Vasquez v. United States

• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York
• Writing for the Court: DEBRA FREEMAN, United States Magistrate Judge
• Decision Date: 15 January 2016
• Docket Number: 14-CV-1510 (DF)
• Citation: Vasquez v. United States, 14-CV-1510 (DF) (S.D. N.Y. Jan 15, 2016)
• Parties: LIDIA VASQUEZ, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant.

LIDIA VASQUEZ, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant.

14-CV-1510 (DF)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

January 15, 2016

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DEBRA FREEMAN, United States Magistrate Judge:

In this action, before me on consent pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), plaintiff Lidia Vasquez ("Plaintiff") brings a negligence claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1346, to recover for injuries she sustained when she allegedly tripped over a door saddle at the Fort George Station United States Post Office ("Post Office"), located at 4558 Broadway, New York, New York. Currently before the Court is a motion by defendant United States of America ("Defendant") for summary judgment in its favor. (Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment, dated May 28, 2015 ("Def. Mot.") (Dkt. 19).) For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion is granted.

BACKGROUND¹

A. Plaintiff's Accident

On April 18, 2012, Plaintiff visited the Post Office. (Def. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 1.) Plaintiff entered the Post Office from its Broadway entrance, which consists of two sets of double doors,each with a metal door saddle that spans the threshold between the interior vestibule and the exterior landing and rises no more than approximately one-half inch from the ground.² (See id. ¶ 2, 5; Pl. Counterstatement ¶ 5.) After conducting business inside the Post Office, Plaintiff exited through the same set of double doors. (Declaration of Rebecca J. Fortney, dated July 14, 2015 ("Fortney Decl.") (Dkt. 25), Ex. 1 (Transcript of the Deposition of Lidia Vasquez, conducted Nov. 13, 2014 ("Pl. Dep.") (Dkt. 25-1), at 24-26).)³ While crossing the threshold of the doorway, however, Plaintiff tripped on the door saddle and fell forward onto the sidewalk (id., at 24-33), fracturing her ankle and suffering other injuries (id., at 41-52).

Although, at her deposition, Plaintiff plainly testified that she fell because of the door saddle, Plaintiff's testimony is somewhat vague as to how, specifically, the door saddle caused her to trip. According to Plaintiff, she was wearing flat, low shoes, with a small opening near her big toe (id., at 31-33), and she first testified that she fell after the lip of her shoe became stuck "in" the door saddle (id., at 26). Plaintiff did not describe the shoes she was wearing in any further detail - for instance, the record gives no indication as to the thickness of their soles - and she could not remember whether she still owned them. (Id., at 33.) Later, when Defendant's counsel asked Plaintiff if she remembered on what, exactly, her foot became stuck, she answered, "On the piece of metal that's there, yes," while pointing to the door saddle in aphotograph. (Id., at 28-29.) Then, when counsel asked whether it was correct that Plaintiff's foot was caught "under that piece of metal," Plaintiff answered, "Yes, sir." (Id., at 29.) Finally, in response to further questioning, Plaintiff testified that the lip of her shoe became "stuck in the metal strip." (Id., at 33.) Given that Plaintiff variously described her shoe as becoming caught "in," "on," or "under" the door saddle (id. at 26-27, 29, 31-33),⁴ her deposition testimony does not make clear exactly how or why the door saddle caused her to fall. Certainly, the record could be read to suggest that the lip of Plaintiff's shoe became caught in a gap between the door saddle and the ground, but portions of Plaintiff's testimony could also be read to suggest that her shoe became stuck on the raised metal strip itself, causing her to stumble.

B. Practices of Defendant's Employees

The record contains deposition testimony from two of Defendant's employees, Charles Johnson ("Johnson"), who was employed at the Post Office as a custodian at the time of Plaintiff's injury (Chaudhury Decl., Ex. B (Transcript of the Deposition of Charles Johnson, conducted Dec. 15, 2014 ("Johnson Dep.") (Dkt. 22-4 to 22-8)),⁵ and Olga Rosario ("Rosario"), who was a general clerk and safety specialist at the Post Office on that date (Chaudhury Decl., Ex. C (Transcript of the Deposition of Olga Rosario, conducted Dec. 15, 2014 ("Rosario Dep.") (Dkt. 22-9)).⁶

