Vargas v. Keegan, Inc.

Decision Date28 February 2000
Docket NumberNo. 25080.,25080.
PartiesEstanislao VARGAS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KEEGAN, INC. and Liberty Northwest Insurance Corporation, Defendants-Respondents.
CourtIdaho Supreme Court

L. Clyel Berry, Twin Falls, for appellant.

Kent W. Day, Boise, for respondent.

SCHROEDER, Justice.

Estanislao Vargas (Vargas) appeals the findings of the Industrial Commission in a worker's compensation case.

I. BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

Vargas was born in Mexico in 1949 and attended school there through the sixth grade. He could not continue with school because there were no schools in his town beyond the primary level. Vargas served in the military from about age 17 to age 20, where he learned to care for horses. Subsequently, he worked on farms in Mexico before he moved to Mexico City, where he packed boxes in a soap factory for two years. He came to the United States in 1984 and worked in California as a fruit-picker. He alternated between the United States and Mexico, working primarily in the fields, hoeing and doing seasonal work.

During the early 1990s, Vargas worked in Idaho, cleaning beets, harvesting potatoes, packaging corn and later, cheese. He began work at Keegan's potato processing plant in December of 1995, packing potatoes in bags of five to ten pounds which he then stacked. He also cleaned the area where the potatoes were unloaded. He worked approximately 40 hours a week for $5.50 a hour.

On March 8, 1996, Vargas was cleaning underneath a conveyor belt. When he straightened up, he struck the back of his neck against the metal on the conveyor belt. The accident occurred on Friday afternoon, and Vargas spent the weekend trying to heal. He returned to work Monday, but the pain increased after he began working. He was seen by a doctor for the first time on March 13, 1996, and was seen by other physicians afterwards. Vargas suffered from a C6-7 disc herniation with resultant nerve damage. The surety accepted Vargas's claim for compensation and began paying his medical expenses and temporary total disability benefits effective March 22, 1996. Vargas began a four-week course of physical therapy in September of 1996, and on November 4, 1996, he underwent surgery for the injuries to his spine. Dr. Mitgang performed the surgery.

The temporary total disability benefits were terminated on March 16, 1997, and Vargas returned to work on March 17, 1997. However, he did not return to his old position. Instead, he worked as a potato sorter where he could sit or stand at his work station, work at his own speed and take a break whenever necessary. Despite this less stressful position, he experienced pain and dizziness at work. He was taking prescription medication for pain at the time, but often did not work the entire shift for which he was scheduled. He terminated his employment on May 5, 1997, because he could not endure the pain. He has had little success seeking employment since that time.

Vargas made a claim for worker's compensation benefits with the Industrial Commission, and a hearing was held before a referee. The Commission adopted the findings and conclusions proposed by the referee. Vargas appeals the decisions of the Commission determining that he was not entitled to temporary disability benefits from May 7, 1997, through June 24, 1997, and that he was only entitled to permanent partial disability of thirty-five percent of the whole person. He asserts that he was entitled to total and permanent disability benefits, maintaining that the Commission failed to consider his chronic pain syndrome in its determination of permanent impairment or permanent disability in excess of impairment. He also claims that the Commission erred in failing to address whether he is entitled to permanent partial impairment benefits retroactive to the date he reached maximum medical impairment. Additionally, he maintains he is entitled to attorney fees for the proceedings before the Commission and before this Court.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review for appeals from the Industrial Commission is two-fold. While this Court will exercise free review over the Commission's legal conclusions, it will not disturb the Commission's factual findings if they are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Reiher v. American Fine Foods, 126 Idaho 58, 60, 878 P.2d 757, 759 (1994) (citations omitted). Substantial and competent evidence consists of such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Idaho State Ins. Fund v. Hunnicutt, 110 Idaho 257, 260, 715 P.2d 927 (1985). The substantial evidence rule requires a court to determine whether the agency's findings of fact are reasonable. Idaho State Ins. Fund v. Hunnicutt, 110 Idaho 257, 260, 715 P.2d 927, 930 (1985) (citing Local 1494 of the International Association of Firefighters v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 99 Idaho 630, 586 P.2d 1346 (1978)). In deciding whether the agency's findings of fact were reasonable, reviewing courts should not read only one side of the case and, if they find any evidence there, sustain the administrative action and ignore the record to the contrary. Idaho State Ins. Fund v. Hunnicutt, 110 Idaho 257, 260, 715 P.2d 927, 930 (1985) (citing Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477, 71 S.Ct. 456, 459, 95 L.Ed. 456, 461 (1951)).

III.

THE COMMISSION'S DETERMINATION THAT VARGAS WAS NOT ENTITLED TO TEMPORARY DISABILITY BENEFITS FROM MAY 7, 1997, THROUGH JUNE 24, 1997, IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL, COMPETENT EVIDENCE.

