Vasquez v. North County Transit Dist.
| Decision Date | 11 June 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 01-55326.,No. 01-55415.,01-55326.,01-55415. |
| Citation | 292 F.3d 1049 |
| Parties | Kenneth VASQUEZ; Linda Vasquez, as individuals, Plaintiffs-Appellants, City of San Diego, a municipal corporation, permissibly self-insured, Intervenor-Appellant, v. NORTH COUNTY TRANSIT DISTRICT (NCTD); San Diego Northern Railroad Company (subsidiary of NCTD); Metropolitan Transit Development Board; Santa Fe Railway; Atchison Railroad; Topeka Railroad; Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Company; San Diego Metropolitan Transit Board; San Diego Metropolitan Transit District; National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) (formerly DOE 2); and DOES 4 through 200, inclusive, Defendants-Appellees, and Safetran Systems (formerly DOE 3); Western Cullen-Hayes, Inc. (formerly DOE 1), Defendants. Kenneth Vasquez; Linda Vasquez, as individuals, Plaintiffs-Appellees, City of San Diego, a municipal corporation, permissibly self-insured, Intervenor-Appellee, v. North County Transit District, San Diego Northern Railroad Company (subsidiary of NCTD); Santa Fe Railway; Atchison Railroad; Topeka Railroad; Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Company; San Diego Metropolitan Transit Board; San Diego Metropolitan Transit District; Western Cullen-Hayes, Inc. (formerly DOE 1); National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) (formerly DOE 2); Safetran Systems (formerly DOE 3); and DOES 4 through 200, inclusive, Defendants, and Metropolitan Transit Development Board, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Dan Zeidman, Law Offices of Dan Zeidman, El Cajon, CA, for the plaintiffs-appellants-plaintiffs-appellees.
Tracy R. Richmond, Worden, Williams, Richmond, Brechtel & Gibbs, APC, Solana Beach, CA, for the defendants-appellees Robert R. Heft and Lee H. Roistacher, Daley & Heft, Solana Beach, CA, for the defendant-appellee-defendant-appellant.
Robert J. Mulcahy, Deputy City Attorney, City of San Diego, for the intervenor-appellant-intervenor-appellee.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California; M. James Lorenz, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-97-01996-L(POR).
Before: REINHARDT and GRABER, Circuit Judges, and HUNT,* District Judge.
Plaintiff Kenneth Vasquez brought this action against Defendants Metropolitan Transit Development Board (Board), North County Transit District, San Diego Northern Railroad Company, and Amtrak to recover damages for personal injury.1 Vasquez, a police officer, was hurt while working when a railroad crossing-gate arm broke and struck him on the head. The City of San Diego (City), which covered the resulting workers' compensation claim, intervened to recover benefits paid to Vasquez.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on the ground that the "firefighter's rule" prevented Vasquez and the City from recovering damages. That doctrine generally bars firefighters and police officers from suing those whose negligence caused or contributed to a fire or dangerous condition that, in turn, caused the firefighter's or officer's injury or death.
However, the district court had denied two motions in which the Board sought to dispose of the City's claim. First, the Board argued that the City's claim arose under California workers' compensation law and, therefore, could not be removed to federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c). The district court disagreed, ruling that the claim did not arise under the workers' compensation law. Second, the Board argued that the City was not a proper party to recover expenses that it incurred as a result of Vasquez' disability retirement. The district court ruled to the contrary.
Vasquez and the City appeal the district court's grant of summary judgment to Defendants, and the Board cross-appeals the district court's denial of its two motions. We hold that (1) the firefighter's rule does not preclude Vasquez and the City from bringing this action because the "independent cause" exception may apply; (2) 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c) does not divest the district court of jurisdiction because the City's claim against the Board was first properly filed in federal court and no other party objected to removal; and (3) the City may recover funds that it had to pay as a result of Vasquez' disability retirement.
