Vandenades v. U.S., 75-1511

• Decision Date: 21 November 1975
• Docket Number: No. 75-1511,75-1511
• Citation: 523 F.2d 1220
• Parties: Rene VANDENADES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 1220

523 F.2d 1220

Rene VANDENADES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 75-1511.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

Nov. 21, 1975.

Michael J. Rosen, Asst. Federal Public Defender, Miami, Fla., for petitioner-appellant.

Robert W. Rust, U. S. Atty., Rebekah J. Poston, Asst. U. S. Atty., Miami, Fla., for respondent-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Before GEWIN, GOLDBERG and DYER, Circuit Judges.

GEWIN, Circuit Judge:

In January of 1972 appellant Rene Vandenades was indicted by a federal grand jury for violations of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801 Et seq. The alleged transgressions entailed his possession of some eleven pounds of pure heroin and six and one-half pounds of cocaine. Vandenades decided to plead guilty to counts one and four of the indictment, which charged him with possession with intent to distribute (§ 841(a)(1)) and conspiracy (§ 846). He was given a ten year sentence and a three year special parole term on each count, apparently to run consecutively. This appeal involves a challenge to the guilty plea and the sentences.

Vandenades is unschooled in English, but his counsel was present when he plead guilty and was sentenced. Before accepting his plea, the trial judge made the routine Rule 11 inquiry, asking Vandenades, among other things, whether anyone had promised him anything other than dismissal of the remaining counts in return for his guilty plea. Vandenades responded in the negative and his attorney responded affirmatively to the question whether the plea was voluntary. The court accepted the plea and ordered a presentence investigation.

When sentence was imposed in March, 1972, appellant's counsel addressed the court but made no mention of any promise regarding a single ten year sentence; Vandenades likewise made a statement, but he did not refer to any promise or agreement. The trial judge then imposed a ten year sentence and a three year parole term on each count with the provision that, "the sentence imposed in Count IV to run consecutive With the sentence imposed in Count I." Neither appellant nor his counsel objected to the sentence or mentioned any agreement.

Later in 1972 two different motions for mitigation of sentence, filed by two different attorneys, listing fifteen grounds for relief, were submitted on behalf of Vandenades and denied by the trial court. Neither of these motions referred to any promise concerning the sentences.

In 1974 while visiting the federal penitentiary in Atlanta, Georgia, the district judge who had sentenced Vandenades spoke to him during an encounter which was apparently entirely fortuitous. As a result of this meeting, the appellant wrote a letter to the judge in which he stated: "During our talk, your Honor indicated that he was under the impression that I had been sentenced concurrently, and advised me to write you immediately to have this matter corrected, and that your Honor would correct the sentence to reflect the Court's intention of a concurrent sentence." In response to this letter, the district judge wrote an ambiguous letter to Vandenades on November 12, 1972, indicating an inclination to reduce his sentence by half, but also reflecting a feeling of lack of jurisdiction to do so. ¹

On November 27, 1974, Vandenades filed a motion to vacate the conviction and sentences, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970). ² This motion was denied without an evidentiary hearing. The district judge held that, "the records and files conclusively show that there was no evidence of any unfulfilled plea bargain agreement and that the petitioner testified without conflict or equivocation and that no plea bargain had been made." With respect to a second contention by Vandenades that his sentences had been enhanced by a prior invalid conviction, the court found that "the sentence imposed of two consecutive ten year terms was still appropriate." Finally, with regard to still another conviction, appellant's assertion that he was entitled to have it vacated because of the unconstitutionality of the presumption contained in 26 U.S.C. § 4704(a) (1970), was rejected by the court since Vandenades had plead guilty to one count of violating § 4704(a), rendering the unconstitutional presumption immaterial to his conviction.

After denial of his § 2255 motion without an evidentiary hearing, appellant filed notice of appeal and requested that he be allowed to proceed In forma pauperis and that counsel be appointed to assist him. These requests were granted on February 21, 1975.

It is our opinion, and we so hold, that the district court erred in finding that the motion, files and records in this case conclusively show that appellant is entitled to no relief. Accordingly, we vacate the lower court's order denying the § 2255 motion and remand for an evidentiary hearing.

