we examine the record to determine whether sufficient material evidence supports a charge that the plaintiff was treated unfavorably on the basis of sex and that the employer's stated reasons are pretextual. See Rutherford v. Harris County, 197 F.3d 173, 181 (5th Cir. 1999). Vance introduced sufficient evidence to support the verdict.

During the search process, Davis approached Ed Neelly, a retired branch president, and asked whether he wanted the job of Oxford branch president. Neelly declined the position and recommended Vance for the position. After Neelly turned down the job, Davis told Neelly that he needed a "mature man in the office in Oxford." Neelly testified that at the time he assumed that Davis meant that he was interested in hiring a "mature man" for the number two position at the new bank. Neelly then testified that in retrospect this assumption was incorrect, i.e., that Davis appears to have wanted a "mature man" to head the branch.

The jury reasonably could have inferred that this preference for "a mature man" at the bank colored his decision to hire Carroll over Vance, especially in light of his subsequent actions--hiring Carroll as President and offering Vance the number-two position. Vance also testified that Davis told her he wanted to hire a 40- to 50-year-old man for the number two position because such a person would lend stability and credibility to the bank.

Union Planters argues that these comments were "merely stray" and thus insufficient to constitute a basis for liability. We have held, however, that workplace remarks like Davis's may constitute sufficient evidence of discrimination if the remarks are (1) related to sex; (2) proximate in time to the employment action; (3) made by an individual with authority over the employment decision; and (4) related to the employment decision at issue. See Krystek v. University of S. Miss., 164 F.3d 251, 256 (5th Cir. 1999).

Davis's remark that he wanted to hire a "mature man" is certainly related to sex, was said...