Kenneth Vasquez, a police officer, was dispatched to a railroad crossing in downtown San Diego because the crossing-gate arms at the railroad tracks were stuck in the "down" position and traffic was backing up. While Vasquez was directing traffic, another officer manually lifted the crossing-gate arm across the street from where Vasquez was standing. The arm on Vasquez' side also responded to this manual movement, and all the crossing-gate arms moved into a vertical position. Seeing that the traffic could flow normally again, Vasquez turned his back to the crossing and began to return to his police car. Unfortunately, the crossing-gate arm nearest him broke and fell. Instead of traveling down in its usual arc to a position perpendicular to the roadway, the arm fell sideways and struck Vasquez on the head.
Another officer at the scene found two bolts that had once connected the crossing-gate arm to the lifting mechanism. Apparently, the bolts holding the arm had broken, causing it to fall sideways rather than straight down. The bolts found near the collapsed arm appeared to be unrelated to the electrical unit that raised and lowered the arm.
Vasquez filed an action in state court. He alleged claims for personal injury, premises liability, product defect and product liability, and general negligence. His wife alleged loss of consortium. Amtrak removed the case to federal court on the ground that the company is a federally chartered corporation and the United States of America owns more than one-half the company's capital stock. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1349, 1441(a). Only one other Defendant, North County Transit District, joined in Amtrak's notice of removal, and no party sought remand to the state court within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
Because Vasquez' injuries occurred while he was engaged in his duties as a police officer, he was entitled to workers' compensation benefits. The City, Vasquez' workers' compensation provider, filed a complaint in intervention in state court, pursuant to California Labor Code § 3852,2 seeking to recover the benefits it paid to Vasquez. Although the City properly served the other parties with its state-court complaint in intervention, it failed to serve the Board before the action was removed to federal court. After removal, the City neglected to perfect service against the Board within 120 days as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1448 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m).3
The Board moved to dismiss the City's claim on this ground and on the ground that the district court lacked jurisdiction. The Board asserted that the City's claim could not be removed to federal court because of 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c), which provides: "A civil action in any State court arising under the workmen's compensation laws of such State may not be removed to any district court of the United States." (Emphasis added.) The district court ruled that the City's claim did not "aris[e] under" section 3852 and, therefore, removal of the claim was allowed. However, because the City had failed to effect proper service, the district court dismissed without prejudice the City's complaint against the Board.
The City then filed an amended complaint in intervention, in federal court, which it properly served on the Board and the other parties. In addition to seeking reimbursement for standard workers' compensation benefits, the City sought to recover the excess cost of Vasquez' disability retirement.
Shortly after Amtrak removed the case to federal court, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district court denied. Later, the California Court of Appeal decided Farnam v. State, 84 Cal.App.4th 1448, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 642 (2000). On the basis of that new precedent, Defendants asked to renew their motion for summary judgment. The court permitted them to revive the motion and, thereafter, granted it on the ground that the firefighter's rule barred Vasquez and the City from bringing their claims.
Additionally, the Board filed a motion for partial summary judgment with respect to the City's amended complaint in intervention. The Board argued that the City was not a proper plaintiff to recover disability retirement benefits paid to Vasquez and, accordingly, that the City should not be allowed to pursue that part of its claim. The district court denied the motion.
Vasquez and the City timely appealed, and the Board timely cross-appealed.
We review de novo a grant of summary judgment. Delta Sav. Bank v. United States, 265 F.3d 1017, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 816, 151 L.Ed.2d 700 (2002). The propriety of removal is a question of federal jurisdiction that, likewise, we review de novo. Prize Frize, Inc. v. Matrix (U.S.) Inc., 167 F.3d 1261, 1265 (9th Cir.1999).
We also review de novo the district court's interpretation of state law. Churchill v. F/V Fjord (In re McLinn), 739 F.2d 1395, 1398 (9th Cir.1984) (en banc). When interpreting state law, we are bound to follow the decisions of the state's highest court. Hewitt v. Joyner, 940 F.2d 1561, 1565(9th Cir.1991). "When the state supreme court has not spoken on an issue, we must determine what result the court would reach based on state appellate court opinions, statutes and treatises." Id.
The firefighter's rule originated as a common law doctrine. It precluded firefighters from suing those whose...
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