Vasquez v. Kijakazi
| Docket Number | Civ. 20-0776 WJ/KBM |
| Decision Date | 11 March 2022 |
| Parties | SAMUEL A. VASQUEZ O/B/O YVONNE VASQUEZ-CHACON, DECEASED CLAIMANT FOR SAMANTHA VASQUEZ, MINOR DAUGHTER OF CLAIMANT YVONNE M. VASQUEZ-CHACON, Plaintiff, v. KILOLOKIJAKAZI, [1] Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico |
PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiffs [sic] Motion to Reverse or Remand Administrative Agency Decision (Doc 23) filed on June 1, 2021. Having carefully reviewed the parties' positions and the material portions of the record, the Court recommends that the motion be denied.
On December 15, 2016, Ms. Yvonne Vasquez-Chacon ("Ms. Vasquez-Chacon") filed applications with the Social Security Administration for a period of disability and Disability Insurance Benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act ("SSA"), and for Supplemental Security Income under Title XVI of the SSA. Administrative Record[2] (AR) at 15, 86, 99. She alleged a disability onset date of February 24, 2014. AR at 100. Disability Determination Services determined that Ms. Vasquez-Chacon was not disabled both initially (AR at 86-95) and on reconsideration (AR at 99-109). Ms. Vasquez-Chacon requested a hearing with an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") on the merits of her applications. AR at 125-26. Prior to the hearing, however, she passed away. AR at 171-72. Her father, Samuel Vasquez, filed a substitution of party and proceeded with her claims. AR at 171. Mr. Vasquez, together with counsel, attended two hearings before an ALJ in connection with Ms. Vasquez-Chacon's disability applications. AR at 35-79. Both Mr. Vasquez and a vocational expert ("VE") testified. See AR at 36-72.
ALJ Jeffrey N. Holappa issued an unfavorable decision on July 17, 2019. AR at 15-27. Mr. Vasquez submitted a Request for Review of Hearing Decision/Order to the Appeals Council (AR at 232-33), which the Council denied on October 22, 2019 (AR at 1-3). Consequently, the ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. See Doyal v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 758, 759 (10th Cir. 2003).
A claimant seeking disability benefits must establish that she is unable "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505(a), 416.905(a). The Commissioner must use a five-step sequential evaluation process to determine eligibility for benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4); see also Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 1048, 1052 (10th Cir. 2009).
The claimant has the burden at the first four steps of the process to show: (1) she is not engaged in "substantial gainful activity"; (2) she has a "severe medically determinable . . . impairment... or a combination of impairments" that has lasted or is expected to last for at least one year; and (3) her impairment(s) meet or equal one of the listings in Appendix 1, Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404; or (4) pursuant to the assessment of his residual functional capacity (RFC), she is unable to perform her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i-iv), 416.920(a)(4)(i-iv); see also Grogan v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 1257, 1261 (10th Cir. 2005). "RFC is a multidimensional description of the work-related abilities [a claimant] retain[s] in spite of her medical impairments." Ryan v. Colvin, Civ. 15-0740 KBM, 2016 WL 8230660, at *2 (D.N.M. Sept. 29, 2016) . If the claimant meets "the burden of establishing a prima facie case of disability[, ]... the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner at step five to show that" the claimant retains sufficient RFC "to perform work in the national economy, given [her] age, education, and work experience." Grogan, 399 F.3d at 1261 (citing Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 751 & n.2 (10th Cir. 1988)); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v).
At Step One of the process, [3] ALJ Jeffrey N. Holappa found that Ms. Vasquez-Chacon "had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since February 24, 2014, the alleged onset date." AR at 18 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1571-1576, 416.971-976). At Step Two, the ALJ concluded that Ms. Vasquez-Chacon "had the following severe impairments: Degenerative Disc Disease of the Lumbar Spine/Spinal Stenosis/Radiculopathy, Alcoholic Cirrhosis with Esophageal Varices, Pancytopenia, Hepatitis C, Portal Vein Thrombosis/Status-Post Failed TIPS Procedure, Small Umbilical Hernia, and Hepatic Encephalopathy." AR at 18 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c)). The ALJ also found that Ms. Vasquez-Chacon had the following non-severe impairments: depression, anxiety, and substance abuse. AR at 18-19. Similarly, the ALJ acknowledged that Ms. Vasquez-Chacon was 5'6" and weighed 190 pounds but concluded that her obesity was not disabling and did not "aggravate[] her other impairments to the point that they would prevent the reduced range of light exertion specified in the claimant's residual functional capacity." AR at 18.
