Vannoy v. Uniroyal Tire Co.

• Decision Date: 22 November 1985
• Docket Number: No. 15529,15529
• Parties: , 54 USLW 2331, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 10,889 Jerry VANNOY and Nadine Vannoy, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Respondents, Cross Appellants, v. UNIROYAL TIRE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant, Cross Respondent.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 648

726 P.2d 648

111 Idaho 536, 54 USLW 2331, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 10,889

Jerry VANNOY and Nadine Vannoy, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Respondents, Cross Appellants, v. UNIROYAL TIRE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant, Cross Respondent.

No. 15529.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

Nov. 22, 1985.

On Rehearing Sept. 10, 1986.

Thomas B. High of Benoit, Alexander & Sinclair, Twin Falls, for defendant-appellant, cross respondent.

Kenneth L. Pedersen of Webb, Burton, Carlson, Pederson & Paine, Twin Falls, for plaintiffs-respondents, cross appellants.

BAKES, Justice.

Uniroyal, a tire manufacturer has appealed from a judgment awarding damages to plaintiffs in a products liability action stemming from a tire explosion accident. Plaintiffs have cross appealed from an order for remittitur of a portion of damages for loss of consortium or, in the alternative, granting a new trial. We reverse in part and remand for a new trial limited to the question of liability.

Jerry Vannoy was a tire manager for a business which sold and repaired tires. On October 6, 1980, Vannoy was attempting to mount a 16-inch tire on a 16.5-inch rim with the use of a tire mounting machine. Vannoy testified that on this occasion he was not aware of the difference in size; however, he further testified that, had he been aware, he would have still attempted to mount the tire since he had successfully mounted 16-inch tires on 16.5-inch rims on previous occasions. While Vannoy was filling the tire with air and attempting to get the tire bead to properly seat against the rim, the tire exploded. The explosion propelled the tire and rim into the ceiling and seriously injured Vannoy, leaving him with a permanent impairment to his right arm.

Vannoy and his wife filed a complaint for damages against the tire manufacturer, Uniroyal; the wheel rim manufacturer, Kelsey-Hayes Co.; the mounting machine manufacturer, The Coats Co., Inc.; a trade association, The Tire & Rim Association, Inc.; and the seller of the rim wheel, Terry Brennan. Brennan was granted summary judgment and was dismissed from the case. Vannoys dismissed the Tire & Rim Association without prejudice, and Coats and Kelsey-Hayes settled separately with the Vannoys prior to or during trial.

The case proceeded to trial against the single defendant, Uniroyal. The major claim at trial against the defendant Uniroyal was whether the tire contained a design defect consisting of an alleged weak spot in The defendant Uniroyal requested a special verdict form which would have allowed the jury to assign a percentage of fault or causation to Coats for the allegedly defective tire mounting machine, and to Kelsey-Hayes for the allegedly defective wheel rim. The trial court denied the request.

[111 Idaho 538] the bead of the tire. Other issues included the adequacy of warnings, Vannoy's alleged misuse of the product, and the alleged contributing factors of the rim and the tire mounting machine. Although the plaintiffs' case originally included a negligence claim, that theory was dropped during the trial and the case was submitted to the jury solely on the theory of strict liability for the alleged defective design of the tire and the alleged inadequate warnings.

The jury returned a verdict finding that Uniroyal "contributed to the cause of the accident" by 90% and Vannoy by 10%. The jury also found Vannoy's total damages to be $224,688, with his wife's loss of consortium damages at $74,895. All post trial motions were denied with the exception of a motion for a remittitur on the damages awarded for loss of consortium. The trial court ruled that the evidence would not support the jury's award of $74,895 for loss of consortium and therefore granted a new trial unless the plaintiffs accepted a remittitur which reduced the loss of consortium damages to $20,000. Vannoys accepted the remittitur claiming a reservation of rights on appeal.

Uniroyal has appealed assigning several points of error, the principal assignment being the refusal of the trial court to allow the special verdict form to list Coats and Kelsey-Hayes for the purpose of having all or a portion of the causation for the accident and injuries attributed to the mounting machine and wheel rim. Vannoys have cross appealed from the order granting the new trial unless plaintiffs accept a remittitur of a substantial portion of the loss of consortium damages.

