Vandal v. Vandal
Decision Date | 08 June 1993 |
Docket Number | No. 11474,11474 |
Citation | 626 A.2d 784,31 Conn.App. 561 |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | Sophia VANDAL v. Paul J. VANDAL. |
Judith C. Benedict, West Hartford, for appellant-appellee (plaintiff).
Timothy Sheehan, Farmington, for appellee-appellant (defendant).
Before FOTI, SCHALLER and CRETELLA, JJ.
The defendant appeals challenging the financial awards made by the trial court in a marital dissolution action. 1 The defendant claims that the trial court improperly (1) awarded periodic alimony that could not be modified even upon the plaintiff's cohabitation or remarriage, (2) found the defendant's earning capacity, and (3) awarded attorney's fees. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts are pertinent to this appeal. The parties were married on August 15, 1971, in Norwich. There are two minor children issue of the marriage, Kathryn, born December 30, 1976, and Paul, Jr., born April 10, 1980. The parties separated in 1989, and the plaintiff commenced an action for dissolution in September[31 Conn.App. 563] , 1990. The plaintiff had not been employed outside of the house for fifteen years before returning to full-time employment as a substitute teacher. The trial court found that she has an annual earning capacity of $40,000 to $45,000. At the time of judgment, the defendant, a certified public accountant, had realized aggregate gross earnings of $277,000 during the four preceding years and had an annual earning capacity of $85,000. The defendant was ordered to pay alimony and child support.
The defendant first claims that the court improperly awarded nonmodifiable alimony by incorrectly applying the law and abused its discretion by making the alimony nonmodifiable even upon the plaintiff's cohabitation or remarriage. The defendant argues that (1) remarriage should, as a matter of law, terminate alimony, (2) the court made no findings to support the award, (3) the award precludes modification based on cohabitation, which is in conflict with General Statutes § 46b-86(b), (4) the order is inconsistent with General Statutes §§ 46b-82 and 46b-86, and (5) the order is vague and ambiguous and therefore modifiable.
Lawler v. Lawler, 16 Conn.App. 193, 203, 547 A.2d 89 (1988), appeal dismissed, 212 Conn. 117, 561 A.2d 128 (1989).
The judgment file discloses the following regarding alimony: "The court finds the defendant should pay alimony of approximately $300 to $325 per week for about ten to twelve years." The court finds, however, that the defendant is unable to do that while he pays off some of the debt he has incurred throughout the marriage.
In making this order, the court specifically addressed the nonmodification of the alimony, stating that "[i]n all other respects, the alimony shall be nonmodifiable as to duration and amount, and it shall not terminate upon plaintiff's remarriage or cohabitation, but it shall terminate upon the death of either party."
The court explained the provision as to nonmodifiability as follows:
" Lawler v. Lawler, supra, 16 Conn.App. at 204, 547 A.2d 89. Since the court has the statutory right to award nonmodifiable alimony and the equitable power to meet the ends of justice--in this case, by ordering that alimony not be modifiable even if the plaintiff remarries or cohabits--we cannot hold this order to be improper as a matter of law. We are likewise unpersuaded by the public policy argument made by the defendant, even disregarding the trial court's finding that the defendant, himself, was cohabiting. The court's findings as to the defendant's financial inability at this time, because of his significant personal debt, to pay alimony in the amount to which the plaintiff is rightfully entitled are clear and sufficient to support the award, which is neither vague nor ambiguous. We are unpersuaded that the order in any way conflicts with or is inconsistent with our statutes.
The defendant next claims that the court improperly found his annual earning capacity to be $80,000 to $85,000 and based its financial awards on this finding.
Venuti v. Venuti, 185 Conn. 156, 161, 440 A.2d 878 (1981). "In marital dissolution proceedings, under appropriate circumstances the trial court may base financial awards on the earning capacity rather than the actual earned income of the parties...." Id.
The trial court in its oral decision gave particular attention to the financial circumstances of the parties. The court also noted: "After hearing all the evidence and witnesses, expert witnesses included, in this case, it is my opinion that the defendant has not been forthright with his financial disclosures." He is a certified public accountant. He is a sole proprietor of his own business; he completely controls his personal and business finances. He has created a series of companies for business and personal use,...
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