Vaughan v. Tetzlaff, 145-81
| Decision Date | 06 April 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 145-81,145-81 |
| Citation | 141 Vt. 150,446 A.2d 356 |
| Parties | Charles B. VAUGHAN, Jr. v. Frederick TETZLAFF and Elizabeth Tetzlaff. |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
Arthur J. O'Dea, P. C., Manchester, for plaintiff.
Ryan, Smith & Carbine, Ltd., Rutland, for defendants.
Before BARNEY, C. J., and BILLINGS, HILL, UNDERWOOD and PECK, JJ.
The plaintiff-appellant sued for specific performance of a real estate contract with the defendants. The trial court found that the parties had not agreed on a critical contract term, and concluded that the contract was so uncertain as to bar the remedy of specific performance. We reverse.
The plaintiff, as buyer, and defendants, as sellers, signed a contract which described the land to be conveyed as follows:
23 + /- (twenty-three plus or minus) acres located on Morse Hill Road, adjacent to lands of Orla Reed on the North and East, and containing a right of way to said land on the north, presently owned by Mr. Frederick W. and Mrs. Elizabeth D. Tetzlaff....
There is no dispute concerning the description of the parcel. The parties, however, disagreed over whether another right of way could also be created in the deed.
The defendants submitted a deed to the plaintiff which reserved the existing right of way:
The premises are subject to the right of way reserved to Orla Reed and wife in said deed as follows:
The GRANTORS except and reserve to themselves, their heirs, successors and assigns, a right of way for all purposes through the parcel herein conveyed along an existing roadway running the entire length of said parcel from the highway hereinabove described, known as Morse Hill Road, to the other lands of the Grantor situated Northerly and Easterly of the parcel herein conveyed, the said right of way being 50 feet in width, 25 feet either side from the middle of the existing roadway, said roadway to be more specifically described on the survey prepared by Claude D. Dern above noted, by said Land Surveyor.
Excepting and reserving also, to the said Frederick W. Tetzlaff and Elizabeth D. Tetzlaff, their successors and assigns, a right of way 50 feet in width extending northerly from Old Morse Hill Road to the north line of the premises conveyed; the centerline of said 50 foot strip shall be the centerline of the existing roadway as now located.
They added another sentence:
If the said C. B. Vaughan, Jr. or his successors in title shall construct a roadway leading northerly from Morse Hill Road at a different location, upon completion of that roadway the right of way for highway purposes excepted and reserved to Frederick W. and Elizabeth D. Tetzlaff, their successors and assigns, shall be transferred to such new roadway and their rights over the old roadway insofar as the same are duplicated by the rights over the new roadway shall cease and determine.
The plaintiffs did not object to the reservation of the existing right of way, as outlined in the first quoted portion of the deed. They objected to the second reservation as adding a condition to the original contract. The issue before this Court is whether the lower court erred in finding that there was no "meeting of the minds" on the right of way provision, and consequently, that the provision was too vague to be specifically enforced.
We will not reverse the findings of the trial court unless they are clearly erroneous. Frogate v. Kissell, 138 Vt. 167, 168, 412 A.2d 1138, 1139 (1980); V.R.C.P. 52(a). In this case, however, the findings of the trial court contain inconsistencies flowing from a misapplication of the governing legal standards. Once the confusion is unraveled, the trial court's finding that there was no "meeting of the minds" loses its credibility.
The findings do address the dispositive factual issue: the additional right of way does not reflect the parties' contract, but appears for the first time in the deed tendered by the defendants....
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...of the trial court contain inconsistencies flowing from a misapplication of the governing legal standards." Vaughan v. Tetzlaff, 141 Vt. 150, 153, 446 A.2d 356, 357 (1982) (reversing court's holding for clear error). Here, we hold that the court erred in determining that the partners intend......
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Fisher v. Poole, 240-81
...from the premise that the findings of the trial court will not be reversed unless they are clearly erroneous. Vaughan v. Tetzlaff, 141 Vt. 150, ---, 446 A.2d 356, 357 (1982) (citing Frogate v. Kissell, 138 Vt. 167, 168, 412 A.2d 1138, 1139 (1980)); V.R.C.P. 52(a). In situations where there ......
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