Vasquez v. Leprino Foods Co.

• Decision Date: 01 May 2021
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 1:17-cv-00796-AWI-BAM
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
• Parties: ISAIAS VASQUEZ and LINDA HEFKE, on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs, v. LEPRINO FOODS COMPANY, a Colorado Corporation; LEPRINO FOODS DAIRY PRODUCTS COMPANY, a Colorado Corporation; and DOES 1-50, inclusive, Defendants.

ISAIAS VASQUEZ and LINDA HEFKE,on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs, v. LEPRINO FOODS COMPANY, a Colorado Corporation;

LEPRINO FOODS DAIRY PRODUCTS COMPANY, a Colorado Corporation;

and DOES 1-50, inclusive, Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:17-cv-00796-AWI-BAM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

May 1, 2021

ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

(Doc. No. 189)

In this class action lawsuit, Isaias Vasquez and Linda Hefke are suing two cheese manufacturing companies, Leprino Foods Company and Leprino Foods Dairy Products Company.¹ Before the court is Plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the pleadings, which challenges Leprino's numerous affirmative defenses on multiple grounds. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant in part and deny in part Plaintiffs' motion.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs filed their lawsuit on May 8, 2017. The action proceeds on Plaintiffs' third-amended complaint, which sets forth the following seven (now-certified) class claims: (1) failureto provide legally compliant meal and rest periods or compensation in lieu thereof, Cal. Labor Code §§ 226.7, 512, and California Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order 8-2001 ("Wage Order 8"); (2) failure to furnish accurate wage statements, Cal. Labor Code § 226; (3) failure to pay minimum wages, Cal. Labor Code § 1194 and Wage Order 8; (4) failure to pay wages for all hours worked, Cal. Labor Code § 204; (5) failure to pay overtime wages, Cal. Labor Code §§ 510, 1194, and Wage Order 8; (6) failure to pay separation wages, Cal. Labor Code §§ 201-203; and (7) unfair competition law ("UCL") violations, Cal. Bus. & Profs. Code § 17200 et seq. Doc. No. 61. In its operative answer—which was filed on February 12, 2019—Leprino pleaded twenty-six affirmative defenses and reserved the right to assert additional defenses. Doc. No. 70. On November 16, 2020, Plaintiffs moved for judgment on the pleadings as to all of these matters. Doc. No. 189. Leprino filed an opposition, to which Plaintiffs replied. Doc. Nos. 192 & 199.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides that "[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings. " Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). A Rule 12(c) motion is reviewed under the same standard as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 1989) (describing the motions as "functionally identical" except for time of filing). The court takes as true the non-moving party's factual allegations and draws all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Hines v. Youseff, 914 F.3d 1218, 1227 (9th Cir. 2019); Living Designs, Inc. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 431 F.3d 353, 360 (9th Cir. 2005). Judgment under Rule 12(c) "is proper when the moving party clearly establishes on the face of the pleadings that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1989). While Rule 12(c) does not address "partial" judgments, it is common practice to apply the rule to individual claims and defenses. Mays v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 3d 1136, 1141 (C.D. Cal. 2019). Likewise, although unmentioned in Rule 12(c), a court may grant a motion with leave to amend, but it need not do so if amendment would be futile or unfairly prejudicial or if the amending party acted in bad faith orunduly delayed. Deveraturda v. Globe Aviation Sec. Servs., 454 F.3d 1043, 1046 (9th Cir. 2006).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs challenge Leprino's affirmative defenses under Rule 12(c) on one or more of the following grounds: (1) the defense is not an affirmative defense, but a denial or negative defense; (2) the defense is inapplicable to Plaintiffs' causes of action; and (3) the defense is pleaded with insufficient factual support. Leprino voluntarily withdraws its seventh (standing), twelfth (laches), and thirteenth (mitigation of damages) affirmative defenses in opposition to Plaintiffs' motion.

A. Non-Affirmative Defenses

Before turning to the merits of Plaintiffs' "non-affirmative defenses" challenges, the Court must resolve a dispute regarding the proper procedural device for consideration of the challenges.

