Vandalia Coal Co. v. Lawson

• Decision Date: 29 January 1909
• Docket Number: No. 6,887.,6,887.
• Parties: VANDALIA COAL CO. v. LAWSON et al.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

43 Ind.App. 226

87 N.E. 47

VANDALIA COAL CO.

v.LAWSON et al.

No. 6,887.

Appellate Court of Indiana, Division No. 2.

Jan. 29, 1909.

Syllabus by the Court.

Equity will not grant relief because of a multiplicity of actions, where such actions may be consolidated at law.

The courts, though there be no statutory sanction, may, in proper cases, consolidate actions at law.

Persons having separate causes of action against the same person cannot join as plaintiffs.

Where plaintiffs join in one action, and the complaint fails to show a joint cause of action in favor of all, it will be bad on demurrer.

Under section 921, Rev. St. U. S. (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 685), the consolidation of similar actions rests in the discretion of the courts.

A paragraph of complaint in a suit to restrain several defendants from prosecuting against plaintiff separate actions at law for damages, praying that if the court should be of the opinion that the deprivation of a jury trial would be unfair to defendants the court should refer the questions of fact to a jury, is superfluous, the court possessing such right in every suit in equity.

Equity has jurisdiction to determine controversies arising out of a right claimed by one as against many, or by many as against the one.

Bills of peace were used for two purposes: (1) To prevent a vexatious recurrence of litigation by several persons asserting the same right, and (2) to prevent the reiteration of an unsuccessful claim.

Equity takes jurisdiction on the ground of the prevention of a multiplicity of actions, (1) where the controversy is between but two persons and the plaintiff has established his right at law, and (2) where persons controverting plaintiff's right are so numerous as to require injunction.

Jurisdiction of a suit is assumed on the ground of the prevention of a multiplicity of actions only where the prevented successive actions at law involve the same questions of law and a similar state of facts, and where decree would necessarily determine the controverted question as to all of the defendants.

Community of interest in the joint parties is requisite in order to give a court of equity jurisdiction on the ground of a prevention of a multiplicity of actions, and such community of interest exists only where some right common to all joint parties is in controversy.

Equity has jurisdiction of a case wherein plaintiff desires to restrain continuing injuries which would result in the bringing of several actions at law therefor.

Where the same person is sued, or is liable to be sued, by several persons upon separate causes of action, equity cannot interfere.

Courts of equity will not entertain jurisdiction of a suit brought on the ground of a prevention of a multiplicity of actions, unless such action will promote justice, the court being required to exercise a sound legal discretion in respect to the facts of each particular case.

The purpose of litigation is to establish justice, and the courts are more and more disregarding formalism in determining the justice of the litigation.

Where a plaintiff has a clear right to a jury trial, the courts are not disposed to deny such right.

Equity will not restrain the bringing of several suits at law merely on the ground of the prevention of costs.

The constitutional provision for a jury trial (section 20, art. 1) applies only to common-law cases, the verdict of a jury in equity cases being merely advisory.

The liberty of the citizen is largely safeguarded by his right to a jury trial.

Where several persons are injured because of an alleged negligent act, they cannot be deprived of the right of a jury trial by the bringing of a suit by the alleged negligent person to restrain the bringing of separate actions on the ground that the alleged negligence did not exist, that the multiplicity of actions would be ruinous, and that such injured persons were insolvent.

A complaint by a company to prevent its several servants who were injured by its alleged negligence from bringing separate actions for damages is not sufficient, if it were maintainable in any event, unless it completely negatives every possible liability to any one of the injured persons.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Clay County; J. M. Rawley, Judge.

Action by the Vandalia Coal Company against Alexander Lawson and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Barrett & Barrett, Smith, Duncan, Hornbrook & Smith, S. M. McGregor, and Lamb, Beasley & Lawyer, for appellant. Geo. A. Knight, A. W. Knight, M. C. Hamill, and John Hickey, for appellees.

ROBY, J.

