Vaughan v. City of Richmond

• Citation: 165 Va. 145
• Parties: W. N. VAUGHAN v. CITY OF RICHMOND.
• Decision Date: 19 September 1935
• Court: Supreme Court of Virginia

Page 145

165 Va. 145

W. N. VAUGHAN v. CITY OF RICHMOND.

Supreme Court of Virginia, Staunton.

September 19, 1935.

Present, All the Justices.

TAXATION — Licenses — Classification of Property for Purposes of Taxation — Non-Resident Laundries — Case at Bar. — In the instant case defendant was convicted of violating an ordinance of the city of Richmond, providing that a non-resident laundry soliciting laundry business in the city should pay a license fee of $150, and in addition a license tax of $75 for each vehicle so used. Defendant operated a laundry outside the city and under an agreement with the drivers used several trucks in soliciting business in Richmond. He paid the city license tax, but refused to pay the additional license tax, contending that the ordinance was invalid because it fixed an unreasonable and arbitrary classification between those engaged in the same business and denied to defendant the equal protection of the law.

Held: That the instant case was controlled by the case of Richmond Linen Supply Co. City of Lynchburg, 160 Va. 644, 169 S.E. 554, upholding the validity of a similar ordinance on the ground that such a classification is not arbitrary or unreasonable.

Error to a judgment of the Hustings Court of the City of Richmond.

The opinion states the case.

David Meade White and Andrew J. Ellis, for the plaintiff in error.

James E. Cannon, for the defendant in error.

CHINN, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

W. N. Vaughan was convicted in the Hustings Court of the city of Richmond upon the charge of "being engaged in the laundry business at a place of business located outside of the city of Richmond, and soliciting laundry business in the city of Richmond without having paid the required city of Richmond license therefor," in violation of an ordinance of said city. That provision of the ordinance under which the defendant was found guilty reads as follows:

"(c) Any person, firm, or corporation engaged in the laundry business whose principal office or place of business is located outside of the city of Richmond, and who solicits laundry business in the city of Richmond, $150.00, and in addition thereto there shall be paid a license tax of $75.00 for each vehicle so used. The whole license tax assessed in this sub-section shall be paid in one sum at the time the license is issued and the same shall not be pro-rated or transferred."

The facts certified show that prior to and at the time of his conviction Vaughan was operator and owner of a steam laundry in the town of Ashland, Virginia; that he had no plant or place of business in the city of Richmond, or in any other place except in the town of Ashland; that under an agreement with the drivers, Vaughan used and employed several trucks in soliciting laundry business for him in the city of Richmond, and in bringing it to Vaughan's plant in Ashland where it is laundered under the agreement with the drivers. The drivers then get it and return it to the customers, collect the regular price named in the Ashland laundry ticket, retain thirty per cent thereof as their full compensation in soliciting and bringing the laundry business to Vaughan, and turn over seventy per cent thereof to Vaughan under their agreement with him.

Vaughan paid the city license tax of $150.00 as required by the above ordinance, but refused to pay the additional license tax of $75.00 each thereby prescribed for the vehicles used in soliciting laundry business for him. He contends that the said ordinance is void because it prescribes and fixes an unreasonable and arbitrary classification between and discriminates against those who are engaged in the same business, and denies to the defendant the equal protection of the law, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and the Constitution of Virginia (section 11).

The sole question is, therefore, whether that provision of the ordinance which requires laundries located outside of the city of Richmond and soliciting business in the city, to pay a license tax of $75.00 for each vehicle used in soliciting such business, is valid as held by the Hustings Court, or invalid as contended by petitioner.

We think the question is controlled by the case of Richmond Linen Supply Company City of Lynchburg, 160 Va. 644, 169 S.E. 554. In that case the Linen Supply Company operated a laundry in the city of...