1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f)

Plaintiffs seek judgment in their favor on several of Leprino's defenses on grounds that the challenged matters are not actually cognizable affirmative defenses, but rather denials, negative defenses, or other non-affirmative defenses. Leprino mostly agrees with Plaintiffs' characterizations, but also contends that these specific challenges are improperly raised through a Rule 12(c) motion. According to Leprino, Plaintiffs should have moved to strike any non-affirmative defenses under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), and that their doing so now would result in an untimely Rule 12(f) motion. Plaintiffs reject Leprino's theory and insist that their entire motion should be considered solely through the lens of Rule 12(c).

Taking a step back for some additional context, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) provides in part that "a party must affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c). "[A]n affirmative defense, under the meaning of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c), is a defense that does not negate the elements of the plaintiff's claim, but instead precludes liability even if all of the elements of the plaintiff's claim are proven." Barnes v. AT & T Pension Ben. Plan, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1173 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (quoted source omitted). "It is a defenseon which the defendant has the burden of proof." Id. at 1174. In contrast, "[a] defense which demonstrates that plaintiff has not met its burden of proof is not an affirmative defense." Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002). Defenses of this nature are usually described as "denials" or "negative defenses." See Gomez v. J. Jacobo Farm Labor Contractor, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 3d 986, 995 (E.D. Cal. 2016); Barnes, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 1173-74; see also 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1270 (3d ed.) (distinguishing affirmative defenses from denials or negative defenses that directly contradict elements of the plaintiff's claim for relief).

Affirmative defenses are usually (but not always) challenged through motions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), which allows courts to "strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f); see also Barnes, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 1170 (explaining that Rule 12(f) motions can save time and money, but also are generally disfavored because of the potential for delay tactics and the limited importance of pleadings in federal practice). When denials and negative defenses are challenged under Rule 12(f), courts, including this one, often strike these pleadings as redundant. See, e.g., Gomez, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 1001, 1003-04; Barnes, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 1174. Yet, the same outcome cannot be reached through a Rule 12(c) motion, as granting judgment in the plaintiff's favor on a denial or negative defense is functionally very different than striking a redundant pleading. Where a defense is a denial that asserts the plaintiff has not proved an element of her prima facie case, judgment under Rule 12(c) is improper because the plaintiff has not established that no material issue of fact remains. That is, the redundant denial itself shows on the face of the pleadings the existence of a material issue of fact.

Thus, in so far as some of Leprino's pleaded defenses are not actually affirmative defenses, Plaintiffs' commitment to having these particular defenses considered under Rule 12(c) is misplaced. Moreover, Leprino correctly points out that the twenty-one-day period for Plaintiffs to have moved to strike any non-affirmative defenses under Rule 12(f) has long expired. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f)(2). Nonetheless, because Plaintiffs' motion brings these and other issues to the fore, the Court will exercise its discretionary authority under Rule 12(f) to consider striking Leprino'sdenials, negative defenses, and other non-affirmative defenses on its own initiative. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f)(1). The Court will consider the rest of Plaintiffs' motion as it was filed—that is, as a Rule 12(c) motion challenging Leprino's actual affirmative defenses. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2)(B) (indicating that failure to state a legal defense to a claim may be raised by a Rule 12(c) motion); see also Neo4j, Inc. v. PureThink, LLC, No. 5:18-cv-07182-EJD, 2020 WL 2614871, at *8 (N.D. Cal. May 21, 2020) (granting judgment on the pleadings against affirmative defenses); Mag Instrument, Inc. v. JS Prod., Inc., 595 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1109-11 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (same).

2. Denials (Affirmative Defenses 3, 17, 18, 23, 24, 25, and 26)

For its third affirmative defense, Leprino states that the class claims are barred "to the extent that Defendants acted in accordance with the applicable law, state regulations, and applicable order of the California Industrial Welfare Commission in effect during the relevant time periods." Doc. No. 70 at 15. For its seventeenth affirmative defense, Leprino states that the class claims for monetary relief or restitution are barred and subject to offset "to the extent that Plaintiffs or any alleged putative class member has received premium pay for any on-duty meal periods or any payments under Labor Code Section 226.7." Doc. No. 70 at 17. For its eighteenth affirmative defense, Leprino states that the class claims for monetary relief or restitution are barred and subject to offset "to the extent that Plaintiffs or any alleged putative class member has received premium pay for any on-duty rest periods or any payments under Labor Code Section 226.7." Doc. No. 70 at 17. For its...