Vartanian v. Monsanto Co., Civil Action No. 92-30223-MAP.

• Decision Date: 20 February 1997
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 92-30223-MAP.
• Citation: 956 F.Supp. 61
• Parties: Leo VARTANIAN, Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

956 F.Supp. 61

Leo VARTANIAN, Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 92-30223-MAP.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

February 20, 1997.

John C. Sikorski, John W. Lake, Robinson, Donovan, Madden & Barry, Springfield, MA, for Leo Vartanian.

Francis D. Dibble, Jr., Jerome M. Scully, Bulkley, Richardson & Gelinas, Springfield, MA, Richard J. Pautler, Richard P. Sher, Peper, Martin, Jensen, Maichel & Hetlage, St. Louis, MO, for Monsanto Company, The Monsanto Company Salaried Employee's Pension Plan (1986), The Monsanto Special Voluntary Retirement Incentive Plan for MCC and Corporate Staff Employees, The Employee Benefits Plans Committee of the Monsanto Company.

MEMORANDUM REGARDING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(Docket No. 57)

PONSOR, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION.

On March 27, 1990 plaintiff Leo Vartanian, a thirty-six year employee of the defendant Monsanto, notified his employer that he would be retiring in thirteen months, effective May 1, 1991. At that time he was the beneficiary of a pension plan adopted by Monsanto in 1986.

In the late winter and spring of 1990-91 Vartanian began to hear rumors about a new, more generous pension plan possibly under consideration by defendant. He made inquiry about these rumors to appropriate personnel at Monsanto. They told him that no new pension provisions applicable to him were under consideration. Relying on these comments plaintiff then left Monsanto as planned on May 1, 1991, receiving a lump sum in full payment of his pension entitlement.

Plaintiff subsequently learned that, following his departure, a new pension plan was in fact adopted. Under its terms he would have received a significant addition to his lump sum had he continued in Monsanto's employ until December 1, 1991. He now contends that he was the victim of misrepresentations by Monsanto personnel, and that he would have remained employed for the additional seven months and received the additional payment but for these misrepresentations. Plaintiff has charged that Monsanto's conduct violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq.

Defendants have moved for summary judgment, contending that the facts of record, distilled from extensive discovery, support only one material conclusion: Monsanto had no new pension plan applicable to the plaintiff under serious consideration at the time plaintiff made his inquiries, or indeed even at the time of his retirement on May 1, 1991. Because the court agrees that no factfinder could reasonably draw any other inference from this record, it will allow defendants' motion.

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND.

The complaint as originally filed on November 6, 1992 asserted claims in Counts I-III under ERISA and in Count IV under the common law. On December 15, 1992, Monsanto filed a motion to dismiss. On May 24, 1993 this court allowed the defendant's motion, holding that the common law claims were preempted by ERISA, and that plaintiff lacked standing to pursue his ERISA claims because he was not a participant in, or beneficiary of, the 1991 pension plan.

On February 2, 1994 the First Circuit affirmed that portion of the May 24 decision dismissing the plaintiff's common law claims, but reversed the part holding that plaintiff lacked standing to pursue claims under ERISA. Accepting the facts as pled, the Court of Appeals concluded that plaintiff was "within the `zone of interests' ERISA was intended to protect." Vartanian v. Monsanto Co., 14 F.3d 697, 702 (1st Cir.1994), citing Astor v. International Business Machines Corp., 7 F.3d 533, 538-39 (6th Cir.1993).

Upon remand, this court dismissed Count II of plaintiff's complaint, which alleged that the defendants had violated ERISA by failing to disclose to plaintiff that they were considering a business restructuring. What remain now before the court are Count I, which claims that defendants violated ERISA by failing to disclose that they were "seriously considering" a sweetened pension plan, and Count III, which charges that defendants violated ERISA by interfering with plaintiff's efforts to obtain benefits under the new plan.

