Vasquez v. Schweiker, 82-1416
| Decision Date | 08 March 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 82-1416,82-1416 |
| Citation | 701 F.2d 733 |
| Parties | Jesse VASQUEZ, Appellant, v. Richard SCHWEIKER, Secretary, Health & Human Services, Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Robert G. Ulrich, U.S. Atty., Judith M. Strong, Asst. U.S. Atty., Francis Reddis, Asst. Regional Atty., Dept. of Health & Human Services, Kansas City, Mo., for appellee.
Larry O. Denny, Kansas City, Mo., for appellant.
Before ROSS, Circuit Judge, HENLEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and FAGG, Circuit Judge.
This is an action involving the review of a denial of disability benefits under the Social Security Act. The district court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 405(g), and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291. The question presented is whether there is substantial evidence, based on the record as a whole, to support the Secretary's decision that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a "disability" as defined by the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 423(d).
Before applying for disability benefits, the plaintiff had worked for ten years at Armco Steel. His duties included the maintenance of two paint booth machines, driving a fork lift, welding, and spraying paint. In December 1979 plaintiff filed an application to establish a period of disability and to obtain disability insurance benefits.
Intermittent hospitalization from June to August of that year revealed that Mr. Vasquez had high blood pressure, diabetes, inflammation of the liver, and alcohol and pep pill addiction. Additionally, plaintiff complains of various nervous disorders, which cause him to shake, hyperventilate, become dizzy, and suffer from headaches, backaches, neck pains and insomnia. Plaintiff testified that he becomes incapacitated during these spells. Two doctors substantiated this testimony.
Mr. Vasquez has undergone extensive diagnosis and treatment. It appears that the symptoms of the diabetes and high blood pressure have been neutralized by diet and medication, and that alcohol and pep pill addiction is in remission. Plaintiff bases his petition for disability payments on the debilitating effects of the nervous disorders.
A hearing was held in January 1981 before the Administrative Law Judge. A vocational expert was asked the following hypothetical question:
I want you to take into account the claimant's training, education, and his experience and working background, and I want you to assume that I will find as a matter of fact that the claimant suffers from high blood pressure, and that the--and also suffers from headaches, he suffers from depression, and he suffers from diabetes, but he indicates that the diabetes is under control; that the claimant also was at one time a dependent upon drugs and that the consumption of alcoholic beverages has caused certain damage to his liver, namely, infection of the liver; and that the claimant has pain about his neck and back, that he's drowsy and he suffers dizzy spells on the frequency of about 4 to 5 times per week; and that the claimant has some restriction, however, he doesn't have any restriction with respect to walking; he cannot stand for more than one half hour at a time; and he can--he has testified that he could lift up to 60 pounds without any adverse effect, with the exception of fatigue; and he has no restriction with respect to sitting; but these impairments are such--of such severity that they would prevent the claimant from working at the--namely the two jobs he has named; one of a machine operator, and the other as a laborer in the steel mill, where he used to perform an assortment of jobs. Now, do you have an opinion, based upon a reasonable certainty, as to what alternative employment the claimant could engage in, and if so, whether jobs exist in the Kansas City, Missouri, area; or other regions of the country, in significant numbers?
The expert testified in response that plaintiff could do sedentary work such as small parts assembler, grinding machine operator, clerk, or a crane operator and light work such as checker, examiner, inspector, porter sexton, or laundry worker. She stated that none of these jobs are stressful and that all were available in the immediate area.
The ALJ found that while the medical evidence established that plaintiff suffers from "anxiety neurosis with underlying depression," plaintiff's allegation of "constant, severe, and unabated pain" was not credible. The ALJ found that plaintiff was not prevented from maintaining gainful employment for any continuous twelve month period. Disability benefits were denied.
Plaintiff contends that the hypothetical question entertained by the vocational expert concerning available work for a period with plaintiff's qualifications and afflictions was deficient by omission of symptoms sufficiently demonstrated by the evidence. In addition, plaintiff alleges that the ALJ's decision failed to give proper weight to the testimony of two doctors who testified that plaintiff could not do sedentary work. The district court refused to disturb the findings of the ALJ.
On appellate review of a decision regarding disability benefits, the determinative standard is whether the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence based on the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 405(g); see also Brand v. Secretary of Dept. of Health, Etc., 623 F.2d 523, 527 (8th Cir.1980). The standard of review is aptly particularized in Janka v. Secretary of Health, Ed. and Welfare, 589 F.2d 365, 367-68 n. 3 (8th Cir.1978):
(a) the claimant has the burden of establishing his claim; (b) the Act is remedial and is to be construed liberally; (c) the Secretary's findings and the reasonable inferences drawn from them are conclusive if they are supported by substantial evidence; (d) substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion; (e) it must be based on the record as a whole; (f) the determination of the presence of substantial evidence is to be made on a case-to-case basis; (g) where the evidence is conflicting it is for the Appeals Council on behalf of the Secretary to resolve those conflicts; (h) the statutory definition of disability imposes a three-fold requirement (1) that there be a medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to [result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months], (2) that there be an inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity, and (3) that the inability be by reason of the impairment; (i) such substantial gainful activity is that which is both substantial and gainful and within the claimant's capability, realistically judged by his education, training, and experience; (j) the emphasis is on the particular claimant's capabilities...
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