Vaughan v. Romm

Decision Date07 June 2022
Docket Number2:21-CV-42-D
PartiesSUSAN W. VAUGHAN, Plaintiff, v. KATHLYN S. ROMM, an individual, RAY MATUSKO, an individual, COURTNEY HULL, an individual, MEADER W. HARRISS III, an individual, and DEPUTY CLERK DOE, an individual, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina

ORDER AND MEMORANDUM & RECOMMENDATION

KIMBERLY A. SWANK, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This pro se case is before the court on the application [DE #1] by Plaintiff Susan W.Vaughan to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and for frivolity review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the matter having been referred to the undersigned by the Honorable James C. Dever III, United States District Judge. For the reasons set forth below, the court grants Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis and recommends that Plaintiff's complaint be dismissed in its entirety.

IFP MOTION

The standard for determining in forma pauperis status is whether “one cannot because of his poverty pay or give security for the costs . . . and still be able to provide himself and dependents with the necessities of life.” Adkins v E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948). Based on the information contained in Plaintiff's affidavit, the court finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated appropriate evidence of inability to pay the required court costs. Thus, Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis is ALLOWED.

DISCUSSION
I. Background

Plaintiff sues Defendants in connection with 2013 state child welfare removal proceedings in Currituck County, North Carolina, involving her minor grandchild E.J.V. Plaintiff previously litigated this dispute, and extensive factual summary is provided in this court's orders in that prior case. See generally Vaughan v. Foltz, No. 2:16-CV-61-FL, 2019 WL 1265055 (E.D. N.C. Mar. 19, 2019) (summary judgment order), aff'd, 825. Fed.Appx. 131 (4th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S.Ct. 2831 (2021), petition for reh'g denied, 142 S.Ct. 1093 (2021).[1] A summary of the procedural history of the state child welfare proceedings is available in Vaughan v. Romm, 256 N.C.App. 398, 806 S.E.2d 80 (Nov. 7, 2017) (unpublished table decision), review denied, 370 N.C. 581, 809 S.Ed.2d 873 (2018) (mem.), cert. denied, 139 S.Ct. 252 (2018), reh'g denied, 139 S.Ct. 589 (2018).

In this action, Plaintiff alleges deprivations of her Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 & 1985, including claims pursuant to Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y.C., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). (Prop. Compl. [DE #1-1] at 3-5.) Plaintiff states: “This lawsuit is based predominantly on the facts and evidence provided by the sworn (9/28/2018) testimony of Defendant Ray Matusko, discovered for the first time by Plaintiff . . . on October 1, 2018.” (Id. at 14 (citing Pl.'s Suppl. Resp. Opp'n Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 55,Vaughan v. Foltz, No. 2:16-CV-61-FL, ECF No. 147-13 (E.D. N.C. Nov. 29, 2018)).) Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief in the form of an expungement of all records relating to the child welfare matter and at least $500,000 in damages. (Prop. Compl. at 37.)

Identification of each Defendant is helpful for ease of explanation. Defendant Hull is an attorney for Currituck County Department of Social Services (“Currituck DSS”); Defendant Romm is the director of Currituck DSS; Defendant Matusko is the Clerk of Court of Currituck County; Defendant Harriss is a former assistant public defender who represented Plaintiff in the child welfare matter and currently serves as a state district court judge; and Defendant Doe is an unnamed deputy clerk working for Defendant Matusko. (Prop. Compl. at 38.) See also Order and M&R, Vaughan v. Foltz, No. 2:16-CV-61-FL, 2017 WL 9480142, at *2 (E.D.N.C May 8, 2017) (summarizing identities of defendants), recommitted for supplemental mem. & recommendation, 5/24/2017 Text Order (E.D. N.C. May 24, 2017).

