Vanvorst v. State
Decision Date | 27 March 2000 |
Docket Number | No. 98-154.,98-154. |
Citation | 1 P.3d 1223 |
Parties | John F. VANVORST a/k/a John F. Lumbra, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff). |
Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Representing Appellant: Sylvia Lee Hackl, State Public Defender, and Donna Domonkos, Appellate Counsel, Wyoming Public Defender's Office; Diane Courselle, Director, and Julia Tyson, Student Intern, of the Wyoming Defender Aid Program. Argument by Ms. Tyson.
Representing Appellee: Gay Woodhouse, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, Director, and John N. O'Brien, Student Intern, of the Prosecution Assistance Program. Argument by Mr. O'Brien.
Before LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and HILL, JJ.
John F. Vanvorst a/k/a John F. Lumbra (Lumbra) presents several issues to be resolved in this case. He contends the evidence was not sufficient to permit the jury to find him guilty of concealment of stolen property in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-403(a)(i) (LEXIS 1999) or to justify giving an instruction on the inference to be drawn from possession of recently stolen property. Lumbra also maintains testimony by the arresting officer included improper hearsay testimony consisting of the officer's radio conversations with his dispatcher. Further, Lumbra claims the officer's testimony that he arrested Lumbra because he believed Lumbra was lying to him improperly commented on Lumbra's credibility. Our examination of this record and the pertinent authorities persuades the Court that there was sufficient evidence to sustain Lumbra's conviction; the evidence justified the giving of an instruction on the inference to be drawn from the possession of recently stolen property; the officer's hearsay testimony properly was admitted; and no error occurred when the arresting officer testified that he believed Lumbra had lied to him. The Judgment, Sentence, and Order of Incarceration entered by the trial court are affirmed.
This statement of the issues is found in the Brief of Appellant:
This Statement of the Issues is found in the Brief of Appellee:
On the afternoon of July 16, 1997, a Wyoming State Patrol officer stopped Lumbra for speeding on Highway 287 south of Laramie. When the officer asked Lumbra for his driver's license and registration, Lumbra told the officer that the car, a 1997 red Dodge Intrepid, belonged to his girlfriend. Lumbra began looking around the car and in the trunk for his wallet. He was unable to locate the wallet and told the officer he must have left it at a gas station in Laramie. Although Lumbra did not know the name of the station, he described the location and the attendant working there. A subsequent search in Laramie found no attendant matching this description, and Lumbra's license was never found.
The officer asked Lumbra his name and date of birth. The officer ran a driver's license check in Colorado where Lumbra claimed to have a valid license, but the check revealed no record of a Colorado license. While the officer was reconfirming the information with Lumbra, Lumbra took a driver's license out of the center console and told the officer the license belonged to his girlfriend, the owner of the car. When the officer asked what the name on the license was, Lumbra was unable to provide the correct last name, at which time the officer asked Lumbra to get out of the car and placed him in handcuffs. The officer said he arrested and handcuffed Lumbra for safety because he "believed he was lying" to him.
The officer proceeded to run a VIN number check to determine whether the vehicle was stolen or registered in another state. The search did not reveal any information, and no paperwork existed in the car to prove ownership. Based on the dealer's decal on the back of the car, the officer requested dispatch to contact the Denver-based dealership to determine whether this vehicle was missing from the lot. Based upon the dispatcher's response, the officer assumed the vehicle was stolen. This was later confirmed by the sales manager who determined that a new 1997 Dodge Intrepid was stolen from the dealer's lot between June 20, 1997, and July 16, 1997. The VIN number of the missing vehicle matched the one Lumbra was driving. The officer transported Lumbra to the Albany County Detention Center, and the car was towed to a towing company lot until the owner claimed it.
A jury convicted Lumbra for violating Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-403(a)(i), and he was sentenced to four to six years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary. The district court entered this judgment and sentence on March 6, 1998. Lumbra timely appeals the judgment, sentence, and order of incarceration.
Martinez v. State, 943 P.2d 1178, 1182 (Wyo. 1997) (quoting Bloomquist v. State, 914 P.2d 812, 823-24 (Wyo.1996)).
Lumbra was charged with and convicted of violating Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-403(a)(i) (LEXIS 1999), which prohibits concealment of stolen property. Under the statute, "[a] person who buys, receives, conceals or disposes of property which he knows, believes or has reasonable cause to believe was obtained in violation of law is guilty of... a felony ... if the value of the property is five hundred dollars ($500.00) or more." The State has the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Lumbra (1) bought, received, concealed, or disposed of property (2) which he knew, believed, or had reasonable cause to believe was obtained in violation of law, and (3) that the value of the property was more than $500. Capshaw v. State, 737 P.2d 740, 745 (Wyo.1987).
Tageant, 673 P.2d at 654 (citations omitted).
During its deliberations, the jury may consider a variety of surrounding circumstances to determine whether the defendant possessed the requisite guilty knowledge.1 Possession of recently stolen property coupled with "admissions or contradictory or evasive statements by the accused" is "corroborative of and sufficient to support a finding of guilty knowledge." Tageant, 673 P.2d at 655. Lumbra asserts that neither his possession nor any corroborating circumstances reasonably support an inference that he knew he was driving a...
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