Vanderlinden v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 4:00CV0062.
| Citation | 137 F.Supp.2d 1160 |
| Decision Date | 23 April 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:00CV0062.,4:00CV0062. |
| Parties | Robert L. VANDERLINDEN, Plaintiff, v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a New York corporation, Defendant, Counter-Claim Plaintiff and Third-Party Plaintiff, v. Estate of Loretta A. Vanderlinden, Shane Vanderlinden, and Amanda Vanderlinden, Third-Party Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nebraska |
Dana C. Bradford, III, Bradford, Coenen Law Firm, Onaha, NE, David S. Houghton, Lieben, Whitted Law Firm, Omaha, NE, for plaintiff and third party defendants.
Thomas E. Johnson, Heidi A. Guttau-Fox, Baird, Holm Law Firm, Omaha, NE, for defendant, counter-claim plaintiff, and third-party plaintiff.
This matter is before the court on defendant Metropolitan Life Insurance Company's "second motion for leave to deposit proceeds with the registry of the court and to dismiss MetLife with prejudice," as filed on February 27, 2001 (filing 37), and on defendant's "unopposed renewed second motion" for the same relief, as filed on April 11, 2001 (filing 42). Because I find that defendant is not entitled to interpleader under Fed.R.Civ.P. 22, both motions will be denied.
This action originated in the District Court of Douglas County, Nebraska, on January 4, 2000. Plaintiff, Robert L. Vanderlinden, alleged in the state court petition that he is the beneficiary under a $100,000 group life insurance policy that defendant, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (MetLife), issued with respect to plaintiff's deceased wife, Loretta A. Vanderlinden, who was shot to death on August 12, 1999, and that MetLife has wrongfully refused to make payment.
On January 28, 2000, MetLife removed the action to federal court, based upon federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (), or, alternatively, based upon diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. After obtaining several extensions of time to plead, MetLife, on May 1, 2000, filed an "answer, interpleader counterclaim, and third-party complaint in interpleader" (filing11). The answer alleges, among other affirmative defenses, that plaintiff's state-law claim is preempted by ERISA,1 that plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and that plaintiff is a suspect in the death of his wife and therefore may be precluded from recovering benefits under the provisions of Neb.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 30-2354 (Michie 1995)2 or under federal common law.
In its counterclaim, MetLife seeks to obtain interpleader pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 22, and alleges that it is or may be exposed to multiple liability because of potential claims by the decedent's estate and by the couple's two (adult) children, Amanda and Shane Vanderlinden. The estate and the two children have also been brought into the action by means of MetLife's "third-party complaint in interpleader." Waivers of service of summons, signed by Amanda Vanderlinden (filing 25), Shane Vanderlinden (filing 24), and plaintiff, Robert L. Vanderlinden, as the personal representative of the estate (filing 23), were filed on October 19, 2000.
On October 20, 2000, MetLife filed a motion (filing 28) seeking leave to deposit the insurance proceeds of $100,000, plus interest, with the registry of the court, and also requesting that it be dismissed from the action with prejudice. On December 13, 2000, the court received a "response to defendant's motion for leave to deposit proceeds," signed by D.C. Bradford, as attorney for plaintiff and all third-party defendants, which stated that none of these parties had any objection to MetLife's motion.3 On that same date, however, the estate and the Vanderlinden children, through attorney Bradford, filed a joint answer to the third-party complaint (filing 31), in which they specifically denied being claimants or potential claimants to the insurance proceeds. Plaintiff's answer to the counterclaim, also signed by attorney Bradford and filed on December 13, 2000 (filing 30), likewise denied MetLife's interpleader allegations.
In a memorandum and order entered on December 19, 2000 (filing 32), I denied MetLife's motion on the basis of the filed answers to the counterclaim and the third-party complaint, which suggest that interpleader is not appropriate in this case. As I then explained, if MetLife were to be dismissed from the action, there would be no adverse parties and no case or controversy for the court to decide.
On February 27, 2001, MetLife filed a second motion for the same relief (filing 37), representing that it understood the Vanderlinden children were in the process of obtaining separate counsel, and asserting that such a change in circumstances would entitle MetLife to judgment as a matter of law.4 Attorney David S. Houghton did, in fact, enter an appearance as counsel for Amanda and Shane Vanderlinden on March 19, 2001 (filing 39), and, on April 10, 2001, filed a separate answer on their behalf (filing 41). In general, such answer responds to the third-party complaint with statements that the third-party defendants "are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations." However, it is specifically stated that Amanda and Shane Vanderlinden "make no claim to the benefits, if any, from the MetLife policy alleged in the Third Party Complaint," and they request that they be dismissed from the action on this basis.
On April 11, 2001, MetLife filed an "unopposed renewed second motion" for interpleader relief (filing 42), and submitted a proposed order, signed and approved by all counsel of record, which would direct MetLife to deposit the insurance proceeds with the registry of the court, and order that MetLife then be dismissed from the action with prejudice. The renewed motion is not accompanied by any additional evidence.
My previous denial of MetLife's request for interpleader relief was not based upon a perceived conflict of interest in attorney Bradford's representation of all other parties. Rather, it was based upon the fact that the pleadings established that such parties are not adverse to each other, and that the only party making any claim to the insurance proceeds is plaintiff, Robert L. Vanderlinden. That situation has not changed with the entry of an appearance by attorney Houghton.
In order to be entitled to interpleader relief under Rule 22, MetLife must demonstrate that it "is or may be exposed to double or multiple liability." Although MetLife has alleged that there are or may be competing claims to the insurance proceeds, and has identified the decedent's estate and the Vanderlinden children as potential claimants, these parties have disavowed any interest in the insurance proceeds, and have prayed for dismissal of the third-party complaint.
The primary step in an interpleader proceeding concerns the determination of a fundholder's right to compel claimants to litigate their numerous claims in one proceeding and to confine total recovery to an amount not exceeding the deposited fund. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Bank of Bellevue, 366 F.2d 289, 293 (8th Cir.1966). This first stage of interpleader may be initiated by a defendant by way of counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim.5 See 7 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1714 at 625 n. 2 (3d ed.2001).
During the first [step or stage of interpleader] the court determines the right of the party invoking the remedy to compel the claimants to litigate their claims to the stake in one proceeding. It is at this point that the court determines whether the prerequisites to rule or statutory interpleader have been met by examining such things as the citizenship of the litigants, the merits of the asserted threat of multiple vexation, and, if interpleader is sought under the statute, the sufficiency of the stakeholder's deposit or bond....
There is no set procedure for conducting the first stage of interpleader. The issues typically are formulated by motion. In some cases courts have determined whether interpleader should lie as part of a summary-judgment motion or have treated their inquiry into the matter as if it had been presented on a formal motion for summary judgment. The burden is on the party seeking interpleader to demonstrate that the requirements are satisfied....
When the court decides that interpleader is available, it may issue an order discharging the stakeholder, if the...
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