Vandyke v. Commonwealth

• Decision Date: 31 March 2020
• Docket Number: Record No. 1322-18-2
• Citation: 71 Va.App. 723,840 S.E.2d 8
• Parties: Melanie VANDYKE v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia
• Court: Virginia Court of Appeals

71 Va.App. 723

840 S.E.2d 8

Melanie VANDYKE

v.COMMONWEALTH of Virginia

Record No. 1322-18-2

Court of Appeals of Virginia, Richmond.

MARCH 31, 2020

Elliott B. Bender, Richmond (David C. Reinhardt; Bender Law Group, PLLC, on briefs), for appellant.

A. Anne Lloyd, Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Present: Chief Judge Decker, Judges Beales and AtLee

OPINION BY CHIEF JUDGE MARLA GRAFF DECKER

Melanie Vandyke appeals her conviction for obtaining morphine by fraud, deceit, embezzlement, or subterfuge, in violation of Code § 18.2-258.1. On appeal, she contends that the trial court misinterpreted the statute and abused its discretion by refusing her request for a deferred disposition. We hold that the denial of the appellant’s request for a deferred disposition was not error because the request came too late. Consequently, we affirm the appellant’s conviction and sentence without reaching the merits of her claims.

I. BACKGROUND¹

The instant conviction arose from an incident in which the appellant, who was a nurse at a medical facility, was found by two other nurses in an empty patient room with a syringe in her hand. An investigation involving her nursing license ensued, and she was ultimately charged with the criminal offense of controlled substance fraud.

A suppression hearing and trial proceedings were held on May 30 and June 1, 2018. On the first of those dates, the court heard witness testimony and the parties’ joint proffer.

On June 1, they argued the motion to suppress, which the judge denied. The parties then presented closing argument for what was treated as completion of the guilt phase of the trial. Following argument, the judge detailed the evidence and "f[ound the appellant] guilty as charged" for violating Code § 18.2-258.1(A).²

After this pronouncement, the appellant asked the judge to "defer [a] finding" under either Hernandez v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 222, 707 S.E.2d 273 (2011), or Code § 18.2-258.1. The prosecutor argued that a deferred finding and subsequent dismissal under Hernandez were not available because the statute controlled the issue. He explained that the statute permitted a deferred disposition with the possible subsequent reduction of the crime to a Class 1 misdemeanor but did not allow a dismissal. The prosecutor also suggested that the deferral provision was "for people who ... admit guilt and ask for help from the Court," which the appellant did not do. The judge asked if the parties could reach agreement on a disposition. The prosecutor stated that the appellant had received a written offer in advance of the hearing. The court then set the matter for June 27, 2018, "for disposition."

Ten days later, on June 11, the court entered a "trial order." That order reflected that at the June 1 hearing, it had found the appellant guilty of controlled substance fraud. The order also noted that the appellant "moved to continue the case for disposition," the "motion was granted," and "sentencing" would occur on June 27, 2018.

At the June sentencing hearing, counsel for the appellant framed the court’s action at the June 1 hearing as merely having "found facts sufficient to find [the appellant] guilty" rather than having made an actual finding of guilt. Counsel again asked the court to take the matter under advisement pursuant to the controlled substance fraud statute. He suggested that the court put the appellant on "terms and conditions" and that if she "successfully complete[d] all that, [the offense] would be reduced to a misdemeanor." The court recognized that "the endorsement from the last hearing ... indicate[d that] she was found guilty" and, consequently, it "d[id not] know ... what [was to] be[ ] taken under advisement."

Counsel for the appellant then referenced his need to call witnesses or gather documentary evidence and again characterized what the court had "already" done as merely "f[inding the] facts sufficient of guilty [sic]." The court granted the appellant’s request for a continuance and set the "next court date for sentencing" as July 25, 2018.

At the July sentencing, the appellant again requested a deferred disposition under Code § 18.2-258.1(H). She presented evidence and related argument in support of her request. The prosecutor continued to oppose the request. He asked the court to sentence the appellant to two years of incarceration, all suspended, and condition her probation on substance abuse treatment.

The court ultimately ruled that the appellant was not entitled to a deferred disposition under the applicable statute because the matter was "contested." In doing so, it observed that the appellant had "already been found guilty" on the indictment. (Emphasis added). The judge also referenced his discretion to deny the request on the merits. He then pronounced the appellant guilty yet again and sentenced her to three years of incarceration, with all time suspended.

