Vaughan v. Godman
Decision Date | 06 November 1885 |
Docket Number | 12,113 |
Citation | 3 N.E. 257,103 Ind. 499 |
Parties | Vaughan v. Godman et al |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
From the Tippecanoe Circuit Court.
The judgment is affirmed, with costs.
W. C Wilson, J. H. Adams, J. A. Wilstach and J. N. Wilstach, for appellant.
J. R Coffroth, H. W. Chase and F. S. Chase, for appellees.
We copy from the opinion rendered in this cause upon a former appeal and reported as Vaughan v. Godman, 94 Ind. 191, the following summary of appellant's complaint:
The prayer of the complaint is that the deed be declared to be a nullity and be cancelled and held for naught, and that a commissioner be appointed to convey the real estate to the plaintiff, Vaughan. Since the action was commenced, the daughter's name has been changed by marriage.
Citing Taylor v. McClure, 28 Ind. 39, Somers v. Pumphrey, 24 Ind. 231, Mallett v. Page, 8 Ind. 364, Tallman v. Cooke, 39 Iowa 402, and 3 Washb. Real Prop. (4th ed.) 284, we held upon the former appeal, that a deed may be delivered by the grantor having it recorded, if his purpose in so doing is to effectuate a delivery.
Citing the above authorities, and the cases of Hotchkiss v. Olmstead, 37 Ind. 74, Berry v. Anderson, 22 Ind. 36, Thatcher v. St. Andrew's Church, 37 Mich. 264, Jones v. Swayze, 42 N.J.L. 279, Gilbert v. North American Fire Ins. Co., 23 Wend. 43, Byars v. Spencer, 101 Ill. 429, and Martindale Law of Conv., sections 204, 206, 212 and 222, it was further held that if a deed is recorded by the procurement of the grantor, that is, prima facie, a delivery, especially when the conveyance is to a minor; that this prima facie case may be overthrown by evidence; that the question of delivery is one of fact to be determined upon the evidence; that in all disputes as to whether or not a deed has been delivered, the important inquiry is to ascertain the intent of the grantor in the act, or several acts, which it may be claimed constitute a delivery; that in such inquiry the question is, did he intend to divest himself of title and lodge it in the grantee? And, again, citing some of the above authorities, and Cecil v. Beaver, 28 Iowa 241 (4 Am. Rep. 174), Spencer v. Carr, 45 N.Y. 406 (6 Am. Rep. 112), Guard v. Bradley, 7 Ind. 600, Squires v. Summers, 85 Ind. 252, Bryan v. Wash, 7 Ill. 557, Reed v. Douthit, 62 Ill. 348, Rivard v. Walker, 39 Ill. 413, and 3 Washb. Real Prop. (4th ed.), p. 284, it was held that where the grant is to a child, by way of a gift, and is beneficial in effect, acceptance of the deed will be presumed, although the deed may be retained in the possession of the grantor.
In accordance with the holdings above stated, it was further held, reversing the judgment, that disregarding some of the averments in the complaint, because they are statements of evidentiary facts, rather than of the ultimate fact, the repeated allegation, that the deed was not delivered, rendered the complaint good as against the demurrer directed against it, although the grantor had caused the deed to be recorded. These rulings are supported by the subsequent cases of Jones v. Loveless, 99 Ind. 317, Fitzgerald v. Goff, 99 Ind. 28, and Bremmerman v. Jennings, 101 Ind. 253.
Since the reversal upon the former appeal, the case has been tried below; the relief asked by appellant was denied, and judgment was rendered against him for costs. The overruling of appellant's motion for a new trial is the only assigned error. That motion raises the single question of the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the finding and judgment of the trial court. That appellant is the father of appellee, Catharine Godman; that in October, 1867, without any money consideration, he and his then living wife, who was her mother, signed and acknowledged a deed, which upon its face is a deed of conveyance in fee simple to said appellee of the real estate in dispute; that appellant shortly thereafter caused the deed to be recorded; that at that time appellee was about six and one-half years old, and lived with her parents, are facts about which there is no dispute.
Upon these undisputed facts the following presumptions, if none other, arise:
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