Vandenhouten v. Olde Towne Tours, LLC
Decision Date | 08 July 2009 |
Docket Number | Civil No. 2008–41. |
Citation | 52 V.I. 551 |
Court | U.S. District Court — Virgin Islands |
Parties | Rosemary VANDENHOUTEN and Donat Vandenhouten, Plaintiffs, v. OLDE TOWNE TOURS, LLC, Defendant and Third–Party Plaintiff. v. Eldondane Francis, Ronald Olivacce and Ron's Taxi & Tour Service, Third–Party Defendants. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Julie German Evert, Esq., St. Thomas, U.S.V.I., for the plaintiffs.
Patrick D. Blake, Esq., Norfolk, VA, for defendant and third-party plaintiff Olde Towne Tours, LLC.
Mark D. Hodge, Esq., St. Thomas, U.S.V.I., for third-party defendant Eldondane Francis.
Robert L. King, Esq., St. Thomas, U.S.V.I., for third-party defendants Ronald Olivacce and Ron's Taxi & Tour Service.
Before the Court is the motion of third-party defendant Eldondane Francis (“Francis”) for summary judgment against defendant and third-party plaintiff Olde Towne Tours, LLC (“Olde Towne”).
Rosemary Vandenhouten and Donat Vandenhouten (the “Vandenhoutens”) are a married couple from Wisconsin. On or about February 1, 2007, while visiting St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands, the Vandenhoutens rode in a taxi allegedly owned and operated by Francis. As she left the taxi, Mrs. Vandenhouten stepped into a culvert. The Vandenhoutens contend that Francis was negligent in choosing where to park the taxi. They allege that Francis is an agent of, or employed by, Olde Towne. In March 2008, the Vandenhoutens commenced this action against both Francis and Olde Towne to recover for Mrs. Vandenhouten's alleged injuries. 1
In December 2008, the Vandenhoutens and Francis jointly filed a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice of the Vandenhoutens' claims against Francis, indicating that they had “amicably resolved [their] dispute[.]” (Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice as to Eldondane Francis at 1.) Thereafter, the Court approved the parties' stipulation, dismissed the Vandenhoutens' claims against Francis and dismissed Francis from this matter.
In January 2009, Olde Towne asserted a third-party complaint against Francis, Ronald Olivacce (“Olivacce”) and Ron's Taxi & Tour Service (“Ron's Taxi”). Olde Towne alleges that Olivacce owns Ron's Taxi, a Virgin Islands taxi service. Olde Towne and Ron's Taxi allegedly had an agreement pursuant to which Ron's Taxi provided drivers to Olde Towne. Francis is alleged to be one such driver. Olde Towne asserts a claim for contribution and indemnity against Francis and a separate claim for contribution and indemnity against Olivacce and Ron's Taxi.
In February 2009, Francis moved to dismiss Olde Towne's third-party claim as against him pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The primary basis for Francis's motion was a settlement agreement between the Vandenhoutens and him. Olde Towne opposed the motion. Because the settlement agreement constitutes a matter outside the pleadings, the Court converted the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment and gave all parties an opportunity to respond and to supplement the record. SeeFed.R.Civ.P. 12(d); Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 340 (3d Cir.1989). Francis and Olde Towne have both timely availed themselves of that opportunity.
Summary judgment is appropriate if “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Hersh v. Allen Products Co., 789 F.2d 230, 232 (3d Cir.1986).
The movant has the initial burden of showing there is no genuine issue of material fact, but once this burden is met it shifts to the non-moving party to establish specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d 338, 342 (3d Cir.1985). The non-moving party “may not rest upon mere allegations, general denials, or ... vague statements....” Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 500 (3d Cir.1991). “[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
“[A]t the summary judgment stage the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id . In making this determination, this Court draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 850 (2002); see also Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 777 (3d Cir.1994).
