Vanda v. Lane

Decision Date28 May 1992
Docket NumberNo. 91-1689,91-1689
PartiesThomas VANDA, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Michael P. LANE and Michael O'Leary, Respondents-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Stephen J. Connolly (argued), Connolly, Ekl & Williams, Clarendon Hills, Ill., for Thomas Vanda.

Marcia L. Friedl, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, Ill., (argued), for Michael P. Lane.

Terence M. Madsen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Crim. Appeals Div., Chicago, Ill., for Michael O'Leary.

Before CUMMINGS, POSNER and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges.

CUMMINGS, Circuit Judge.

Petitioner Thomas Vanda is an inmate of the Stateville Correctional Center in Illinois. He was convicted of the April 1977 murder of Marguerita Bowers after a jury of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, rejected his insanity defense. In June 1979 he was sentenced to a term of 300-500 years' imprisonment. It is undisputed that petitioner killed Bowers. His sole defense was that he was not guilty by reason of insanity. His conviction was affirmed in People v. Vanda, 111 Ill.App.3d 551, 67 Ill.Dec. 373, 444 N.E.2d 609 (1st Dist.1982). In April 1983 the Illinois Supreme Court denied a petition for leave to appeal, and the Supreme Court of the United States subsequently denied certiorari, 464 U.S. 841, 104 S.Ct. 136, 78 L.Ed.2d 130 (1983).

Thereafter petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus in the district court, which filed a memorandum opinion and order denying the request. 1 758 F.Supp. 1252. Petitioner's argument before us is that his constitutional rights were violated by the state's use during trial of his silence and request for counsel when he was apprehended. While mentioning a defendant's right to silence under Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), 2 the Appellate Court of Illinois held only that it was unconstitutional for Illinois to introduce and comment upon evidence relating to petitioner's exercise of his right to counsel. 111 Ill.App.3d at 570-571, 67 Ill.Dec. 373, 444 N.E.2d 609. Nevertheless the court concluded that while admission of evidence concerning the petitioner's post-arrest requests for an attorney was an error of constitutional magnitude, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As the court stated:

We note first that this was a lengthy trial where voluminous evidence was presented by both the defense and the State. The trial spanned a two-week period and generated nearly 2,000 pages of trial and pretrial transcripts. The parties presented and examined 30 witnesses, including seven expert medical experts. Also, additional potential witnesses were not called because the parties stipulated as to the nature of their respective testimony. The defense had the opportunity to present an exhaustive amount of testimony through both lay and expert witnesses regarding the defendant's mental condition and to extensively cross-examine the State's witnesses. Ultimately, a vast amount of evidence was presented by both the defense and the prosecution concerning the issue of the defendant's mental state. 111 Ill.App.3d at 570-571, 67 Ill.Dec. 373, 444 N.E.2d 609.

Subsequently the court concluded that this was harmless error because "where this evidence was isolated in a lengthy trial and there was an exhaustive amount of evidence on both sides of the insanity issue, we do not believe this evidence [request for an attorney] had a significant impact on the minds of the jury." 111 Ill.App.3d at 572, 67 Ill.Dec. 373, 444 N.E.2d 609.

In Sulie v. Duckworth, 689 F.2d 128 (7th Cir.1982) (Sulie I ), certiorari denied, 460 U.S. 1043, 103 S.Ct. 1439, 75 L.Ed.2d 796 we held it was permissible for the state to adduce a defendant's request for counsel to show sanity, as was done here. Then in 1986, in Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 106 S.Ct. 634, 88 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986), for the first time the Supreme Court applied Doyle to requests for an attorney. Id. at 295 and n. 13, 106 S.Ct. at 640 and n. 13. 3 Greenfield cited Vanda with approval and held that under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a defendant's request for an attorney could not be used to prove a defendant's sanity. Id. at 295 and n. 14, 106 S.Ct. at 640-41 and n. 14. Along came Sulie II, 864 F.2d 1348 (1988), where we held that Greenfield applies retroactively. Sulie v. Duckworth, 864 F.2d 1348, 1356 (7th Cir.1988) (Sulie II ). Subsequently, the Supreme Court squarely held that a new rule of constitutional law is not to be applied in a habeas corpus case. E.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 110 S.Ct. 1212, 108 L.Ed.2d 347 (1990), so that Sulie II has been overruled by implication, a question we reserved in Thomas v. Indiana, 910 F.2d 1413, 1415 (7th Cir.1990). Therefore, as in Sulie I, the references to Vanda's requests for counsel did not constitute reversible error.

Like the Appellate Court of Illinois, the district judge concluded that the Doyle violation caused by one reference to petitioner's silence (R. 1401) constituted harmless error, stating:

Finally, the evidence introduced as to Vanda's sanity was extensive. Vanda and the State presented the testimony of eight expert witnesses as to Vanda's mental condition. The other evidence as to Vanda's sanity was also extensive, including testimony relating to his early childhood and the letter he authored on [how to fabricate a good] * * * insanity defense while incarcerated at Cook County Jail. Accordingly, the court finds that the prosecution's [single] reference to Vanda's post-Miranda silence was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. (758 F.Supp. at 1257-58.)

However, Judge Alesia concluded that Wainwright v. Greenfield established a new rule in 1986 as to requests for counsel and was therefore not retroactive and not applicable to this 1977 trial....

To continue reading

Request your trial
8 cases
  • Pursell v. Horn
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania
    • February 1, 2002
    ...was required by the Constitution." O'Dell, 521 U.S. at 156, 117 S.Ct. 1969. Thus, the Wainwright rule is a new one. See Vanda v. Lane, 962 F.2d 583, 585 (7th Cir. 1992). Because the two Teague exceptions obviously do not apply, relief under this new rule is 31. The statement was also inadmi......
  • People v. Stack
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • March 15, 1993
    ...defense was fabricated. (See United States ex rel. Vanda v. Lane (N.D.Ill.1991), 758 F.Supp. 1252, 1257-58, aff'd Vanda v. Lane (7th Cir.1992), 962 F.2d 583, 585.) The record here is similar in all of these respects. It is therefore possible that the argument, when considered in isolation, ......
  • Burleson v. United States
    • United States
    • United States Court of Criminal Appeals, Navy-Marine Corps
    • February 26, 2018
    ... ... with both positions ... We are ... guided in our retroactivity analysis by Teague v ... Lane , 489 U.S. 288 (1989)-the seminal case on the ... retroactive application of court-created rules of criminal ... law-and its progeny. New ... ...
  • Jones v. Stotts, 94-3269
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit
    • July 6, 1995
    ...of insanity), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 828, 110 S.Ct. 93, 107 L.Ed.2d 58 (1989), overruled by implication on other grounds, Vanda v. Lane, 962 F.2d 583, 585 (7th Cir.) (Sulie's reliance on Wainwright impermissible because Wainwright introduced a new rule of law and could not be applied retroa......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT