VaSalle v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

• Decision Date: 28 November 2001
• Docket Number: No. 2001-C-0462.,2001-C-0462.
• Citation: 801 So.2d 331
• Parties: Lisa VASALLE and Renelle VaSalle v. WAL-MART STORES, INC., et al.
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

801 So.2d 331

Lisa VASALLE and Renelle VaSalle v. WAL-MART STORES, INC., et al.

No. 2001-C-0462.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

November 28, 2001.

Rehearing Denied January 11, 2002.

Marianne Garvey, Dominic J. Gianna, Middleberg, Riddle & Gianna, New Orleans, Counsel for Applicant.

Jere J. Bice, Donald W. McKnight, Raleigh Newman, Lake Charles, Counsel for Respondent.

KIMBALL, Justice.¹

We granted certiorari to determine whether the district court had the right to reconsider its ruling giving defendants the choice between additur and new trial and, after defendants chose a new trial, subsequently grant plaintiffs' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("JNOV"). For the reasons that follow, we conclude the district court had the right to reconsider its interlocutory rulings prior to the signing of a final judgment. We further conclude that the jury's verdict was reasonably based on the evidence presented at trial and plaintiffs were not entitled to JNOV or a new trial.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 2, 1995, Lisa VaSalle was shopping in a Wal-Mart store located in Moss Bluff, Louisiana. As she stooped down in front of a magazine rack, Ms. VaSalle was struck by a shopping cart being pushed by a Wal-Mart employee. Initially, Ms. VaSalle did not report any injuries and did not seek immediate medical treatment. Later, however, Ms. Va-Salle consulted with a doctor who had treated her for a previous back injury. After a period of conservative treatment, Ms. VaSalle's doctor ultimately recommended that she undergo back surgery.

Ms. VaSalle and her husband filed the instant suit against Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., its employee, Glenn Goodeaux, and its insurer, National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (collectively referred to as "Wal-Mart" or "defendants"). The matter was tried before a jury in September 1998. At the close of the evidence, the district court entered a directed verdict in favor of plaintiffs on the issue of liability, finding that Wal-Mart was 100% at fault in causing Ms. VaSalle's accident and resultant injuries. Subsequently, the jury awarded plaintiffs a total of $70,000 in damages, including $15,000 in past medical expenses, $20,000 in future medical expenses, $25,000 in pain and suffering, and $10,000 in future loss of earning capacity. The jury made no awards for permanent disability or for Mr. VaSalle's loss of consortium.

After the district court signed a judgment in conformity with the jury's verdict, plaintiffs filed a timely motion for JNOV, or alternatively for additur or new trial. After a contradictory hearing on the motion, the district court, on January 29, 1999, signed a ruling entitled "Opinion" wherein it found that the jury's award was inadequate and that additur was warranted. The court determined plaintiffs were entitled to a total of $426,628.69 in damages, including $15,128.69 in past medical expenses, $32,000 in future medical expenses, $250,000 in pain and suffering and disability, $114,500 in future loss of earning capacity, and $15,000 in loss of consortium. The district court gave Wal-Mart fifteen days to request a new trial or agree to the additur. The court's "Opinion" concluded with the sentence, "A judgment to this effect will be signed when presented."

On February 5, 1999, Wal-Mart filed a motion objecting to the additur and requesting a new trial. Attached to Wal-Mart's motion was a proposed order granting plaintiffs' motion for a new trial and re-fixing the case for trial. The district court never acted on this order. On February 18, 1999, plaintiffs filed a motion seeking reconsideration of their original motion for JNOV, which had not been mentioned in the trial court's January 29, 1999 "Opinion." Following another contradictory hearing, the district court signed a judgment granting a JNOV and awarding plaintiffs damages in the total amount of $426,628.69, the same amount set forth in the January 29, 1999 "Opinion." In a separate "Opinion" signed on March 30, 2000, the district court stated that the jury's award was abusively low and JNOV was therefore warranted. The court noted that it had reached the conclusion that the jury's award was unquestionably low in its previous "Opinion," and that a miscarriage of justice would result if the jury's award was allowed to stand.

Wal-Mart appealed the district court's judgment. In an opinion not designated for publication, the court of appeal affirmed. VaSalle v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 00-0950 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/6/00), 778 So.2d 108. The court of appeal found that because the district court's January 29, 1999 "Opinion" was never reduced to judgment, Wal-Mart's right to a new trial under La. C.C.P. art. 1814² did not attach. Moreover, the court of appeal reasoned, the judgment reflecting the jury's verdict was not reformed by the district court's January 29, 1999 "Opinion" because Wal-Mart never consented to the additur and the damage award therefore remained at $70,000. Based on this reasoning, the court of appeal determined that Wal-Mart was not entitled to a new trial under art. 1814. Next, the court of appeal concluded that the district court properly granted plaintiffs' motion for JNOV and did not abuse its vast discretion in awarding $426,628.69 in damages.

