Vanzzini v. Action Meat Distribs., Inc.

• Decision Date: 31 January 2014
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. H–11–4173.
• Parties: Juan VANZZINI, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ACTION MEAT DISTRIBUTORS, INC., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

995 F.Supp.2d 703

Juan VANZZINI, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.ACTION MEAT DISTRIBUTORS, INC., et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. H–11–4173.

United States District Court,

S.D. Texas,

Houston Division.

Jan. 31, 2014.

John Charles Lipps, Joe Micah Williams, The Law Offices of Joe M. Williams & Associates, Houston, TX, for Plaintiffs.

Jim Luis Garcia, Cersonsky, Rosen & Garcia, P.C., Josef Franz Buenker, Attorney at Law, Houston, TX, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

KEITH P. ELLISON, District Judge.

Pending before the Court in this Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) collective action are Defendants Action Meat Distributors, Inc. and J. Fred Cramm's (“Defendants”) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Applicability of the Federal Motor Carrier Act Exemption as to the Drivers (“MCA Summary Judgment Motion”; Doc. No. 62), Motion for Partial Decertification as to the Conditionally Certified Class (“Decertification Motion”; Doc. No. 63), and Motion for Summary Judgment as to the Claims of Juan Vanzzini (“Vanzzini Summary Judgment Motion”; Doc. No. 69). The Court believes that summary judgment regarding the Motor Carrier Act (“MCA”) exemption to the requirements of the FLSA is warranted as to the claims of all of the drivers in the conditionally certified class except Rufus Flanagan. Thus, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants' MCA Summary Judgment Motion. Further, the Court agrees with Defendants that, of the remaining members of the conditionally certified class, only Juan Vanzzini and Margarito Zavala are similarly situated. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Decertification Motion. The Court is not convinced that summary judgment as to the claims of Plaintiff Juan Vanzzini is warranted, however; the Court DENIES Defendants' Vanzzini Summary Judgment Motion.

I. BACKGROUND

In December 2011, Plaintiff Juan Vanzzini filed this lawsuit against Defendants Action Meat Distributors, Inc. and J. Fred Cramm, its President, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219, and the Texas Labor Code, Tex. Lab.Code §§ 61.001–61.095. Defendants are and control a meat distributioncompany operating in Texas, Oklahoma, and Louisiana. Mr. Vanzzini was employed by Defendants as a “puller,” and states that his job duties included filling customer orders and loading them onto trucks for delivery. Compl. ¶¶ 26, 28 (Doc. No. 1). He contends that he was paid on an hourly basis, and regularly worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek without receiving overtime pay. Compl. ¶¶ 36–37.

Mr. Vanzzini seeks to represent a class of individuals whom he describes in the Complaint as:

All current and former employees of any of the facilities owned or operated by Defendant in Texas who 1) worked at any business located in Texas that was owned, operated, controlled and/or acquired by Defendants during the class period, and 2) claims that he or she was either (a) deliberately misclassified as being exempt from the overtime pay provisions of 29 U.S.C., et seq. or (b) failed to receive all or his or her overtime pay, in violation of 29 U.S.C., et seq. and seeks payment for such lawfully earned overtime pay.

Compl. ¶ 19. The Court conditionally certified the class on July 12, 2012 and notice was approved and ordered on August 14, 2012. See Doc. No. 31. Notice was sent to potential class members, and fourteen individuals opted-in to the class. See Doc. Nos. 28, 30, 32–38. As of this date, six have withdrawn their consent to participate, see Doc. Nos. 41 and 64, leaving Juan Vanzzini, Rodolfo Calderón, Rufus Flanagan, Ricardo López, Luis F. Molano, Mario José Roque, Yolanda Salazar, and Margarito Zavala as potential class members.¹