This is an appeal from the action of the lower court in sustaining appellees' joint demurrer to plaintiff's complaint. The complaint was a bill in equity against 18 appellees, each of whom had brought an action at law against appellant to recover damages alleged to have been sustained by them respectively by reason of an explosion in appellant's coal mine. The bill prayed that all the cases be tried as one, for the reason that such action would avoid a multiplicity of suits at law; and that an injunction issue against further proceedings in the actions at law.

The first paragraph of complaint alleges that the plaintiff is a corporation engaged in the business of mining coal in Clay and Vigo counties, Ind.; that on and prior to December 5, 1906, it owned and operated the Rosebud mine in Vigo county, in which is employed more than 100 men. The method of reaching and working the coal, the driving of entries, and the ventilation of the mine is explained, and details are given tending to show the manner in which an explosion which occurred on December 5, 1906, was brought about and caused. It is alleged that the mine was a pick mine, worked by “blasting off the solid”; that the miners placed five shots in holes drilled more than five feet into the solid coal, which were put off on December 5, 1906, at the time when the miners were quitting their work and leaving for the day; that said shots so placed in the solid coal did not, by reason of that fact, expend their force in the coal, but the powder contained in said shots was blown out into the entries and rooms, burned and generated a gas, which when mingled with the air became highly explosive and dangerous; that said gas was ignited and exploded by other shots put off in said mine by the miners working therein immediately after putting off said “blown out” shots; that the explosion injured a number of miners then in the employ of this plaintiff working in said mine; that each of the several defendants claim and assert that they were injured and burned by reason of said explosion; that each has brought an action at law against this plaintiff, seeking and asking to recover damages for the injuries claimed to have been sustained by reason of said explosion, and that each of said defendants claims and asserts in the several complaints that said explosion and injuries were the result of negligence upon the part of this plaintiff, in that this plaintiff had not and did not regularly and thoroughly sprinkle the roadways or entryways in said mine for a period of many weeks prior to said explosion, by reason of which failure and neglect of duty upon the part of this plaintiff the roadways had become so dry that the air therein was charged with dust, rendering it dangerous and liable at any time to create what is known as a “dust explosion,” and that a dust explosion took place in said mine and occasioned the injuries of the several defendants in this action in their several complaints against this plaintiff complained of. It is averred that the explosion was not a dust explosion, but was brought about in the manner herein set out; that the plaintiff in no way neglected its duty; that the entries did not contain an accumulation of dust; and that the injuries alleged to have been sustained were wholly the result of the wrongful and negligent act of said several miners preparing and putting off said blown out shots. It is averred that the plaintiff is in no wise liable to the defendants on account of their alleged injuries; that the claim of each is based upon the same explosion; and that plaintiff will, upon the trial of this cause, fully maintain and establish all the facts herein alleged.

Following these allegations, it is averred that separate actions against plaintiff have been brought and are now pending in the Putnam circuit court by Alexander Lawson, Tom Meeley, Elza Danhour, Lewis Smith, Samuel James, David Morgan, Thomas Travis, Lewis James, Riley Rinehart, Edward Haverkamp, Josef Kowandy, Karl Haverkamp, William Yemm, Samuel Darby, and William Travis, and in the Clay circuit court by George Ambrazatis, Emery Le May, Frank Giezk, and Joseph Grizikowski. Plaintiff says that it believes the expense of litigating the several actions separately will aggregate more than $30,000, and be ruinous to it; that each of said several defendants is insolvent, and plaintiff will be wholly unable to recover any costs or expenses laid out and expended by it in the defense of said causes; that the trial of all the causes would consume a great amount of the courts' time, and subject the counties wherein the same are pending to an enormous amount of costs; and that time and costs can be saved by requiring all the matters, claims, and grievances set up by all of said defendants in their respective complaints against this plaintiff to be set up, heard, and determined in this action; “Wherefore plaintiff prays the court *** that all said several defendants herein shall be required to *** appear in this *** court, and in this cause set forth their several and separate claims of right of action against this plaintiff, for and on account of the matters stated and alleged in their several and separate complaints in their several actions against this plaintiff, and asks that this court, sitting as a court of equity, hear and determine all said several matters in this cause.” A...