Vater v. Glenn County

• Decision Date: 21 March 1958
• Citation: Vater v. Glenn County, 323 P.2d 85, 49 Cal.2d 815 (Cal. 1958)
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: Grace Marie VATER, Appellant, v. COUNTY OF GLENN et al., Defendants, Glenn-Colusa Irrigation District (a Corporation), Respondent. Sac. 6826.

Page 85

323 P.2d 85

49 Cal.2d 815

Grace Marie VATER, Appellant, v. COUNTY OF GLENN et al., Defendants Glenn-Colusa Irrigation District (a Corporation), Respondent.

Sac. 6826.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

March 21, 1958.

Rehearing Denied April 16, 1958.

P. M. Barceloux, Burton J. Goldstein and Goldstein, Barceloux & Goldstein, San Francisco, for appellant.

Duard F. Geis, Carroll F. Byrd, Geis & Byrd and Carroll F. Byrd, Jr., Willows, for respondent.

GIBSON, Chief Justice.

Plaintiff brought this action against Glenn County and the Glenn-Colusa Irrigation District for damages for the wrongful death of her husband and son. General and special demurrers by the district to the second amended complaint were sustained without leave to amend, and judgment was entered in its favor. ¹ Plaintiff moved to set aside the judgment upon the grounds of mistake, inadvertence, surprise and excusable neglect. She filed a supporting affidavit of her attorney to the effect that on the hearing of the demurrer he had neglected to argue an available theory of liability. The motion was denied without prejudice to its renewal within ten days, accompanied by a proposed amended complaint. Pursuant to this permission plaintiff renewed the motion and presented a proposed third amended complaint. This motion was also denied.

The principal question is whether plaintiff has alleged facts which constitute a cause of action.

The allegations of the second amended complaint may be summarized as follows: In 1910 certain persons, some of whom were agents of the district, constructed a private roadway over their land in extension of County Roard R so as to make the private roadway appear to be part of the county road. About the same time the district or its predecessor in interest constructed a wooden bridge to connect two portions of the private roadway which were separated by the district's main canal. There was a 45-degree turn where the roadway met the bridge, but the turn was not indicated by any signs or warning devices, and there were no adequate barricades, railings or lights. The levees of the canal were above the roadway, and, because of the construction and height of the levees and the bridge, travelers could not observe the abrupt change of direction or see the bridge until they were upon it. As a result, travelers were likely to drive off the bridge into the canal, and the roadway and bridge thus constituted a dangerous and defective condition and an 'absolute nuisance per se.' The district permitted this condition to exist on its premises without taking any steps to protect the public or provide a reasonable warning. In 1917 the bridge was taken over by the county to be maintained by it as a county bridge. Although the county and its supervisors knew of the dangerous condition, they failed to remedy it or warn the public. Plaintiff's husband was led by the appearance of the private roadway to believe that it was a public highway. As a proximate result of the dangerous condition of the roadway and the bridge, he drove his car off the bridge into the canal, and he and his son were killed.

The proposed third amended complaint repeated in substance the allegations of the second amended complaint and further stated that there is a dispute between the several parties as to whether the county or the district or both are responsible for the maintenance of the bridge and that plaintiff does not know whether either or both are responsible. It was also alleged that plaintiff does not know whether the district constructed the bridge or acquired it, that the dangerous condition has existed for 40 years and that the district had notice of it.

The general rule is that, in the absence of a statutory or constitutional provision to the contrary, the state and its agencies are immune from liability for tort in the discharge of governmental duties and activities. Pianka v. State, 46 Cal.2d 208, 210, 293 P.2d 458; Talley v. Northern San Diego County Hosp. Dist., 41 Cal.2d 33, 36, 257 P.2d 22; Stang v. City of Mill Valley, 38 Cal.2d 486, 488, 240 P.2d 980. This rule has been applied to irrigation districts. Nissen v. Cordua Irr. Dist., 204 Cal. 542, 545, 269 P. 171; Jackson & Perkins Co. of California v. Byron-Bethany Irr. Dist., 136 Cal.App. 375, 380 et seq., 29 P.2d 217, 30 P.2d 546; Whiteman v. Anderson-Cottonwood Irr. Dist., 60 Cal.App. 234, 241-242, 212 P. 706; see Talley v. Northern San Diego County Hosp. Dist., 41 Cal.2d 33, 40, 257 P.2d 22.

Plaintiff does not claim that the district was acting in a proprietary capacity with respect to the bridge and roadway, and the only provisions upon which she relies as constituting a waiver of the district's immunity are section 22725-22732 of the Water Code, which constitute the article entitled 'Public Liability' in the division of the code relating to irrigation districts. Wat.Code, div. 11, pt. 5, ch. 4, art. 4. These sections are of no avail to plaintiff.

