Vandalia R. Co. v. Holland

Decision Date20 April 1915
Docket NumberNo. 22333.,22333.
Citation108 N.E. 580,183 Ind. 438
PartiesVANDALIA R. CO. v. HOLLAND.
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from Circuit Court, Marion County; Charles Remster, Judge.

Action by John A. Holland against the Vandalia Railroad Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Defendant's requested instructions Nos. 10 and 16 were as follows:

(10) If you find from the preponderance of the evidence that the couplers between the two cars which separated, as alleged in the complaint, were in proper condition and repair to allow said cars to be properly and securely coupled when they came together, and that it was the plaintiff's duty to see that they were properly and securely coupled before he gave the signal to indicate that they were so coupled, and that he undertook to perform that duty and gave such signal, and you further find from the preponderance of the evidence and such reasonable inferences as you may draw from the evidence, that said cars separated, as alleged in the complaint, because they were not properly and securely coupled, then the plaintiff cannot recover, and you should return a verdict for the defendant.

(16) If you find from the evidence that the coupler on the car which separated from the car on which plaintiff was riding at the time of the accident was in condition to properly and securely couple to the coupler on the other car if the plaintiff had properly and carefully attended to his duties to see that it was coupled, and you believe from the evidence and all reasonable inferences which you may draw from the facts and circumstances proven that the cars would not have separated if the coupling had been properly made, then the plaintiff cannot recover, and you should return a verdict for the defendant.

Pickens & Pickens, and John G. Williams, all of Indianapolis, for appellant. Wymond J. Beckett, of Indianapolis, for appellee.

SPENCER, J.

This is an action by appellee against appellant under the federal Employers'Liability Act to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by appellee while in the employ of appellant as a switchman. Verdict and judgment in favor of appellee. The sole error assigned and relied on for reversal in this appeal challenges the action of the lower court in overruling appellant's motion for a new trial.

[1] At the time of the injury the switching crew of which appellee was a member was engaged in switching cars on appellant's tracks, a short distance west of the union station in the city of Indianapolis. Appellee was on top of the fifth car from the engine of a cut of six cars which was being pushed westwardly by said engine. He was walking over said fifth car toward the west end of the cut when the sixth car separated from the one he was on and he fell between the cars to the ground, receiving the injuries of which he complains. Three acts of negligence are charged in the complaint: (1) That the automatic couplers between the cars which separated were defective, in this, that the locks and pins of said couplers were out of condition and worn and bent so that said couplers would not hold; that said couplers would come together and lock and couple; but that, when the weight of said car came upon said coupling, the jaws would open out and permit said couplers to come uncoupled. (2) That the engineer and conductor in charge of said cut of cars negligently backed the same at a high and dangerous rate of speed, to wit, from 10 to 12 miles an hour. And (3) that while so backing said cars at said high and dangerous rate of speed said engineer and conductor, without warning or notice to appellee that they were going to stop said cut of cars, did stop the same negligently and with great suddenness, thereby causing the last car, by reason of its great momentum, suddenly to leave and run away from the car on which appellee was riding and from which he was in the act of stepping to said last car.

Instruction No. 11, given by the court of its own motion, told the jury that it was the duty of a master to furnish his servant with a reasonably safe place in which to do his work. No contention is made that the instruction is erroneous as an abstract statement of law, but it is insisted that the pleadings presented no issue as to “safe place,” and that the instruction was therefore inapplicable and misleading. Appellee's working place was on top of the cut of cars, and it was appellant's duty to exercise reasonable...

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