Vargas-Ruiz v. Golden Arch Development, Inc.
Decision Date | 30 June 2003 |
Docket Number | No. CIV.02-1463 DRD.,CIV.02-1463 DRD. |
Citation | 283 F.Supp.2d 450 |
Parties | Armando E. VARGAS-RUIZ, Plaintiff, v. GOLDEN ARCH DEVELOPMENT, INC., et als., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Jaime A. Lamboy-Riley, Edif. Arroyo, San Juan, PR, for plaintiff.
Carlos A. Garcia-Perez, Goldman Antonetti & Cordova, San Juan, PR, for defendant.
Pending before the Court is Co-Defendant's, Mc Donald's System de Puerto Rico, Inc.1, (hereinafter referred to as "Co-Defendant") Motion to Dismiss, (Docket No. 12) which Plaintiff's duly opposed (Docket No. 15). Co-Defendant replied through Docket No. 20, and Plaintiff thereafter surreplied. (Docket No. 21). For the reasons set forth below, Co-Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED.
Co-Defendant's grounds for Dismissal are that Plaintiff's tort action is time-barred under Puerto Rico's one-year statute of limitations, and that Plaintiff's claims for damages in the instant case fail to meet the jurisdictional amount required under diversity jurisdiction.2 In his Opposition Plaintiff contends that the claims are not time-barred because the statute of limitations was tolled as a result of extrajudicial claims made to Co-Defendant's claims representative, Gallagher Bassett Services Inc., ("Gallagher Bassett") (Exhibits II, III, IV, Docket No. 15), and additionally argues that the magnitude of the injuries satisfy the jurisdictional amount in diversity cases. In its Reply, Co-Defendant avers that the extrajudicial claim was dated prior to March 6, 2001, and that the present complaint was filed on March 27, 2002, that is, more than a year after Plaintiff's alleged claim to Gallagher Bassett.3 Co-Defendant also avers that "Plaintiff does not set forth any information or documentation to sustain its allegation of damages equal to or in excess of the jurisdictional amount", (Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, p. 2), (Docket No. 20). In his sur-reply, Plaintiff alleges that the statute of limitations was tolled because during the time, Plaintiff was in constant communication and negotiations with Co-Defendant's representatives. Plaintiff further contends that the only document the Court has to evaluate is the good faith allegations made in the complaint in order to solve the jurisdictional amount issue. (Docket No. 21).
As the instant matter is before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court accepts as true the facts alleged by plaintiff, and draws all reasonable inferences in his favor. Calderon-Ortiz v. Laboy-Alvarado, 300 F.3d 60, 62-63 (1st Cir. 2002); SEC v. SG Ltd., 265 F.3d 42, 46 (1st Cir.2001); Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1996).
On February 13, 2001, Armando E. Vargas Ruiz (hereinafter referred to as "Plaintiff"), visited the McDonald's restaurant located at the municipality of Canovanas, Rt. # 185. This restaurant is operated by Co-Defendant. Plaintiff ordered a hamburger and a glass of cold milk. The order was placed by an employee of the restaurant in a tray and the milk was served in a cardboard glass which was covered with a plastic cap. After being served, the plaintiff took the tray to a table. At all moments, the contents of the cardboard glass were concealed and no trace of vapor could be noticed. Plaintiff was unaware that the contents were nearly boiling. At all times, Mr. Vargas thought that the milk was cold as requested.
Once seated at the table, Plaintiff started to eat and later drink his milk. He placed a straw through the plastic cap of the cardboard glass and swallowed the contents. Immediately, he felt the burning milk running down his throat, and screamed for help. Plaintiff was assisted by employees of Co-Defendant. The manager of the restaurant immediately reported in writing an accident wherein he described the events and Plaintiff's conditions.
After the events, Plaintiff drove himself to the Emergency room of the Canovanas Health System where he received emergency medical attention and was preliminary diagnosed with esophagus burns. Plaintiff was prescribed medications, ordered to rest, and was sent home on the same day.
After a few months of continuous pain in his throat, unease, hoarseness, difficulty in speaking, and problems with eating and swallowing, Plaintiff visited the offices of Dr. Jose D. Torres Rodriguez, E.N.T. After several visits to Dr. Jose D. Torres Rodriguez, Plaintiff was diagnosed with Chronic Arytenoiditis with Disfagia and Chronic Laryngitis. Due to the injury, Mr. Vargas has a permanent scar on his right arytenoide.
Plaintiff filed a claim against Co-Defendant through their claims representatives, Gallagher Bassett, as evidenced from the letter of May 21, 2001, signed by Plaintiff's legal representative. (Exhibit III, Docket No. 15). This claim dates prior to March 6, 2001. On January 11, 2002, by way of letter sent to Plaintiff, Gallagher Basset denied any and all claims against Co-Defendant. (Exhibit IV, Docket No. 15). Finally, Plaintiff filed his complaint in this District Court on March 27, 2002. Co-Defendant filed its Motion to Dismiss on December 30, 2002.