At Step Three, the ALJ found that Ms. Vasquez-Chacon "did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meet or medically equal the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 [C.F.R.] Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1." AR at 20 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925, 416.926). At Step Four, the ALJ considered the evidence of record and found that Ms. Vasquez-Chacon:
had the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 [C.F.R. §§] 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except she was limited to occasional climbing of ramps & stairs, never climbing ladders or scaffolds, occasional balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching and crawling, and could have no exposure to unprotected heights or moving mechanical parts.
AR at 20. Based on this RFC, ALJ Holappa found that Ms. Vasquez-Chacon "was unable to perform any past relevant work." AR at 25 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1565, 416.965). The ALJ also found that Ms. Vasquez-Chacon could perform the jobs of Housekeeping Cleaner (DOT 323.687-014), Marker (DOT 209.587-034), and Cleaner/Polisher (709.687-010). AR at 26. Consequently, the ALJ ultimately determined that Ms. Vasquez-Chacon "ha[d] not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from February 24, 2014, through the date of [the ALJ's] decision." AR at 26 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g)).
The Court must "review the Commissioner's decision to determine whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether the correct legal standards were applied." Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Hackett v. Bamhart, 395 F.3d 1168, 1172 (10th Cir. 2005)). A deficiency in either area is grounds for remand. Keyes-Zachary v. Astrue, 695 F.3d 1156, 1161, 1166 (10th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). "Substantial evidence is 'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Lax, 489 F.3d at 1084 (quoting Hackett, 395 F.3d at 1172). "It requires more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance." Id. (quoting Zoltanski v. F.A.A., 372 F.3d 1195, 1200 (10th Cir. 2004)). The Court will "consider whether the ALJ followed the specific rules of law that must be followed in weighing particular types of evidence in disability cases, but [it] will not reweigh the evidence or substitute [its] judgment for the Commissioner's." Id. (quoting Hackett, 395 F.3d at 1172 (quotation marks omitted)).
"The possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency's findings from being supported by substantial evidence." Id. (quoting Zoltanski, 372 F.3d at 1200). The Court "may not 'displace the agenc[y's] choice between two fairly conflicting views, even though the court would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before it de novo.'" Id. (quoting Zoltanski, 372 F.3d at 1200).
Mr. Valdez raises the following issues in his motion: (1) that the ALJ failed to properly consider Ms. Vasquez-Chacon's non-severe impairments when determining her RFC; and (2) that the ALJ erred in relying upon vocational testimony that significant numbers of jobs exist that Ms. Vasquez-Chacon could have performed. Doc. 23-1 at 19- 23. Mr. Valdez also asserts sub-arguments as discussed below. For the reasons that follow, the Court should reject each of Mr. Valdez's arguments and affirm the ALJ's decision.
First, Mr. Vasquez argues that the ALJ erred by failing to determine the effects, if any, that Ms. Vasquez-Chacon's mental impairments had on her capacity to perform work. Doc. 23-1 at 21. He suggests that the ALJ erred in his consideration of the non-severe mental limitations assessed by state agency consultants, Cathy Simutis, Ph.D and Stephen Scott, Ph.D and, instead, only "summarily address[ed] the State agency psychological consultants in a 2 sentence paragraph" before assigning them "great weight." Id. Mr. Vasquez maintains that the state agency consultants' opinions regarding Ms. Vasquez-Chacon's mental limitations should have been disregarded. See Doc. 28 at 4.
In her June 28, 2017 opinion, Dr. Simutis observed that Ms Vasquez-Chacon was diagnosed with bipolar...
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