Vanhoose v. Seifert, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:11-0448

• Decision Date: 30 March 2012
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:11-0448
• Parties: MEREDITH LEE VANHOOSE. Petitioner, v. EVELYN SEIFERT, Warden Northern Correctional Center, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia

MEREDITH LEE VANHOOSE. Petitioner,

v.EVELYN SEIFERT, Warden Northern Correctional Center, Respondent.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:11-0448

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA HUNTINGTON DIVISION

ENTER: March 30, 2012

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Petitioner Meredith Lee VanHoose, proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (ECF No. 1). Respondent Evelyn Seifert, Warden of the Northern Correctional Institution, moved for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 9). This action was referred to the Honorable Cheryl A. Eifert, United States Magistrate Judge, for submission to this Court of proposed findings of fact and recommendation for disposition, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).

The Magistrate Judge has submitted Findings of Fact and recommended that the Court deny Petitioner's application for habeas corpus relief filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and grant Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment. Having reviewed de novo the pleadings and Petitioner's objections, the Court DENIES Petitioner's objections. For the reasons given below, the Court ADOPTS in part the Magistrate Judge's Findings and ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge's Recommendations. Petitioner's Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1) is DENIED and Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 9) is DENIED as moot.

I. Background

The facts underlying the pending Petition are summarized here, and given more fully in the Magistrate Judge's Proposed Findings and Recommendations, ECF No. 13, at 2-8. Petitioner was indicted in September 1998 in Cabell County for the March 1998 murder of two men, James ("Nick") Flowers and Eric Smith. Police officers found Flowers and Smith shot in Petitioner's home after Petitioner and his wife called to report the shootings. Initially, both Petitioner and his wife, Michelle VanHoose, claimed that Michelle VanHoose had shot the men when they tried to sexually assault her. The next day, Petitioner called the police and changed his account of events, claiming that he, not his wife, shot Flowers and Smith. Later, Petitioner again took the position that his wife shot the two men.

Petitioner was arrested March 30, 1998, and indicted September 18, 1998. His first appointed attorney was replaced, and so the first trial date was set for January 6, 1999. On that date, Petitioner's new counsel moved for a continuance, over Petitioner's apparent objection. The trial was reset for May 11, 1999, then for May 18, 1999. On May 7, 1999, the State moved to continue the trial, having discovered that Petitioner's wife had filed for divorce in Kentucky, where the VanHooses had married, and wished to testify against her husband once the divorce was granted. See W. Va. Code § 57-3-3 ("In criminal cases husband and wife . . . shall [not] be compelled, nor, without the consent of the other, allowed to be called as a witness against the other[.]"). The trial court granted the motion, and later re-set the trial for August 24, 1999. That trial date was also continued on the basis that Petitioner's wife was not yet divorced, and thus not yet available to testify. On September 27, 1999, Petitioner filed a motion for a speedy trial, but the court continued the trial to January 25, 2000. On November 2, 1999, Petitioner renewed the motion. The trial wasagain continued, and in January, February, and April 2000, the trial court held hearings on the status of the divorce proceedings and Michelle VanHoose's availability to testify. The trial court determined that she was still unavailable, and continued the trial to August 2000, and then September 2000. On September 7, 2000, one day before the scheduled trial date, Petitioner entered a conditional guilty plea. See generally State v. VanHoose, 705 S.E.2d 544 (W. Va. 2010) (opinion in Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia habeas proceeding); ECF No. 9, Exs. 1, 2, 5, 6 (state trial court proceedings and appellate briefs in state habeas proceedings); ECF No. 9, Ex. 9 (Petitioner's state habeas corpus petition); ECF No. 13, at 2-8 (Magistrate Judge's Proposed Findings and Recommendations).

Various appeals and collateral attacks followed at the state level, compounded by several changes in counsel, and problems with appointed counsel receiving notice of appointment. For the purposes of the present Petition, it is relevant mainly that the case eventually reached the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia ("state court") on an appeal of the denial of Petitioner's state habeas corpus claim. The state court heard the matter and issued an opinion, holding, in relevant part, that the trial court's several continuances of Petitioner's trial date in order to permit his wife to testify at the trial did not violate his constitutional right to a speedy trial. State v. VanHoose, 705 S.E.2d 544 (W. Va. 2010).

Petitioner, having exhausted his state remedies, filed the present Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (ECF No. 1), in which he claimed the violation of two federal constitutional rights: the right to counsel and the right to a speedy trial. However, in his Objections (ECF No. 22), he abandoned the ineffective assistance of counsel claim and instead relied exclusively on his speedy trial claim. The Court therefore examinesonly that claim.¹ In the Proposed Findings and Recommendations, the Magistrate Judge found that the state court identified and applied the correct standard for evaluating Petitioner's claim that he was deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy trial, and did not unreasonably apply the law. This Court agrees.

2. Standard

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") authorizes a federal court to review a petition for habeas corpus relief from a state prisoner claiming he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. Where such claim was adjudicated on the merits in a state court proceeding, the reviewing federal court may not grant the writ unless the state court's determination was:

1) contrary to, or involves an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

2) based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the state court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. §§ 2254 (d)(1) and (2). This standard is "difficult to meet." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011). Moreover, it is a "highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt." Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002).

3. Analysis

Under this standard, Petitioner's claim must fail unless the state court's determination was "contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law." 28 U.S.C.§ 2254 (d)(1). "Contrary to" and "involves an unreasonable application" of clearly established Federal law are two different inquiries. A decision may be "contrary to" clearly established federal law when a state court (1) "arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law," or (2) "confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result opposite to [the Supreme Court]." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000). A state court decision may be an "unreasonable application" of clearly established federal law if "the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 786-87. "A habeas petitioner proceeding under § 2254 bears the burden of showing that he is entitled to habeas relief under this highly deferential standard." Jones v. Seifert, 808 F. Supp. 2d 900, 919 (S.D.W. Va. 2011) (Goodwin, C.J.) (citing Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011)).² Here, there is no allegation that the state court's decision was "contrary to" established federal law; rather, Petitioner's alleges the state court's determination regarding his speedy trial claim was an "unreasonable application" of clearly established federal law.

A

The state court's determination that Petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was not violated is only an "unreasonable application" of existing law if it was "so lacking injustification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 786-87.

Whether a defendant has been denied his federal constitutional right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment is determined by applying the four-factor test set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).³ The four-pronged Barker analysis is a "balancing test," which "necessarily compels courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis." Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. Therefore, no one prong is dispositive. The four factors are:

1) The length of the delay. This factor is a "triggering factor." Id. at 530-31. If a defendant's pre-trial incarceration is more than one year, the delay is "presumptively prejudicial," in that it triggers the rest of the speedy trial analysis.

2) The reason for the delay. "Closely related to the length of delay is the reason the government assigns to justify the delay . . . different weights should be assigned to different reasons." Id. at 531. Where the government purposefully delays the trial to hamper the defense, prejudice is highest, where the reason for delay is "more neutral," such as negligence or administrative delay, prejudice is slimmer, and a "valid reason, such as a missing witness," may justify the delay. Id.

3) The defendant's assertion of his right to a

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