Vander Jagt v. O'NEILL, Civ. A. No. 81-1722.

• Decision Date: 08 October 1981
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 81-1722.
• Citation: 524 F. Supp. 519
• Parties: Guy VANDER JAGT, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Thomas P. O'NEILL, Jr., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

524 F. Supp. 519

Guy VANDER JAGT, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Thomas P. O'NEILL, Jr., et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 81-1722.

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

October 8, 1981.

Stanley M. Brand, Washington, D. C., for plaintiffs.

James F. Schoener, Washington, D. C., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM

OBERDORFER, District Judge.

Thirteen Republican Members of the House of Representatives have sued the Speaker of the House of Representatives and several of the Democratic leaders essentially because the defendants have allegedly provided plaintiffs with fewer seats on certain House committees than they are legally entitled to, thereby diluting plaintiffs' constitutional rights as voters and as Members of Congress.

Defendants move to dismiss the complaint on jurisdictional and standing grounds. They contend that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is the only arguable basis for jurisdiction. They urge that exercise of such jurisdiction by the Court would violate the Speech and Debate Clause, U.S. Const., art. I, § 6, cl. 1, involve the Court in a nonjusticiable political question textually committed to Congress, require the Court to attempt to make a decision for which there are no discernable standards, and derogate the deference owed by one coordinate branch of the federal government to another branch. In addition, defendants challenge plaintiffs' standing on the theory that they have suffered no actual injury and that there is no causal connection between their claimed injury and the actions allegedly taken by defendants.

Plaintiffs oppose the motion principally on the ground that their claim against defendants relates only to their role as officers and leaders of the Democratic Steering and Policy Committee. Therefore, plaintiffs contend, defendants' actions are unofficial and unprotected by the Speech and Debate Clause. Plaintiffs further claim that the question lacks essential characteristics of a nonjusticiable political one. Finally, plaintiffs urge that their injury is of a sort which is traditionally actionable, and that the alternative remedies within Congress are ephemeral and inadequate to correct the wrong they claim to have suffered.

Taking the principal issues in reverse order, the Court is satisfied that constitutional deprivations and the loss of voting power alleged would, all things being equal, give plaintiffs standing to bring this action. Kennedy v. Sampson, 167 U.S.App. D.C. 192, 511 F.2d 430 (1974). The prospect of a significant change in the division of House committee assignments effected by the House majority is sufficiently remote that the Court cannot assume that a legislative remedy is a viable alternative to judicial relief, justifying the Court to stand aside.

The Court concludes, however, that the plaintiffs have not overcome the defendants' challenge to this Court's jurisdiction by virtue of both the Speech and Debate Clause and the corollary Separation of Powers doctrine. The Court is persuaded that actions taken by House Members belonging to one party pursuant to decisions made by them in a caucus of that party are actions performed within the "legitimate legislative sphere." See Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 95 S.Ct. 1813, 44 L.Ed.2d 324 (1975); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 312-13, 93 S.Ct. 2018, 2024-25, 36 L.Ed.2d 912 (1973); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 92 S.Ct. 2531, 33 L.Ed.2d 507 (1972); see also Dombrowski v. Eastland...