Johnson testified that, during the period of time leading up to Plaintiff's accident, his duties were to maintain the cleanliness of the facility and to report any property damage orunsafe condition to his supervisor. (Johnson Dep., at 6-8.) As part of these duties, Johnson would clean the vestibule and doorway area at the Post Office's Broadway entrance about once a day. (Id., at 27.) Johnson was also responsible for ensuring that the Broadway entrance was locked at the close of business each day, which he accomplished by inserting a set of pins that were attached to the door and fit into the door saddle. (Id., at 20-23.) After setting the pins in place, Johnson would "rock" and "shake" the door to "physically check" that the door was secured. (Id., at 20-21.) These activities required Johnson to handle, touch, and step on the door saddle, but he never noticed that the saddle was loose or that there was a gap between the saddle and the ground. (Id., at 18-20, 23, 28, 34.) Johnson also assisted Rosario in performing quarterly safety inspections, during which the entrances of the Post Office were checked for hazards. (Rosario Dep., at 17.) Both Johnson and Rosario stated that, during these inspections, they never noticed any dangerous or defective condition relating to the door saddle. (Id., at 41-44, 47-48; Johnson Dep., at 33-34.) Rosario also testified, however, that the door saddle was not "on the list" of items to be checked, and that she therefore did not specifically examine the saddle during safety inspections. (Rosario Dep., at 41-44.)

The doorway to the Broadway entrance, including the saddle, was replaced in 2010, and, from that time until the date that Plaintiff was injured, there were no other repairs or changes affecting the door saddle. (Def. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 8.) There were no accidents or complaints regarding the saddle prior to Plaintiff's accident, on April 18, 2012. (Def. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 11.)

C. Procedural History

On March 5, 2014, Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a Complaint. (Verified Complaint, dated Feb. 19, 2014 (Dkt. 2).) In the Complaint, Plaintiff brings a claim under theFTCA, alleging that she was injured as a result of Defendant's negligence. (Id.) Defendant filed an Answer to the Complaint on May 21, 2014. (Answer, dated May 21, 2014 (Dkt. 6).)

On May 28, 2015, Defendant filed its motion for summary judgment and memorandum of law (Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, dated May 28, 2015 ("Def. Mem.") (Dkt. 20)), arguing that the record produced in discovery is devoid of any evidence showing that a dangerous or defective condition caused Plaintiff's injuries. (Id., at 5-6.) Defendant further argues that, if such a condition did exist, the facts adduced in discovery do not show that Defendant either created the condition or had actual or constructive notice of it. (Id., at 6.) In support of its motion, Defendants also filed a Local Rule 56.1 Statement (Def. 56.1 Stmt.), and an attorney declaration (Chaudhury Decl.) with attached exhibits, including photographs of the Broadway entrance of the Post Office (id., Ex. D), and excerpts from the transcripts of the depositions of Plaintiff (Pl. Dep.), Johnson (id., Ex. B (Johnson Dep.)), and Rosario (id., Ex. C (Rosario Dep.)).

On July 15, 2015, Plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition to Defendant's summary judgment motion, contending that there is an issue of fact as to whether Defendant created a dangerous or defective condition, that Defendant has failed to demonstrate as a matter of law that it did not have constructive notice of the dangerous and defective condition, and that any issue as to the proximate cause of Plaintiff's fall must be decided by the trier of fact. (Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's Affirmation in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, dated July 14, 2015 ("Pl. Mem.") (Dkt. 25-5).) Plaintiff also submitted a Counterstatement to Defendant's Local Rule 56.1 Statement (Pl. Counterstatement)), and an attorney declaration (Fortney Decl.) with attached exhibits, including excerpts from the transcripts of the depositions of Plaintiff (id., Ex. 1 (Pl. Dep.)), Johnson (id., Ex. 2 (JohnsonDep.)), and Rosario (id., Ex. 3 (Rosario Dep.)), and photographs of the Broadway entrance that are identical to those submitted by Defendant (id., Ex. 4).⁷

Defendant filed a reply memorandum of law on July 28, 2015. (Defendant's Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, dated July 28, 2015 ("Def. Reply") (Dkt. 26).)

DISCUSSION

I. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

Under Rule 56(c), a motion for summary judgment should be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Holt v. KMI-Continental, Inc., 95 F.3d 123, 128 (2d Cir. 1996). The moving party bears the burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). This burden may be satisfied "by pointing out the absence of evidence to support the non-movant's claims." Citizens Bank of Clearwater v. Hunt, 927 F.2d 707, 710 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325).

Once the movant meets this burden, the non-moving party "must come forward with admissible evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact for trial in order to avoid summary judgment." Jaramillo v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 536 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23). Specifically, the non-moving party must cite to "particular parts ofmaterials in the record" or show "that the materials cited [by the movant] do not establish...