Vance v. Vandercook Co, No. 514
| Court | United States Supreme Court |
| Writing for the Court | WHITE |
| Citation | 42 L.Ed. 1100,170 U.S. 438,18 S.Ct. 674 |
| Parties | VANCE et al. v. W. A. VANDERCOOK CO |
| Docket Number | No. 514 |
| Decision Date | 09 May 1898 |
v.
W. A. VANDERCOOK CO.
Page 439
The bill below was filed by the appellee, a corporation created by the laws of California, and a citizen of that state. It alleged, in substance, that the corporation was the owner of large vineyards in California, from which it produced well-known qualities of pure wines and brandies and other liquors; that through its traveling agent, a citizen of the state of Virginia, it took orders from certain residents of the state of South Carolina residing in the city of Charleston, to deliver to each of them in Charleston certain original packages of wines and brandies, the products of the vineyards of the complainant; that, in consequence of said orders, 73 original packages for the customers aforesaid were shipped
Page 440
in one car, by a contract for continuous interstate carriage from San Francisco to Charleston; that under a law of Sout Carolina, known as the 'Dispensary Law,' certain officers of the state of South Carolina had seized the packages of liquor above described, and prevented the delivery thereof, and openly avowed their intention to continue to levy upon any packages of liquor shipped into the state of South Carolina in violation of the law of the state. The bill moreover alleged another shipment of the same character and a like seizure. The bill then averred as follows:
'And your orator further shows that your orator intends in the course of its said business, as aforesaid, further and in addition to said shipments so ordered by its said customers, in advance as aforesaid, to ship also from San Francisco, California, to its agent in the state of South Carolina, and to store and warehouse in the state of South Carolina, and to sell in the state of South Carolina, in the original unbroken packages as imported, as aforesaid, to the residents and citizens of the state of South Carolina, its wines and other liquors, products of its vineyards, as aforesaid, for the lawful use and consumption of the said residents and citizens of the state of South Carolina in the due and lawful exercise of your orator's right of importation of such wines, &c., products of its, vineyards, into the state of South Carolina, in lawful intercourse, trade, and commerce with the citizens and residents of the state of South Carolina, under the constitution and laws of the United States, all of which shipments, as aforesaid, the defendants and other persons claiming to act as state constables and officials threaten to seize, take, and carry away, detain, convert, and sell, to the manifest wrong, damage, and injury of your orator and its trade and business, as aforesaid.
'And your orator further shows that by and under the terms, principle, policy, and operation of the said dispensary law of the state of South Carolina, as aforesaid, approved March 6, 1896, and amended March 5, 1897, all wines, beers, ales, alcoholic, spirituous, and other intoxicating liquors are subjects of lawful manufacture, barter, sale, export, and import in the state of South Carolina, and have been, are being,
Page 441
and will continue to be, lawfully used and consumed as a beverage by the citizens and residents of the state of South Carolina.'
Averring the avowed purpose of the state officers to continue to seize all liquors thereafter shipped by the complainant into the state to residents therein or for sale in original packages, the bill proceeded to charge that the state law upon whih the officers relied was void, because repugnant to the constitution of the United States; that to prevent the continuing wrong which would necessarily arise from the conduct of the state officers, and to avoid a multiplicity of suits, a writ of injunction was necessary, restraining the state officers from interfering with complainant in its shipment of its products to residents of the state on their orders, and also enjoining the state officers from interfering with the complainant in shipping its products from the state of California into the state of South Carolina to its agents there, for the purpose of selling the same in original packages, the provisions of the South Carolina law to the contrary notwithstanding. This mere outline of the averments of the bill suffices to convey an understanding of the controversy which the record presents. A restraining order was granted as prayed for against the designated state officers, and, after due pleadings and proceedings, this restraining order was perpetuated, and a final decree was entered in favor of the complainant in accordance with the prayer of the bill. 80 Fed. 786.
Wm. A. Barber, for appellants.
J. P. Kennedy Bryan, for appellee.
Mr. Justice WHITE, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the court.
In the two cases of Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 58, 107, 17 Sup. Ct. 262, 265, the court was called upon to determine whether a law of the state of South Carolina, conr olling the sale of intoxicating liquors within that state, was repugnant to the constitution of the
Page 442
United States, In one of the cases it was held that the court below had jurisdiction to entertain a bill filed by the complainants to enjoin the execution of the law, as to liquors by them owned; while in both cases it was decided that, in so far as the law then in question frobade the sending from one state into South Carolina of intoxicating liquors for the use of the person to whom it was shipped, the statute was repugnant to the third clause of section 8 of the first article of the constitution of the United States, commonly spoken of as the 'interstate commerce clause' of the constitution. It was, besides, decided that the law in question, which created state officers or agents with authority to buy liquor to be sold in the state, and which forbade the sale of any liquor except that so bought and offered for sale by the state officers or agents, was also in violation of the constitution of the United States, because amounting to an unjust discrimination against liquors, the products of other states. The conclusion reached on this latter subject was predicated, not on the general theory which the statute put in practice, but on particular provisions of the law by which the discrimination was brought about. Whether a state could, without violating the constitution of the United States, confer upon certain officers or agents the sole power to buy all liquors which were to be sold in the state, allowing no other liquor to be sold except that offered for sale by the designated officers or agents, was not decided. On the contrary, this question was reserved, for, as the state law was found to violate the constitution because of express discriminatory provisions which it contained, it became unnecessary to determine whether a law of that general character would be inherently repugnant to the constitution of the United States. Referring to this last question, the court said (page 101, 165 U. S., and page 272, 17 Sup. Ct.):
'It was pressed on us in the argument that it is not competent for a state, in the exercise of its police power, to monopolize the traffic in intoxicating liquors, and thus put itself in competition with the citizens of other states. This phase of the subject is novel and interesting, but we do not think it necessary for us now to consider it. It is sufficient for the present case to hold, as we do, that, when a state recognizes the
Page 443
manufacture, sale, and use of intoxicating liquors as lawful, it cannot discriminate against the bringing of such articles in and importing them from other states; that such legislation is void, as a hindrance to interstate commerce, and an unjust preference of the products of the enacting state as against similar products of other states.'
The controversy which this record presents arises from a law of South Carolina, similar in its general scope to the one which was under review in Scott v. Donald. The statute before us, however, was enacted after the decision in Scott v. Donald, and changes in many important particulars the law which was passed on in that case. The statute, as changed, retains the general provisions conferring on the state officers or agents the exclusive right to buy all liquor which is to be sold in the state, and to sell the same, but does not contain those clauses in the previous statute which were held to operate as a discrimination. It, moreover, modifies the previous statute to the extent that it allows shipments of intoxicating liquors to be made from other states into the state of South Carolina to residents therein for their own use, but subjects the exercise of this right to designated regulations and restrictions. Despite these differences, it is asserted that the present law is repugnant to the constitution of the United States for the following reasons: First. Because, although the features in the prior act which were held to be discriminatory have been eliminated fromt his act, nevertheless there are, it is asserted, other provisions in the present act which on their face amount to a discrimination, and therefore render the act void. Second. Because, as the act, as at present drawn, created state officers and confers upon them the power to buy all the liquor which is to be sold in the state, and forbids the sale of any other liquor by any other person, it is therefore in violation of the constitution of the United States to the extent that it seeks to control or forbid the sale in original packages of all liquor shipped into South Carolina from other states. And this controversy presents for consideration the question which was reserved in Scott v. Donald. Third. Because, although the amended statute recognizes the right of residents
Page 444
of other states to ship intoxicating liquors to the residents of South Carolina and their right to receive the same, for their own use,...
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