Section 22731 reads: 'Nothing in the preceding portion of this article shall be construed as creating any liability except as provided in Section 22730 unless it would have existed regardless of this article.' ² Section 22730 provides that, when an officer is held liable for acts done in his official capacity, the district shall pay the judgment without obligation for repayment by the officer. In Powers Farms v. Consolidated Irr. Dist., 19 Cal.2d 123, 119 P.2d 717, we considered the substantially identical provisions of the irrigation district liability law (Stats.1935, p. 2250), which was repealed when the Water Code was enacted, and said: 'Section 3 (now section 22730) imposes a limited liability on the district by obligating it to pay certain judgments against its officers. This, according to section 4 (now section 22731), is the only new liability created by the act.' 19 Cal.2d at page 127, 119 at page 720. The Powers Farms case was an action for damage to land caused by the seepage of water from a canal of an irrigation district, and it was brought under the provision of article I, section 14, of the California Constitution which prohibits damage to property for public use without just compensation. We held that this provision gave the plaintiff a cause of action against the district, but that the part of section 2 ³ of the irrigation district liability law which requires the filing of a claim in actions based upon the dangerous or defective condition of property of the district was applicable to the action, and that plaintiff's failure to file a claim prevented his recovery. It is clear that we did not consider section 2 of the act as imposing liability upon the district for defective conditions because we expressly stated that the basis of liability was the constitutional provision (19 Cal.2d at page 126, 119 P.2d at page 720) and that the act imposed no liability on the district other than the one to pay certain judgments against its officers (19 Cal.2d at page 127, 119 P.2d at page 720, quoted above).

There is no doubt that section 4 of the act and section 22731 of the code show a legislative intent not to abrogate the rule of governmental immunity for irrigation districts except with respect to the payment of such judgments. In the present case no judgment has been obtained or sought against any officer of the district, and, therefore, liability cannot be based upon the provisions of the Water Code.

Most of the authorities who have recently written on the subject strongly advocate abolition or modification of the principle of governmental immunity, which lets the loss caused by tortious conduct of the government rest on the injured individual instead of distributing it among all the members of the community, the beneficiaries of the governmental activity. (See, e. g., 2 Harper and James, The Law of Torts (1956), 1612; Prosser on Torts (2d ed. 1955), 775; Borchard, State and Municipal Liability in Tort-Proposed Statutory Reform, 20 A.B.A.J. 747 et seq.; Kuchel, Should California Accept Tort Liability? 25 Cal.State Bar J. 146, 151.) However, the abrogation or restriction of this doctrine is primarily a legislative matter (see Talley v. Northern San Diego County Hosp. Dist., 41 Cal.2d 33, 41, 257 P.2d 22; Waterman v. Los Angeles County General Hospital, 123 Cal.App.2d 143, 144, 266 P.2d 221), and, where, as here, the Legislature has clearly expressed its intention to maintain immunity, that intention is controlling.

Several cases have recognized an exception to the immunity doctrine where a governmental unit is maintaining a nuisance. Phillips v. City of Pasadena, 27 Cal.2d 104, 106-107, 162 P.2d 625; Hassell v. City and County of San Francisco, 11 Cal.2d 168, 170, 78 P.2d 1021; Adams v. City of Modesto, 131 Cal. 501, 502-503, 63 P. 1083; Peterson v. City of Santa Rosa, 119 Cal. 387, 51 P. 557; Lind v. City of San Luis Obispo, 109 Cal. 340, 343, 42 P. 437; Bloom v. City and County of San Francisco, 64 Cal. 503, 3 P. 129. In considering whether the facts alleged are sufficient to constitute a nuisance, we must keep in mind that, in order to state a cause of action based upon this theory, the plaintiff must show that a legislative body has declared the condition complained of to be a nuisance. Palmquist v. Mercer, 43 Cal.2d 92, 101, 272 P.2d 26; Ward v. Oakley Co., 125 Cal.App.2d 840, 850-851, 271 P.2d 536; Brooks v. City of Monterey, 106 Cal.App. 649, 654, 290 P. 540; cf. People v. Lim, 18 Cal.2d 872, 879 et seq., 118 P.2d 472; People v. Johnson, 129 Cal.App.2d 1, 8-9, 277 P.2d 45.

Plaintiff contends that this case comes within section 3479 of the Civil Code, which provides in part: 'Anything which is injurious to health * * * or unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use, in the customary manner, of * * * any public * * * street, or highway, is a nuisance.' The situation described by the complaint was not injurious to health within the meaning of this section. There is no specific allegation that the accident...