The question before the Court is whether a reasonable mind could accept the Commission's findings as adequate to support the conclusion that Vargas was not entitled to temporary disability benefits for the time period beginning May 7, 1997, and ending June 24, 1997. The relevant findings by the Commission are: (1) Dr. Mitgang had released Vargas to work on March 17, 1997, and (2) there was no medical evidence that he could not work for the time period in question. There are facts that weigh against the Commission's findings: Vargas was taking prescription pain medication, and the medication could make the job as potato grader dangerous. Vargas said that his pain was unbearable. The Commission considered all of the evidence and accepted the evidence that Vargas was released to work without medical restrictions that would prevent him from doing his job. Though there was conflicting evidence, there was substantial and competent evidence to support the Commission's findings.

IV.

THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN ITS DETERMINATION OF PERMANENT IMPAIRMENT OR PERMANENT DISABILITY IN EXCESS OF IMPAIRMENT.

The ultimate finding in determining impairment rests with the Commission. Physicians' opinions are advisory only. Urry v. Walker and Fox Masonry Cont., 115 Idaho 750, 769 P.2d 1122 (1989).

Vargas claims that the Commission ignored his diagnosis of chronic pain syndrome, as well as his testimony that he walks slowly, has difficulty bathing and cannot lace his shoes. According to Vargas, such interference in daily activities constitutes permanent impairment pursuant to I.C. § 72-424 and permanent disability pursuant to I.C. § 72-425.

§ 72-424. Permanent impairment evaluation. "Evaluation (rating) of permanent impairment" is a medical appraisal of the nature and extent of the injury or disease as it affects an injured employee's personal efficiency in the activities of daily living, such as self-care, communication, normal living postures, ambulation, elevation, traveling, and nonspecialized activities of bodily members.
§ 72-425. Permanent disability evaluation. "Evaluation (rating) of permanent disability" is an appraisal of the injured employee's present and probable future ability to engage in gainful activity as it is affected by the medical factor of permanent impairment and by pertinent nonmedical factors as provided in section 72-430.
§ 72-430 Permanent disability — Determination of — Percentages — Schedule. (1) Matters to be considered. In determining percentages of permanent disabilities, account shall be taken of the nature of the physical disablement ... consideration being given to the diminished ability of the afflicted employee to compete in an open labor market within a reasonable geographical area considering all the personal and economic circumstances of the employee and other factors as the commission may deem relevant ...

The referee made references to Vargas' pain and prescriptions for pain medications in his findings of fact and mentioned Dr. Phillips' diagnosis of chronic pain syndrome. The referee did not refer to Vargas' pain or the diagnosis of chronic pain syndrome in the permanent impairment or permanent disability assessments.

The claimant in Pomerinke v. Excel Trucking Transport, Inc., 124 Idaho 301, 859 P.2d 337 (1993), was diagnosed with chronic pain syndrome as well. In that case, the Court upheld the Commission's impairment rating, which relied upon the findings of a medical panel. The findings of the medical panel did not specify that pain was a component in its impairment rating, but the Commission discussed its belief that the medical panel nevertheless took account of the claimant's past complaints of pain. 124 Idaho at 305, 859 P.2d at 341. The Court noted that while the medical panel's impairment rating "did not specify that pain is a component of the rating, the panel report is replete with references to pain." Id. This met the substantial and competent evidence standard.

The referee's findings of fact, which were adopted by the Commission, acknowledged Vargas' pain. The references to pain are sufficient to demonstrate that the Commission considered this element in making its decision.

V.

THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL, COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE COMMISSION'S DETERMINATION THAT VARGAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH ENTITLEMENT TO TOTAL AND...

To continue reading

Request your trial
3 cases
  • Davidson v. Riverland Excavating, Inc.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Idaho
    • 29 de maio de 2009
    ...has failed to show that the Commission erred in failing to consider pain when determining his impairment rating. Vargas v. Keegan, 134 Idaho 125, 128, 997 P.2d 586, 589 (2000) (where referee did not refer to claimant's pain or the diagnosis of chronic pain syndrome in the permanent impairme......
  • Freeman v. Twin Falls Clinic and Hosp.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Idaho
    • 1 de novembro de 2000
    ...is limited to a determination of whether the findings of fact are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Vargas v. Keegan, 134 Idaho 125, 997 P.2d 586 (2000); Dinius v. Loving Care & More, Inc., 133 Idaho 572, 574, 990 P.2d 738, 740 (1999), citing Boise Orthopedic Clinic v. Idaho ......
  • Kirk v. Karcher Estates, Inc.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Idaho
    • 15 de dezembro de 2000
    ...will not disturb the Commission's factual findings if they are supported by substantial and competent evidence. See Vargas v. Keegan, Inc., 134 Idaho 125, 997 P.2d 586 (2000); see also Reiher v. American Fine Foods, 126 Idaho 58, 60, 878 P.2d 757, 759 (1994) (citations omitted). Substantial......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT