Vandendries v. General Motors Corp.
| Decision Date | 20 January 1984 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 66845 |
| Citation | 343 N.W.2d 4,130 Mich.App. 195 |
| Parties | Joseph C. VANDENDRIES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee. 130 Mich.App. 195, 343 N.W.2d 4 |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
[130 MICHAPP 196] Hoy & Lostracco by Gordon W. Hoy, Durand, for plaintiff-appellant.
Milliken, Magee & Yuille by Herbert A. Milliken, Jr., Flint, for defendant-appellee.
Before BEASLEY, P.J., and ALLEN and DENEWETH, * JJ.
Plaintiff, Joseph C. Vandendries, a long-time hourly rated employee of the Grand Blanc Fisher Body Plant of defendant, General Motors Corporation (GMC), was promoted in 1968 [130 MICHAPP 197] to a supervisory position, for which he was paid a salary on a monthly basis.
After 1968, the facts are in dispute. Plaintiff claims that in 1968 he started performing the duties of a general shift foreman, although he only was paid the salary of a maintenance supervisor because he was promised that he would be appointed to fill what he felt was a vacancy in the position of a general shift foreman. Plaintiff says that in 1976 he was passed over and another person appointed. When plaintiff retired in 1980, he brought suit for breach of employment contract, seeking money damages, the better fringe benefits of a foreman, etc. Defendant denies plaintiff's version of the facts.
The case was tried before a jury. After plaintiff put in his proofs, defendant moved for a directed verdict, claiming that (1) the plant engineer with whom plaintiff claimed to have agreed lacked authority to make the contract claimed by plaintiff, (2) plaintiff's claims were barred by the statute of limitations, (3) the proofs were insufficient and lacked the necessary specificity to establish a valid, enforceable contract, and (4) plaintiff was barred and estopped from receiving further compensation because he had given regular written acknowledgements (releases) that he had received all the compensation to which he was entitled. The trial court granted defendant's motion and dismissed plaintiff's case.
In a ruling from the bench, the trial judge emphasized the annual compensation agreements (releases) given by plaintiff in 1978, 1979, and 1980. As additional reasons, the trial judge said (1) there was insufficient proof as to the authority of the plant engineer, upon whose testimony plaintiff relied so heavily, to increase plaintiff's compensation[130 MICHAPP 198] and benefits, (2) that part of the money damages sought on an unjust enrichment theory was barred by the statute of limitations, and (3) that, in any event, the proofs, if any, of loss of wages and retirement benefits were far too speculative to support plaintiff's claim.
Plaintiff appeals as of right. After review on appeal, we affirm.
In deciding whether to grant a defendant's motion for a directed verdict, the trial court must view the evidence and all legitimate inferences that may be drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to plaintiff; if the evidence, when examined in this manner, establishes a prima facie case, the motion for directed verdict should be denied. 1
In this contract case, plaintiff claimed that defendant breached express and implied contracts made with plaintiff. While his claims are somewhat less than specific, plaintiff seems to claim that defendant promised to compensate plaintiff during the period from 1968 to 1976 for the difference in pay between the rate for a maintenance foreman, which he in fact received, and the rate for a general foreman, which position he claimed to have actually held, by promoting him to general foreman. The proofs regarding the alleged breach of contract, even when viewed in the most favorable light to plaintiff, are weak. The proofs regarding damages are highly speculative. 2
[130 MICHAPP 199] Thus, even if the only issue on appeal were whether these proofs were sufficient to take plaintiff to the jury, we would be inclined to affirm the trial judge's grant of directed verdict in favor of defendant. But, in addition to this basis, defendant claims plaintiff is barred and estopped from additional compensation by the annual compensation greements that he signed during the years in question.
The record indicates that in 1968, when plaintiff left the hourly rated ranks and went on a monthly salary basis, he signed a written employment agreement with defendant which referred to and included a separate, signed compensation statement. Among other things, the employment agreement included the following:
"The Employer and the employee acknowledge that there are no other arrangements, agreements, or understandings, verbal or in writing, regarding same and that any modification or amendment hereof, other than a cancellation and replacement hereof by another written form of agreement must be endorsed hereon in writing and initiated by both the employee and the Employer."
Thereafter, and particularly in 1978, 1979, and 1980, plaintiff signed annual compensation statements which included, among other things, the following:
"In consideration of my continued employment as evidenced by the 'Employment Agreement' herein referred[130 MICHAPP 200] to, I acknowledge that I have received all compensation due me as an employee of yours for all services rendered during all periods ending prior to and on the last day of the month immediately preceding the date of signing of this statement."
In attempting to avoid the effect of this language, plaintiff claimed that (1) he did not read the agreement before signing, (2) he thought it was a formality necessary to qualify him for his annual raise and paycheck, and (3) the release was not "fairly and knowingly made".
As a general rule, the mere failure to read an agreement, unaccompanied by other facts indicating fraud, artifice, or deception, is not enough to avoid a contract. 3 We do not find Romero v. King, 4 a case cited by plaintiff, apropos or controlling here. We conclude that on this record plaintiff has not avoided the legal effect of the releases that he signed. 5
[130 MICHAPP 201] While unnecessary to the disposition of this appeal, we note that defendant also relied on the statute of limitations defense in his oral motion for directed verdict:
Under M.C.L. Sec. 600.5807(8); M.S.A. Sec. 27A.5807(8), the period of limitations is six years for an action to recover damages or sums due for a breach of contract. A cause of action accrues when a breach of contract occurs, namely, when the promisor fails to perform under the contract. 6 As the following excerpt from plaintiff's testimony on cross-examination evidences, plaintiff learned in 1972 that another GMC employee, Ray Newell, was promoted by defendant to general shift foreman, the position which plaintiff claimed that he was expressly and impliedly promised upon a vacancy therefor:
[130 MICHAPP 202] "Q. Wasn't it in about 1970 or '71 that Mr. Zajdlik first said to you that you would be the next person appointed general foreman in maintenance?
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