On this appeal Vandenades focuses his argument primarily on the two-pronged thesis that the trial court erred in denying his § 2255 motion ³ without appointing counsel and without granting a hearing. We deal first with the failure to hold a hearing.

While a mere self-serving affidavit alleging circumstances with which the trial judge should be familiar does not require an evidentiary hearing, United States v. Curry, 497 F.2d 99, 101 (5th Cir.), Cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1035, 95 S.Ct. 519, 42 L.Ed.2d 311 (1974), when the record discloses other credible documentary evidence which indicates a right to relief, an evidentiary hearing may be necessary, Dugan v. United States, 521 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1975).

In our recent Dugan case, for example, the district court denied a § 2255 motion and refused to vacate its order despite the prisoner's submission of newly discovered evidence, consisting of affidavits of a sheriff and deputy, which supported his assertion of a broken plea bargain by the government. We concluded succinctly that:

When petitioner goes beyond mere allegations by presenting credible affidavits that raise a substantial inference that an unkept bargain was in fact made, § 2255 requires an evidentiary hearing.

521 F.2d at 233.

Although the situation presented in the instant case is somewhat different from the circumstances involved in Dugan, the legal principle applicable to both cases is remarkably similar. In Dugan the affidavits of law enforcement officers were used to support the motion; here we must consider a letter written by the judge who imposed the sentence.

Admittedly, the judge's letter is ambiguous, but such ambiguity is the very fact which renders an evidentiary hearing crucial. Even though the letter mentions the large amount of narcotics involved, it also evidences a firm inclination to reduce the sentence to one ten year term if the court had the power to do so. ⁴ The order denying the motion makes no reference to the correspondence between the appellant and the judge. Appropriate consideration of this correspondence and a clarifying explanation of it is clearly necessary. The assertion by Vandenades that he is the victim of an unkept plea bargain is not totally inconsistent with the sentencing judge's letter and possibly other factors which may be disclosed at a hearing. We intimate no opinion as to the proper disposition of the motion after such a hearing. ⁵

In reaching our conclusion we have carefully considered the teachings of this court's en banc decision in Bryan v. United States, 492 F.2d 775 (5th Cir.), Cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079, 95 S.Ct. 668, 42 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974). The district court relied heavily on Bryan in denying the motion, and of course we are bound by that en banc decision. The facts of the instant case, however, are vastly different from those presented in Bryan and we are unable to perceive how our decision here violates the teachings or the spirit of that decision. We do not view the foreclosure principle set forth in Bryan to constitute an absolute and ironclad rule that the "magic words" of the Bryan-Rule 11 examination completely eliminate the necessity for a hearing on a § 2255 motion in all circumstances. ⁶

The prospective and expanded Rule 11 inquiry enunciated in Bryan ⁷ is not applicable to the instant case. Here the plea was entered prior to the Bryan decision, ⁸ and the critical requisite of placing the defendant under oath was not complied with, nor did the court state that plea agreements were permissible and that the defendant and his counsel were under a duty to reveal the existence and details of any plea agreement. More importantly, the critical distinction between this case and Bryan is the fact that in this case the court was not faced with only the bare allegations of the appellant that there had been a breach of the plea bargain agreement. If so, the district court could have properly concluded that the records and files reflecting the guilty plea proceedings conclusively showed that the appellant was entitled to no relief. It should be remembered that in Bryan the petitioner presented only his allegation that his plea bargain had not been kept. Vandenades presented an additional critical fact, a letter from the trial judge which cast serious doubts upon the validity of the consecutive sentences imposed upon him. When the record reveals the existence of evidence beyond the mere allegations of the petitioner from which the reasonable inference can be drawn that his guilty plea has been induced by an unkept plea bargain, or that a substantial mistake has been made in the imposition of the sentence, the guilty plea cannot stand. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971); Dugan v. United States, supra. Moreover, the appellant was proceeding Pro se and the court should be liberal in its consideration of the motion presented. Cf. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972).

Two additional factors which...