II. ANALYSIS

The appellant asserts that the trial court erred in concluding that she was not entitled to a deferred disposition under Code § 18.2-258.1(H) because she exercised her right to a bench trial. She also suggests more generally that in light of the evidence in the record, the court abused its discretion by not granting her request for a deferred disposition under the statute.

A. Standard of Review

Whether a trial court "has authority to take a case under advisement and defer a finding of guilt is a question of law" reviewed de novo on appeal. White v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 599, 604, 798 S.E.2d 818 (2017). Whether that court properly construed an applicable statute also is a question of law reviewed under the same standard. See Lewis v. Commonwealth, 295 Va. 454, 460, 813 S.E.2d 732 (2018). To the extent the appeal involves any subsidiary findings of fact made by the trial court, this Court defers to those findings unless they are plainly wrong or without evidence to support them. See, e.g., Perry v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 502, 511, 737 S.E.2d 922 (2013).

B. Impact of Trial Court’s Statements and Dispositional Discretion

Trial courts have authority to defer disposition in criminal cases under appropriate circumstances. See Lewis, 295 Va. at 463-65, 813 S.E.2d 732. Numerous statutes expressly permit deferred dispositions in the discretion of the trial court. See, e.g., Code § 16.1-278.9(A) (juvenile delinquency involving alcohol or public intoxication); Code §§ 18.2-57.3(A) (domestic abuse), -251 (drug possession), -258.1(H) (controlled substance fraud); Code § 19.2-303.2 (misdemeanor property crimes).

A deferred disposition involves placing a defendant on probation under terms and conditions. See, e.g., Randolph v. Commonwealth, 45 Va. App. 166, 171-72, 609 S.E.2d 84 (2005). Some statutes expressly permitting deferred dispositions provide for the dismissal of all charges at the end of the period of deferral if the defendant fully complies with those terms and conditions. See, e.g., Code § 18.2-57.3(A), (E). In other cases, the controlling statutory framework provides that upon successful completion of the term of probation, the trial court may convict the defendant of a lesser offense rather than completely dismiss the charge. For example, Code § 18.2-258.1, the statute at issue in this case, categorizes various forms of the crime of controlled substance fraud as a Class 6 felony. That statute permits the trial court to defer disposition and "place [the defendant] on probation upon terms and conditions." Code § 18.2-258.1(H). It also expressly provides that if the defendant complies with those terms and conditions, "the court shall find the defendant guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor" rather than wholly dismiss the charge. See id.

In support of her argument that the trial court erred when it denied her request for a deferred disposition under Code § 18.2-258.1(H), the appellant references several statements that the judge made when explaining the basis for his decision. The appellant specifically notes his ruling, prompted by the prosecutor. The judge stated that the appellant did not qualify because the matter was "highly contested." The appellant further points to the judge’s explanation that the statute "contemplates" a situation in which a defendant "come[s] before the Court" and admits that the record contains "enough facts to find [her] guilty." Without doubt, the record is complicated and contains a number of specific comments by the parties and the judge regarding interpretation of the statute at issue.

Nevertheless, we hold that the trial judge reached the right result in this case. In light of this holding, we do not consider the judge’s apparent ruling that only a defendant who does not contest her guilt is entitled to a deferred disposition under the statute.³ We conclude instead that the best and narrowest ground for decision is the determination that the trial court reached the right result for a reason different than the one upon which it appears ultimately to have relied. See generally Commonwealth v. Swann, 290 Va. 194, 196, 776 S.E.2d 265 (2015) (recognizing best and narrowest ground principles).

Under the right-result-different-reason principle, an appellate court "do[es] not hesitate, in a proper case, where the correct conclusion has been reached but [a different] reason [is] given, to sustain the result [on an alternative] ground." Banks v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 612, 617, 701 S.E.2d 437 (2010) (quoting Eason v. Eason, 204 Va. 347, 352, 131 S.E.2d 280 (1963) ); see Rickman v. Commonwealth, 294 Va. 531, 542, 808 S.E.2d 395 (2017) (recognizing that the "right-result-different -reason doctrine" is applicable in a case in which the appellate court "express[es] no view on the correctness of the lower court’s rationale"). In order for a reviewing court to apply this legal principle, certain conditions must be met. The record supports an alternative ground for affirmance when it reflects two things. Banks, 280 Va. at 617, 701 S.E.2d 437....