Vandervelden v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co.

• Citation: 61 F. 54
• Parties: VANDERVELDEN v. CHICAGO & N.W. RY. CO.
• Decision Date: 09 April 1894
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa

61 F. 54

VANDERVELDEN v. CHICAGO & N.W. RY. CO.

United States Circuit Court, N.D. Iowa, Cedar Rapids Division.

April 9, 1894

Struble & Stiger and C. A. Clark, for plaintiff.

J. C Cook and Hubbard & Dawley, for defendant.

SHIRAS District Judge.

In order to properly state the exact question presented by this motion to strike out part of the testimony, and the view of the court thereon, it is necessary to understand the issues as made by the pleadings. On behalf of the plaintiff it is averred that on or about the 15th of January, 1891, he was in the employ of the defendant company as a brakeman on a freight train running upon part of the defendant's lines in the state of Iowa; that on that day, while engaged in the line of his duty at the station of Havelock, he was injured through the negligence of the engineer in charge of the train, and for the damages resulting from the injuries thus caused him by the negligence of the engineer he seeks to recover in this action. On part of the defendant, all charges of negligence are denied, and, in addition thereto, defendant pleads that the defendant company paid the surgeons who attended the plaintiff during his illness for their services and that on or about March 6, 1891, the parties compromised and settled all further claims on part of plaintiff, the defendant paying, as consideration thereof, the sum of $300 and as evidence of such settlement, and of the payment of said sum, a release in writing was executed by plaintiff, and delivered to the defendant, reading as follows:

'Read This Release.'

'In consideration of the sum of three hundred dollars ($300) to me in hand paid by the Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company, the receipt whereof is hereby confessed, I hereby release and forever discharge said railway company from all claims and demands which I now have, or may have, against it by reason of injuries received by me on or about the 15th day of January, 1891, at Havelock, Iowa, caused by falling from or being thrown off one of said company's cars in a freight train on which I was acting as brakeman, thereby breaking my right leg and otherwise seriously injuring me and in full for all claims which I have or may have on account of said accident. Witness my hand and seal at Eagle Grove, Iowa, this sixth day of March, A.D. 1891.

'Nicholas Vandervelden. (L.S.)

'Geo. Kaiser, J. P., Eagle Grove, Iowa.'

By way of reply the plaintiff admits the execution of the release, but avers that at the time he executed the same he was in feeble health as a consequence of his injuries, and that he was induced to make the settlement and sign the release through the solicitations of the surgeon of the defendant company who had charge of his case, and more particularly through the misrepresentations of the surgeon to the effect that in a reasonable time his leg would be all right, and that, if he did not settle, he would not be able to collect anything from the company, whereas in fact his injuries are serious and permanent, and his leg has never been restored to a proper condition, and is in fact useless to him.

After the introduction of testimony tending to show the happening of the accident and its result to plaintiff, it was proposed to offer testimony on behalf of plaintiff in regard to the settlement, and the inducements held out to secure the same, to which defendant's counsel objected, stating, however, that the court might hear the evidence, and that defendant would move to strike it out, thus presenting the objection more clearly. The plaintiff thereupon testified, in substance, that he executed the release through the persuasions of the surgeon in attendance upon him, and more particularly in reliance upon his assertion that in a short time his leg would be all right, and that he would be able to be up and about his business. Upon the close of this testimony the defendant moved to strike out the same upon two grounds: First, that the execution of the release is admitted, and neither in the pleading nor in the evidence is it claimed that the plaintiff was in any way misled as to the legal effect and purpose of the release, nor is it claimed that he did not intend to sign the release, or that he did not receive the $300; and, second, that the plaintiff had not paid back, or offered to repay, the $300 by him received under the settlement.

The point presented for decision by the first ground of objection is whether, in an action at law, a written release of the character of that introduced in evidence can be impeached for fraud not inhering in the execution thereof, but which only goes to the extent of the consideration. It is not claimed that the plaintiff did not intend to sign the instrument in question, or that he was misled as to its legal effect. The evidence offered shows that he, at the time he signed it, intended to fully release and discharge the company from all further liability to him by reason of the accident named in the release. The reply filed by plaintiff expressly admits the execution of the instrument. For the execution thereof he was paid the consideration therein named. Upon its delivery the instrument became legally binding. Can the plaintiff, in an action at law, escape the legal force of this release by showing that the injuries he received are more serious and permanent than he believed them to be when he settled therefor, even if such belief was created by misrepresentations made by the surgeon of the company who had the care of his case? By sections 2112 and 2113 of the Code of Iowa, the use of private seals in written contracts, except in case of corporations, is abolished, and it is declared that all contracts in writing, signed by the party to be bound or his agent or attorney, shall import a consideration. Practically, the distinction existing at common law between instruments under seal and those not under seal is thus abrogated in Iowa. The execution of the release being admitted in the pleadings, no evidence is required on part of the defendant to sustain the defense based thereon. Being in writing, and its execution by the plaintiff being admitted, it imports a consideration, and therefore at law its validity is established. Can the plaintiff, in this law action, attack it on equitable grounds? The ground of attack is not strictly a failure of consideration, for the plaintiff admits that he has received the full consideration named in the instrument, and the full amount which was promised him as an inducement for entering into the settlement and executing the release. The position of the plaintiff is that he was misled as to the future results of his injuries. At the time he made the settlement, in March, 1891, he then knew that his leg was in such a condition that, unless it grew better, it would be of little use to him. The representations of which he complains were as to future results, and it seems to me that, it falsely or ignorantly made, they cannot be availed of in an action at law. The release is a validly executed instrument, and in an action at law must be given its full legal force and effect. Thus, in Hartshorn v. Day, 19 How. 211, 222, it is said:

'Evidence was given on the trial in the court below for the purpose of proving that the agreement of the 5th of September was procured from Chaffie by the fraudulent representations of Judson, which was objected to, but admitted. The general rule is that, in an action upon a sealed instrument in a court of law, failure of consideration, or fraud in the consideration, for the purpose of avoiding the obligation, is not admissible as between the parties and privies to the deed, and more especially where there has been a part execution of the contract. The difficulties are in adjusting the rights and equities of the parties in a court of law; and hence, in the states where the two systems of jurisprudence prevail,-- of equity and the common law,-- a court of law refuses to open the question of fraud in the consideration, or in the transaction out of which the consideration arises, in a suit upon the sealed instrument, but turns the party over to a court of equity, where the instrument can be set aside upon such terms as, under all the circumstances, may be equitable and just between the parties. A court of law can hold no middle course; the question is limited to the validity or invalidity of the deed. Fraud in the execution of the instrument has always been admitted in a court of law; as, where it has been misread, or some other fraud or imposition has been practiced upon the party in procuring his signature and seal. The fraud in this aspect goes to the question whether or not the instrument ever had any legal

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