Varoukas v. Industrial Commission of Utah

• Decision Date: 21 July 1920
• Docket Number: 3490
• Citation: 56 Utah 574,191 P. 1091
• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Parties: VAROUKAS v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH et al

191 P. 1091

56 Utah 574

VAROUKAS v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH et al

No. 3490

Supreme Court of Utah

July 21, 1920

Proceedings under Workmen's Compensation Act by Louis Varoukas for compensation for injuries, opposed by the Standard Coal Company, employer. Award by Industrial Commission of Utah for claimant, and on denial of his application for additional compensation, he presents the record to the Supreme Court for review.

DECISION OF COMMISSION ANNULLED, and cause remanded, with directions.

Stewart Alexander & Cannon, of Price, for plaintiff.

Dan B Shields, Atty. Gen., James H. Wolfe, Asst. Atty. Gen., and A. R. Barnes, of Salt Lake City, for defendants.

FRICK, J. CORFMAN, C. J., and WEBER, GIDEON, and THURMAN, JJ., concur.

OPINION

FRICK, J.

Plaintiff, in due time and in due form, made application to the Industrial Commission of Utah, hereinafter styled commission, for compensation under our statute for a disability caused by injuries which he sustained in the course of his employment while in the employment of the Standard Coal Company of Utah. The commission, after a hearing, awarded plaintiff "compensation for the disability period, January 10, 1919, to February 20, 1919, less the ten days waiting period," amounting to fifty-four dollars and eighty-one cents. The plaintiff was dissatisfied with the award of the commission, for the reason, as he contends, that the disability period fixed by the commission was for a shorter time than the disability continued, and he asked for a rehearing. In the petition for a rehearing he asked for additional compensation, which additional compensation, however, was denied for the reasons hereinafter appearing. The majority of the commission on the first hearing, after reciting the facts, closed its decision as follows:

"From the evidence, therefore, the commission finds that the applicant met with an accident and sustained injuries arising out of and in the course of his employment, and that there followed a total disability period from January 10, 1919, to February 20, 1919, for which compensation should be allowed. The commission finds that the disability period extended beyond the twentieth of February, 1919, but that compensation may not be allowed for this period on account of the violation of rule 19. The commission feels that this is a reasonable rule which must be respected. In this case the evidence shows that the defendant furnished, and was willing to furnish, all necessary medical attention, and it is conceded that where the defendant is willing to do this it should have the right to so do, and this right should not be interfered with by the employe without reason and without notification to any one taking his departure from the locality.

"Wherefore it is ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the applicant be, and he is hereby, awarded compensation for the disability period, January 10, 1919, to February 20, 1919, less the ten days' waiting period, or 31 days, or fifty-four dollars and eighty-one cents."

In denying the application for additional compensation the commission merely adhered to the reasons originally given, and the plaintiff presents the record to this court for review.

Rule 19 which is referred to in the decision of the commission, and pursuant to which it refused to allow plaintiff additional compensation, reads as follows:

"An injured employe who desires to leave the locality in which he or she has been employed during the treatment of his or her injury or desires to leave the state, shall report to his or her attending physician for examination, notifying the commission in writing of such intention to leave, accompanying such notice with a certificate from the attending physician, setting forth the exact nature of the injury, the condition of the employe, together with a statement of the probable length of time disability will continue. After complying with the requirements herein set forth and upon written consent of the commission, the employe may leave the locality in which he or she has been employed, otherwise no compensation will be allowed during such absence from the locality in which he or she has been employed."

Plaintiff's counsel vigorously assail the findings and conclusions of the commission, and further insist that it was without power or authority to adopt rule 19. They contend, however, that if it be conceded that the commission possessed such power, yet said rule is unreasonable, and for that reason the rule is without force or effect. Without pausing now to point out the particular powers that are conferred on the commission with regard to adopting and promulgating rules and regulations, we are clearly of the opinion that the commission has ample power to promulgate all reasonable rules and regulations for the protection of those who are injured, and also to protect the rights of the employer, and that of the insurance carrier, and may safeguard the state insurance fund. The rules that are promulgated, however, must be reasonable, and must conform to the spirit of the Compensation Act (Laws 1917, chapter 100, as amended by Laws 1919, chapter 63).

In view of its decision and the evidence, which is certified to this court by the commission, the only question we can consider here is the reasonableness of rule 19.

It will be observed that according to the provisions of rule 19 the employe is permitted to leave the locality in which he was employed only after he has complied with those requirements "and upon the written consent of the commission, * * * otherwise no compensation will be allowed during * * * the absence of the employe from the locality in which he has been employed." The rule is absolute and inflexible to the effect that if the employe leave the locality of his employment without complying with its requirements and without the written consent of the commission "no compensation will be allowed during" such absence. The employe thus forfeits all compensation regardless of the cause which may have induced or required him to leave the locality of his employment. It will also be observed that the forfeiture is imposed without giving him a hearing so far as the rule is concerned. As a matter of course, if the commission may forfeit all compensation merely because the rule is disregarded, no hearing is necessary. We are of the opinion, however, that the commission may not forfeit any part...