Plaintiff's core allegation is that her Fourteenth Amendment right to due process was violated via injury to her reputation, which impinged upon her “right to custody and adoption of her grandson.” (Prop. Compl. at 35.) These alleged harms flow from (i) Plaintiff being coerced into agreeing to a written stipulation[2] that E.J.V. was neglected while in Plaintiff's care, to the extent Plaintiff had not been notified that Currituck DSS had decided not to proceed on a juvenile petition alleging E.J.V. was “seriously neglected” (id. at 6, 21, 26); (ii) Defendant Matusko and Defendant Deputy Clerk Doe's failure to schedule a hearing regarding Plaintiff's possible placement on the state Responsible Individuals List (“RIL”), in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-323 (id. at 7-8, 13, 18, 29); and (iii) Defendant Hull and Defendant Romm's failure to notify Plaintiff that Currituck DSS was not proceeding on the serious neglect allegation, in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-320 (id. at 6, 9-10, 20-21, 26, 32-33).

Plaintiff seeks to bring several additional claims, all of which relate to the foregoing due process claim. First, she alleges that Defendants Romm, Hull, and Harriss engaged in a conspiracy to pressure Plaintiff into agreeing to the written stipulation discussed above, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985. (Prop. Compl. at 3-4, 10-13, 22-23.) Second, she purports to assert Monell claims that (i) Defendant Matusko has implemented an official policy of not scheduling for hearing petitions for judicial review unless such requests are submitted to his office on pre-printed North Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts (“AOC”) forms and (ii) Currituck DSS does not train its agents to conduct background checks on prospective foster and adoptive parents, as evidenced by E.J.V.'s adoptive father having a criminal history. (Prop. Compl. at 3-4, 36.) Third, she claims to have suffered cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment from being denied the right to adopt and to have visitation with E.J.V. and as a result of Currituck DSS' negligent adoption of E.J.V. to an unfit person. (Prop. Compl. at 33-34.)

II. Standard for Frivolity Review

Notwithstanding the determination that Plaintiff is entitled to IFP status, the court is required to dismiss all or part of an action found to be frivolous or malicious, which fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted, or which seeks money damages from a defendant immune from such recovery. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Michau v. Charleston County, 434 F.3d 725, 728 (4th Cir. 2006). A case is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Pro se complaints are entitled to a more liberal treatment than pleadings drafted by lawyers. See White v. White, 886 F.2d 721, 722-23 (4th Cir. 1989). However, the court is not required to accept a pro se plaintiff's contentions as true. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). The court is permitted to “pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. In making the “inherently elastic” frivolity determination, Nagy v. FMC Butner, 376 F.3d 252, 256-57 (4th Cir. 2004), the court may “apply common sense,” Nasim v. Warden., Md. House of Correction, 64 F.3d 951, 954 (4th Cir. 1995).

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to give a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The statement must give a defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “A plaintiff must offer more detail . . . than the bald statement that he has a valid claim of some type against the defendant.” Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 405 (4th Cir. 2001); see also White, 886 F.2d at 723 (affirming district court's dismissal of suit as frivolous where complaint “failed to contain any factual allegations tending to support [plaintiff's] bare assertion”). The complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. While the court must read the complaint carefully to determine if the plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to support her claims, White, 886 F.2d at 724, the court is not required to act as the pro se plaintiff's advocate or to parse through volumes of documents or discursive arguments in an attempt to discern the plaintiff's unexpressed intent, Williams v. Ozmint, 716 F.3d 801, 805 (4th Cir. 2013).

III. Analysis
A. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claim

Plaintiff alleges that her right to due process was violated when Currituck DSS, through Defendants Romm and Hull, coerced Plaintiff into stipulating that E.J.V. did not receive proper medical care and lived in an environment injurious to his welfare while Plaintiff served as E.J.V.'s caretaker because Defendant Romm had dismissed the petition alleging “serious neglect” against Plaintiff before engaging in negotiations regarding the stipulation. Plaintiff avers that had she known the petition alleging serious neglect had already been dismissed, she never would have agreed to the stipulation. She further avers that these defendants did this knowing said stipulation would prevent Plaintiff from adopting E.J.V.

Plaintiff made this same allegation in her earlier federal case. See Vaughan, 2019 WL 1265055, at *3 (granting Plaintiff's “motion requesting ‘to address how the threat of the RIL and prosecution of serious neglect were fraudulently misused in a way that violated [Plaintiff's] due process rights injuring her and her family' only to the extent these allegations are related to plaintiff's surviving claim for injury...

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