Vantage Healthcare Corp. v. Agency for Health Care Admin., 96-1437

• Decision Date: 27 January 1997
• Docket Number: No. 96-1437,96-1437
• Parties: 22 Fla. L. Weekly D342 VANTAGE HEALTHCARE CORPORATION, d/b/a Beverly Manor Rehabilitation and Specialty Care Center at Manatee County, Appellant, v. AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION and Manatee Springs Nursing Center, Inc., Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 306

687 So.2d 306

22 Fla. L. Weekly D342

VANTAGE HEALTHCARE CORPORATION, d/b/a Beverly Manor Rehabilitation and Specialty Care Center at Manatee County, Appellant, v. AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION and Manatee Springs Nursing Center, Inc., Appellees.

No. 96-1437.

District Court of Appeal of Florida First District.

Jan. 27, 1997.

Douglas L. Mannheimer and Jay Adams of Broad and Cassel, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

John F. Gilroy, Senior Attorney, Agency for Health Care Administration, and David C. Ashburn of Gunster, Yoakley, Valdes-Fauli & Stewart, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellees.

DAVIS, Judge.

Vantage Healthcare Corporation (Vantage) appeals a final order of the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) awarding a certificate of need (CON) to Manatee Springs Nursing Center, Inc. (Manatee), and denying the application of Vantage. The sole issue is whether AHCA erred in accepting a late filed letter of intent from Manatee. Concluding that the agency erred in departing from the clear and express requirements of its own rule, we reverse.

The facts in this case are simple and undisputed. In the second nursing home application cycle of 1994 AHCA determined there was a need for an additional 63 community nursing home beds in Manatee County, Florida. Vantage timely filed a letter of intent to apply for the CON for those beds on October 31, 1994. That triggered the grace period for competing applicants to file letters of intent under section 408.039(2)(b) and Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.008(1)(g). Rule 59C-1.008(1)(g)2. states that applicants have an additional 16 days to file their letters of intent. Thus, Manatee had until November 16, 1994, to file its letters of intent with the Agency and with the appropriate local health care council. On November 15, 1994, Manatee delivered both letters to Airborne Express for overnight delivery. Manatee made no effort to confirm that the letters were delivered before the deadline. The letters were not delivered until November 17, 1994.

AHCA concedes that both letters of intent were untimely, but, nevertheless, ruled that it could accept the late-filed letters of intent under the doctrine of equitable tolling. AHCA determined that Manatee acted reasonably in relying upon an overnight carrier and that therefore an exception should be made to the rule. The facts of this case do not present an appropriate case for the application of the doctrine of equitable tolling.

In every case cited by Manatee in which the doctrine of equitable tolling has been applied, a party was attempting through judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings to assert or protect a claim or right. "The doctrine of equitable tolling was developed to permit under certain circumstances the filing of a lawsuit that otherwise would be barred by a limitations period." Machules v. Department of Administration, 523 So.2d 1132 (Fla.1988)(emphasis added). Machules considered the denial of an appeal as untimely. Similarly, in Stewart v. Dep't of Corrections, 561 So.2d 15 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) the court invoked the doctrine of equitable tolling and reversed dismissal of a notice of appeal which was filed one day late. Phillip v. University of Florida, 680 So.2d 508 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) was an appeal from the denial of a 120.57 hearing on the grounds that the petition had been untimely filed. In Castillo v. Dep't of Administration, 593 So.2d 1116 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992), the court reversed and remanded the denial of a petition for an administrative hearing. Hamilton County Board of County Commissioners v. Dep't of Environmental Regulation, 587 So.2d 1378 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) also applied the doctrine in the context of actual litigation, as did Dep't of Environmental Regulation v. Puckett Oil Co., Inc., 577 So.2d 988 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). The certificate of need application process is not comparable to such judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. We have found no authority extending the doctrine of equitable tolling to facts such as in the present case.

Nor do the "equities" in this situation mandate that this letter of intent be accepted, despite having been filed late. Manatee chose to wait until the eleventh hour, selected the carrier which was to deliver the letters and failed to follow up and confirm that the letters had been received. As this court stated in Environmental Resource Assocs. of Florida, Inc. v. Dep't of General Services, 624 So.2d 330, 331 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), review denied mem., 634 So.2d 623 (Fla.1994),...