On the dispositive motions deadline, and after the close of discovery, Defendants sought leave to amend their answer to include the affirmative defense of the Motor Carrier Act's statutory exemption to the FLSA's requirements. See Doc. No. 42. The Court ultimately allowed Defendants to amend their complaint over the strong, and continuing, objection of the Plaintiffs. See Doc. No. 48. In order to alleviate prejudice to the Plaintiffs, the Court allowed them several months of additional discovery relating to the new defense. Id. Following the close of that discovery period, the Defendants filed these motions, seeking summary judgment, both as to the MCA exemption and as to Mr. Vanzzini's claims, and decertification of the conditionally certified class.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS

A. Legal Standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is warranted if no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Importantly, “the mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat a motion for summary judgment; Rule 56 requires that the fact dispute be genuine and material.” Willis v. Roche Biomed. Lab., 61 F.3d 313, 315 (5th Cir.1995). Material facts are those whose resolution “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law ....” Id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505). A court may consider any evidence in the record, “including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A). However, conclusory affidavits will not suffice to create or negate a genuine issue of fact. Reese v. Anderson, 926 F.2d 494, 498 (5th Cir.1991); Shaffer v. Williams, 794 F.2d 1030, 1033 (5th Cir.1986); seeFed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(4).

The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, but it need not negate the elements of the nonmoving party's case. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Willis, 61 F.3d at 315 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548); Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., Inc., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir.2005). If the burden of proof at trial lies with the nonmoving party, the moving party may satisfy its initial burden by “ ‘showing’—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. However, “[i]f the moving party fails to meet [its] initial burden, the motion must be denied, regardless of the nonmovant's response.” United States v. $92,203.00 in U.S. Currency, 537 F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir.2008) (quoting Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994) (en banc)).

Once the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party must come forward with specific evidence in order to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Baranowski v. Hart, 486 F.3d 112, 119 (5th Cir.2007). Simply resting on the allegations in the pleadings will not suffice. Neither will this burden be satisfied “by ‘some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, by conclusory allegations, by unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a scintilla of evidence.’ ” Boudreaux, 402 F.3d at 540 (quoting Little, 37 F.3d at 1075). In deciding a summary judgment motion, the court must draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Connors v. Graves, 538 F.3d 373, 376 (5th Cir.2008).

B. MCA Summary Judgment Motion

1. The Propriety of Allowing Defendants' Amended Answer

Plaintiffs first argue that summary judgment should be denied because Defendants' amendment of their answer to include the MCA exemption as an affirmative defense was untimely and should not be permitted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. Even though it previously decided to allow the amendment, Doc. No. 48, the Court will take up Plaintiffs' arguments. They are, however, unavailing.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires that, “[i]n responding to a pleading, a party must affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense ....” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c)(1). Failure to do so may waive the defense. Rogers v. McDorman, 521 F.3d 381, 385 (5th Cir.2008). However, the Fifth Circuit has determined that this rule admits of some flexibility. Id. According to the Fifth Circuit, failure to plead an affirmative defense may be excused so long as “the [affirmative defense] is raised in the trial court in a manner that does not result in unfair surprise.” Id. at 385–86 (quotation marks and citation omitted). If the defense “is raised at a pragmatically sufficient time, and the plaintiff was not prejudiced in its ability to respond,” the Fifth Circuit “generally will not find the defense waived.” Solomon v. Spalitta, 484 Fed.Appx. 883, 884–85 (5th Cir.2012) (citing McDorman, 521 F.3d at 385–86) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, however, it is not the case that Defendants raised the MCA exemption for the first time outside of their pleadings. Rather, Defendants sought leave to amend their pleadings before raising the defense. Thus, the proper question is whether the Court was correct in allowing such an amendment when it did, after the close of discovery and the deadline for dispositive motions.²

The touchstone in this inquiry is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b), which, the Fifth Circuit has determined, controls requests to amend pleadings coming after the deadline set in the scheduling order. S & W Enters., L.L.C. v. SouthTrust Bank of Alabama, NA, 315 F.3d 533, 536 (5th Cir.2003). Rule 16(b) provides that a scheduling order “may be modified only for good cause and with the judge's consent.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(b)(4). The good cause standard “requires the ‘party seeking relief to show that the deadlines cannot...