We granted certiorari upon Wal-Mart's application to consider the correctness of the court of appeal's judgment. VaSalle v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 01-0462 (La.4/20/01), 790 So.2d 8.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

In its first assignment of error, Wal-Mart contends that the trial court's January 29, 1999 ruling granting the additur was a final, appealable judgment. Thus, Wal-Mart argues, the court's judgment granting the JNOV made a substantive change to that earlier judgment in violation of La. C.C.P. art. 1951, which allows amendment of a final judgment only to alter the phraseology of the judgment, but not the substance, or to correct errors of calculation.³ Wal-Mart further contends that the district court's grant of JNOV effectively eliminated its right to a new trial provided by La. C.C.P. art. 1814. For the reasons that follow, we find Wal-Mart's arguments are without merit, primarily because the court's January 29, 1999 ruling, giving defendants a choice between additur and new trial, was not a final, appealable order.

It is well-settled that prior to final judgment a district court may, at its discretion and on its own motion, change the result of interlocutory rulings it finds to be erroneous. Babineaux v. Pernie-Bailey Drilling Co., 261 La. 1080, 262 So.2d 328, 332 (1972) ("[I]nterlocutory orders overruling... peremptory exceptions cannot be binding upon the trial court when it timely—but later—determines error of judgment based upon the matter as submitted or upon subsequent disclosures in the record which require a contrary holding."); Labourdette v. Doullut & Williams Shipbuilding Co., 156 La. 412, 100 So. 547, 548 (1924) ("The judge had the right ... at the stage of the proceeding at which the objection was made, to set aside that [interlocutory] decree, even of his own motion, and thereafter to sustain the exception, upon finding that he had erred in overruling it."); Register v. Harrell, 131 La. 983, 60 So. 638, 639 (1912) ("We can only hold that it was still in the power of the court to recall the prior erroneous ruling and reject the testimony offered on the ground that the petition of plaintiffs did not aver a cause of action."); Hamilton v. His Creditors, 25 So. 965, 966 (La. 1898) ("The judgment of this court, however, denying the motion to dismiss, is to be regarded as in the nature of an interlocutory order, subject to revision in the rendition of the final judgment on the merits."); State ex rel. Leche v. Fowler, 7 So. 180, 181 (La.1889) ("If not a definitive judgment, it is an interlocutory judgment, and as such is revisable by the court before final adjudication. It has been settled by frequent rulings that where a court, whether of original or appellate jurisdiction, discovers that an order given by it is erroneous it may itself set it aside without any formal motion."). See also Muller v. Muller, 94-281 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/5/94), 643 So.2d 478

; Lee v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 623 So.2d 150 (La.App. 1 Cir.1993); Bordelon v. Dauzat, 389 So.2d 820 (La.App. 3 Cir.1980); Grady v. Allstate Ins. Co., 355 So.2d 1070 (La.App. 4 Cir.1978); Arnold v. Stupp Corp., 249 So.2d 276 (La.App. 1 Cir.1971). Because courts have this right, we must determine whether the district court's ruling giving defendants the option to agree to an additur or submit to a new trial was an interlocutory ruling. If it was an interlocutory ruling, then it was subject to recall by the judge prior to final judgment. If, on the other hand, the ruling was a final, appealable judgment, then the district court would not be free to overrule it upon plaintiffs' motion.

La. C.C.P. art. 1841 provides that a final judgment is one that determines the merits in whole or in part. Concomitantly, a judgment that does not determine the merits but only preliminary matters in the course of the action is an interlocutory judgment. La. C.C.P. art. 1841. Article 1814, which provides for remittitur and additur, does not address the status to be afforded the ruling by the trial court giving a party a time limit within which he may consent to the additur or remittitur. Furthermore, this court has never addressed this issue. Consequently, we may look to other jurisdictions with similar rules for guidance in making this determination.

An issue similar to that raised in the instant case has recently been addressed by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. In Anderson v. Roberson, 249 F.3d 539 (6th Cir.2001), the court of appeals explained that a district court's order giving plaintiff a choice between remittitur or a new trial is not a final, appealable order.⁴ In that case, the federal appellate court dismissed an appeal taken after the district...