Francis bifurcates his arguments for dismissal of Olde Towne's contribution and indemnity claims. The Court's analysis follows that approach. See Globe Indem. Co. v. Agway, Inc., 456 F.2d 472, 475 (3d Cir.1972) ( ); Crawford v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 206 F.2d 784, 793 (3d Cir.1953) ( ).
Francis contends that it cannot be held liable to Olde Towne on a contribution theory because it has settled its claims with the Vandenhoutens. Francis relies almost exclusively on the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability, as applied by the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands in In re Kelvin Manbodh Asbestos Litigation Series, 47 V.I. 375 (V.I.Super.Ct.2006). Olde Towne does not explicitly contest the application of that provision of the Restatement. Although the parties appear to agree on the governing law, the Court has an independent obligation to ensure that the law urged by the parties does, in fact, apply here.
In Manbodh, the Superior Court found that the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability, among other things, “represents the current majority substantive law” and “promote[s] the interests of both flexibility and judicial economy by supplying security for settlors.” 47 V.I. at 394. This Court agrees with the Superior Court's conclusion in Manbodh that the Restatement (Third) governs the question of discharge of liability in contribution and indemnity actions.
With respect to contribution actions, the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 23 provides as follows:
(a) When two or more persons are or may be liable for the same harm and one of them discharges the liability of another by settlement or discharge of judgment, the person discharging the liability is entitled to recover contribution from the other, unless the other previously had a valid settlement and release from the plaintiff.
(b) A person entitled to recover contribution may recover no more than the amount paid to the plaintiff in excess of the person's comparative share of responsibility.
(c) A person who has a right of indemnity against another person under § 22 does not have a right of contribution against that person and is not subject to liability for contribution to that person.
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 23 (2000) (emphasis supplied).
The Restatement also defines “settlement” and explains the effect of a settlement on contribution actions:
(a) A settlement is a legally enforceable agreement in which a claimant agrees not to seek recovery outside the agreement for specified injuries or claims from some or all of the persons who might be liable for those injuries or claims.
(b) Persons released from liability by the terms of a settlement are relieved of further liability to the claimant for the injuries or claims covered by the agreement, but the agreement does not discharge any other person from liability.
Comment c to § 24 defines a settling tortfeasor as “a potentially liable tortfeasor who is released from liability to the plaintiff by the settlement.” Id.§ 24 cmt. c. The Restatement further provides that
[w]hen a settlement is reached between the plaintiff and a potentially liable tortfeasor that releases only the settling tortfeasor, the settling tortfeasor ordinarily should be dismissed from the lawsuit or, if no suit has been initiated, not joined in any action that is subsequently brought. Dismissal occurs even if contribution claims have been made against or by the settling tortfeasor. These contribution claims are barred by law.
Id.§ 24 cmt. e (emphasis supplied); see also id.§ 23 cmt. i (“A person who settles with the plaintiff before final judgment is not liable for contribution to others for the injury.”).
In accordance with the Restatement, this Court holds that contribution actions against tortfeasors who settle with a plaintiff are precluded as a matter of law in the Virgin Islands.
Here, Francis claims that he has reached a settlement with the Vandenhoutens. The record reflects that on December 15, 2008, the Vandenhoutens and Francis jointly filed a stipulation of dismissal of the Vandenhoutens' claims against Francis, stating that they had “amicably resolved the[ir] dispute[.]” Pursuant to that stipulation, the Court dismissed the Vandenhoutens' claims against Francis and dismissed Francis from this matter.
To determine whether the Vandenhoutens have actually released Francis from liability, the Court must consider the parties' settlement agreement, which Francis has submitted under seal. That document reflects that the Vandehoutens agreed to release Francis from liability arising out of the injuries Mrs. Vandenhouten suffered in exchange for Francis's payment of a sum certain.
The parties do not dispute that the Vandenhoutens, via the settlement agreement, fully released Francis from any liability arising out of the alleged February 1, 2007, accident. It is also undisputed that Olde Towne seeks contribution from Francis notwithstanding that settlement agreement. Based on these undisputed material facts and the Restatement, the Court finds that Francis...
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