When deciding a Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),4 the Court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual claims and indulge all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor. Doyle v. Hasbro, Inc., 103 F.3d 186, 190 (1st Cir.1996). Furthermore, dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is appropriate if the facts alleged, taken as true, do not justify recovery. Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1996). In order to survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiff must set forth "factual allegations, either direct or inferential, regarding each material element necessary to sustain recovery." Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp. 851 F.2d 513, 515 (1st Cir.1988). Although all inferences must be made in plaintiff's favor, the Court need not accept "bald assertions, unsupportable conclusions, periphrastic circumlocutions, and the like." Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d at 3. Moreover, when considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) the Court must limit its focus to the allegations of the complaint. Litton Indus., Inc. v. Colon, 587 F.2d 70, 74 (1st Cir.1978). Specifically, the inquiry should be "whether a liberal reading of [the complaint] can reasonably admit of a claim." Id.; see also Doyle v. Hasbro, Inc., 103 F.3d at 190.5
The present case is before this District Court upon diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). In diversity tort actions, statute of limitations issues are regarded as questions of substantive law. See Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 822, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 65 S.Ct. 1464, 89 L.Ed. 2079 (1945); Daigle v. Maine Medical Center, 14 F.3d 684, 689 (1st Cir.1994). Therefore, the substantive law of Puerto Rico controls. Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. at 78, 58 S.Ct. at 822; Rolon-Alvarado v. Municipality of San Juan, 1 F.3d 74, 77 (1st Cir.1993). The Court then begins its analysis and turns to the substantive state law to determine the applicable statute of limitations for diversity tort actions. See, Torres Nieves v. Hospital Metropolitano, 998 F.Supp. 127, 136 (D.Puerto Rico 1998).
This tort action was brought pursuant to Puerto Rico's tort statute, Article 1802 of the Civil Code, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5141. Under Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, a person who causes damage to another through fault or negligence shall be liable in damages. Furthermore, Article 1868(2) of the Puerto Rico Civil Code establishes a one-year limitations period for actions arising from fault or negligence, "from the moment the aggrieved person ha[d] knowledge of the injury." P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5298(2). Article 1868 bars any action for recovery of non-contractual damages brought more than one year from the time the aggrieved person has knowledge of the injury. A cause of action under article 1802 accrues —and the prescriptive period set by article 1862(2) therefore begins to run— when the injured party knew or should have known of the injury and of the likely identity of the tortfeasor. See Colon Prieto v. Geigel, 115 D.P.R. 232, 243, 1984 WL 270950 (1984). The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico has held that a plaintiff has knowledge of an injury when he has (1) "notice of the injury" and (2) "notice of the person who caused it." Torres v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 219 F.3d 13, 18 (1st Cir.2000); Santiago Hodge v. Parke Davis & Co., 909 F.2d 628, 632 (1st Cir.1990); Colon Prieto v. Geigel, 1984 WL 270950, 115 P.R.Dec. at 247.
Knowledge of the tort is not easy to ascertain or prove. It has been said, however, that "[n]otice of the injury occurs when there `exist some outward or physical signs through which the aggrieved party may become aware and realize that he has suffered an injurious aftereffect, which when known becomes a damage even if at the time its full scope and extent cannot be weighed.'" Torres v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 219 F.3d at 19; Delgado Rodriguez v. Nazario de Ferrer, 121 P.R. Dec. 347, 360, 21 P.R. Offic. Trans. 342, 356 (1988) ( ). Once a plaintiff is on notice of the injury, the plaintiff may "not wait for his injury to reach its final degree of development and postpone the running of the period of limitation according to his [or her] subjective appraisal and judgment." Ortiz v. Municipio De Orocovis, 1982 WL 210544, 113 P.R. Dec. 484, 487 (1982); Rodriguez-Suris v. Montesinos, 123 F.3d 10, 13 (1st Cir.1997).
In the case at bar, Plaintiff...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Amézquita v. Rivera-Cruz
...it." Lazaro v. Abbott Med. Optics, Inc., Civil No. 248 (PG), 2017 WL 1380539 at 5 * (D.P.R. 2017) (citing Vargas-Ruiz v. Golden Arch Dev., Inc., 283 F. Supp. 2d 450, 456 (D.P.R. 2003) ). In the context of alleged joint tortfeasors, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court held in Fraguada Bonilla v. H......
-
Total Petroleum Puerto Rico Corp. v. Colon
...56(c); see also Santiago–Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir.2000); Vargas–Ruiz v. Golden Arch Development, Inc., 283 F.Supp.2d 450, 458–59 (D.P.R.2003).2. Defendants' Opposition As recounted in the procedural background, defendants only filed a response in opp......
-
Santiago v. Am. Airlines, Inc.
...1 F.3d 74, 77 (1st Cir.1993); Santiago Hodge v. Parke Davis & Co., 909 F.2d 628, 632 (1st Cir.1990); Vargas–Ruiz v. Golden Arch Development, Inc., 283 F.Supp.2d 450, 454–55 (D.P.R.2003); and Torres Nieves v. Hospital Metropolitano, 998 F.Supp. 127, 136 (D.P.R.1998). Thus, the Court must loo......
-
Collazo v. Enter. Holdings, Inc.
...This means that the limitations period for that claim likely expired on or about April 27, 2011. See Vargas–Ruiz v. Golden Arch Development, Inc., 283 F.Supp.2d 450, 455–56 (D.P.R.2003). Thus, if I decide to dismiss rather than transfer the case, Collazo's tort claim could well be time-barr......