In addressing the dispositive motions previously filed, this court as well as the First Circuit of course accepted the facts as pled in the complaint. In particular, the court assumed that plaintiff could prove that a new, more generous pension plan applicable to plaintiff, in fact, was under "serious consideration" at the time plaintiff made his inquiries before retirement. While conceding that this allegation would have to be accepted for purposes of the motions to dismiss, Monsanto's counsel has always made it clear that, if the case proceeded, defendants would vigorously contest this factual claim. Now, with the completion of discovery, defendants have argued that no material fact — nothing beyond plaintiff's ardent speculation — supports plaintiff's contention that any such "serious consideration" was underway at the relevant time. Defendants now contend that, to the contrary, the entire record (even viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff) confirms that no serious consideration of any new plan applicable to the plaintiff occurred until after he left the defendant's employ. As noted above, because the court is compelled to agree, defendants' motion will be allowed.

III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) permits summary judgment only if:

... the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

The burden on the moving party under rule 56 is heavy. All facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in support of that party's position. Stepanischen v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Corp., 722 F.2d 922, 928 (1st Cir. 1983).

At the same time, the non-moving party also bears a significant weight — the obligation to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(e). These facts cannot be merely "conjectural or problematic." Mack v. The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company, Inc., 871 F.2d 179, 181 (1st Cir.1989).

[S]peculation and surmise, even when coupled with effervescent optimism that something definite will materialize further down the line, are impuissant in the face of a properly documented summary judgment motion.

Roche v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 81 F.3d 249, 253 (1st Cir.1996).

The Supreme Court has described the reason for placing this obligation on the nonmoving party succinctly:

... there is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied).

In assessing a motion for summary judgment, this court must place the facts of record against the Rule 56 grid. In other words, the court must determine if it is proper, and fair to the parties, to permit the case to move forward to trial. Obviously, it is unfair to a defendant to require it to defend allegations for which no possibility of adequate support exists. Less obviously, it is unfair to a plaintiff to perpetuate false hopes and generate expense, financial and otherwise, in a cause that is clearly doomed.

IV. FACTS VIEWED IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO PLAINTIFF.

Plaintiff began working for Monsanto Company in June of 1954. By 1991 Monsanto had two operating units, known as the Monsanto Agriculture Company (MAC) and Monsanto Chemical Company (MCC). MCC itself had five operating divisions: Plastics, Resins, Fibers, Rubber and Detergents & Phosphates.

In 1991, plaintiff worked for MCC in the Plastics Division at its Indian Orchard facility. The Indian Orchard facility was also home to employees of the Resins Division, but Resins operated independently of Plastics.

Plaintiff was a participant in a pension plan known as The Monsanto Company Salaried Employees' Pension Plan, first offered in 1986 ("the 1986 Plan"). In May of 1989, plaintiff asked Monsanto to inform him of the amount of his potential lump sum benefit under the terms of the 1986 plan; on December 22, 1989, he informed Monsanto that he intended to retire as of January 1, 1991. Later, plaintiff changed his mind and stated that he intended to retire May 1, 1991, at which time he would be taking his benefits in a lump sum.

In the past, and as recently as the mid-80's, Monsanto had offered some employees a sweetened retirement deal in the form of early retirement or severance programs. Plaintiff learned that as of October 1990 MAC, not MCC, had offered enhanced pension benefits to some of its employees. In early 1991, he heard rumors that MCC might also be considering a more generous pension package.

Also in early 1991 MCC President Robert Potter began talking with Francis Reining, vice president of finance, and Robert Kaltenrider, a manager on Reining's staff, about ways to streamline MCC's operations in the face of projections of continued decreases in net income. These discussions focused on possibly discontinuing certain product lines or closing plants at several locations. None of the potential plant or product line closings involved the Plastics Division. No attempt was made by any of the three to draft, to discuss, or even to gather any information about, any new pension plan for MCC.

In March of 1991, following up on the rumors he had heard, plaintiff asked his immediate supervisor, Charles Eggert, whether there was any substance to the gossip about some sort of more generous early retirement plan at MCC...