I

We first address the issue of whether the trial court erred by refusing to submit a special verdict form which would have permitted the jury to consider and compare the percentage of causation which Coats' and Kelsey-Hayes' mounting machine and wheel rim contributed to the accident. Both had previously settled out of the case. The trial court ruled that the "jury can only attribute fault under the strict liability law in this action on one of two parties, Uniroyal and the plaintiff." Even though the trial court permitted Uniroyal to argue to the jury that the other two manufacturers, and not Uniroyal, had proximately caused the accident, there was no place on the verdict form for the jury to reflect such a conclusion, and the verdict form directed that the plaintiffs' and Uniroyal's contributing cause must add up to 100%. We hold that in refusing to include Coats and Kelsey-Hayes on the verdict form, the trial court erred.

In several of our prior cases we have held that, in tort actions based on negligence,

"It is established without doubt that, when apportioning negligence, a jury must have the opportunity to consider the negligence of all parties to the transaction, whether or not they be parties to the lawsuit and whether or not they can be liable to the plaintiff or to the other tortfeasors either by operation of law or because of a prior release." Lasselle v. Special Products Co., 106 Idaho 170, 172, 677 P.2d 483, 485 (1983), quoting from Pocatello Industrial Park Co. v. Steel West, Inc., 101 Idaho 783, 787, 621 P.2d 399, 403 (1980).

"... [T]rue apportionment cannot be achieved unless that apportionment includes all tortfeasors guilty of causal negligence either causing or contributing to the occurrence in question, whether or not they are parties to the case." Pocatello Industrial Park Co. v. Steel West, Inc., 101 Idaho at 787, 621 P.2d at 403, quoting from Heft & Heft, Comparative Negligence Manual § 8.131 (1978).

While we have not addressed this issue in tort cases based solely upon strict liability rather than negligence, many courts have addressed the problem of how responsibility should be allocated for damages in tort cases based upon strict liability, or a mixture of negligence and strict liability. The Supreme Court of Texas, in its recent decision of Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex.1984), has made a comprehensive analysis of the cases dealing with that issue. In analyzing the cases, the court stated:

"In recent years, products liability litigation has spawned so many intractable problems of loss allocation between negligent plaintiffs and negligent and strictly liable defendants that our brief expression "Product liability suits which are not based on negligence are treated anomalously because the system of allocation provided in Art. 2212a [the Texas comparative negligence statute, similar to I.C. § 6-802] does not apply, and there is no other comprehensive system for loss allocation under existing law. This court has previously attempted to ameliorate the harsh and inequitable consequences stemming from this anomalous treatment of loss allocation in products liability actions. Thus, instead of recognizing 'all or nothing' issues in product misuse and breach of implied warranty cases, we created comparative apportionment schemes. [Citation omitted.] Nevertheless, our limited efforts in [past cases], though positive, have not substantially alleviated the intolerable confusion, unmanageability, and inherent unfairness in this area of Texas products law. [Citation omitted.] As a result, we have been implored repeatedly to recognize some form of comparative fault in strict products liability actions. [Citations omitted.] ....

                [111 Idaho 539]  of concern in [ General Motors Corp. v. ] Simmons [558 S.W.2d 855 (Tex.1977) ] now seems understated.  [Citations omitted.]  ... Courts have had to wrestle with various problematic indemnity doctrines and to recognize 'shadowy distinctions between defenses in products cases and negligence cases.'   Thus, manufacturers have often borne accident costs generated in part by the substandard conduct of the plaintiff or some third party.  [Citation omitted.]
                

....

"A significant majority of the numerous commentators addressing the question have strenuously urged the implementation of comparative fault, also referred to as comparative responsibility or comparative causation, as a means of distributing accident costs among negligent plaintiffs, negligent defendants, and strictly liable defendants. [Citations omitted.] They have pointed out on the one hand that strict products liability is not absolute liability--that is, product suppliers are not insurers of the safety of their products. On the other hand, 'all or nothing' strict liability defenses are outmoded and undesirable doctrinal throwbacks resulting in unfairness to plaintiffs, to defendants, and to other product purchasers who ultimately absorb the loss through price setting. [Citations omitted.] In the absence of apportionment, some manufacturers bear the total expense of accidents for which others are partly to blame, while other manufacturers totally escape liability even though they have sold defective products. Either result is unacceptable.

"Unfairness, however, is not the only serious flaw of virtually ignoring plaintiff and third party misconduct in strict products liability actions. The failure to allocate accident costs in proportion to the parties' relative abilities to prevent or to reduce those costs is economically inefficient. [Citation omitted.] An ideal...