Vaughn v. Ag Processing, Inc., 89-138

Decision Date18 July 1990
Docket NumberNo. 89-138,89-138
Citation459 N.W.2d 627
Parties57 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1227, 55 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 40,555, 7 IER Cases 1679 Howard L. VAUGHN, Appellee, v. AG PROCESSING, INC., Appellant.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Diane M. Stahle, of Davis, Hockenberg, Wine, Brown, Koehn, & Shors, Des Moines, and A. Stevenson Bogue and Patrick J. Barrett of McGrath, North, Mullin & Kratz, P.C., Omaha, Neb., for appellant.

Claus H. Bunz of the Bunz Law Firm, Manning, and James Furey, Carroll, for appellee.

Nancy J. Gannon, Milwaukee, Wis., and Patrick H. Payton, Des Moines, for amicus curiae Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights.

Considered en banc.

SCHULTZ, Justice.

In late December 1985, Plaintiff Howard Vaughn was employed by the defendant, Ag Processing, Inc. (Ag), at its soybean processing plant in Manning, Iowa. In June 1986 plaintiff walked off the job following an incident which culminated several months of an antagonistic relationship between him and his supervisor Alvin Mueller. Plaintiff obtained a right-to-sue letter from the Iowa Civil Rights Commission and filed a petition in district court advancing several theories of recovery. The claims of religious discrimination and intentional infliction of emotional distress survived a ruling on defendant's motion to dismiss. The court found for plaintiff on both counts and awarded a judgment for back pay, emotional distress damages, punitive damages and attorney fees. Defendant appealed, and plaintiff cross-appealed. We affirm in part, and reverse in part and remand.

Plaintiff, who was forty-eight years old at the time of trial in 1988, converted to Catholicism when he was in the Navy in 1964. He is a religious man who attends church regularly with his wife and minor son. He claims that his religious beliefs were ridiculed, starting in February 1986, when he began working in the maintenance department under the supervision of Mr. Mueller. It was generally acknowledged that Mueller was a "rough talker" and an ill-tempered man who frequently swore and called the workers derogatory names when he was dissatisfied with their work. The record is replete with examples of Mueller's abusive language and behavior. Despite this, however, Mueller had worked at the soybean plant since it had opened and was recognized as a knowledgeable and competent worker.

In March while plaintiff was repairing an electrical system, he asked Mueller for some time off to go to church. Mueller initially refused but then allowed plaintiff to leave about four hours later. A day or so after this occurred, while plaintiff was rewiring some motors, Mueller called him a "goddamn stupid fuckin' Catholic" and referred to another employee as "[a]nother dumb Catholic." He then turned to plaintiff and said: "I know you're Catholic, but I haven't seen one yet that had any fuckin' brains." A couple of days later Mueller asked plaintiff, "Is that all you people do is have kids?" when discussing a Catholic coworker whose wife just had had a baby.

In late April, after attempting in vain to discuss his complaints with Mueller, plaintiff, pursuant to the personnel handbook, talked with his superior who spoke to the plant manager. The manager then reprimanded Mueller. Contrary to defendant's claim, this did not stop Mueller from making anti-Catholic remarks to plaintiff. In May Mueller referred to another employee in plaintiff's presence as a "pus-gutted Catholic." He made the following additional comments: "You people like fish, don't you?" and "I suppose you're going to raise [your son] Catholic." Plaintiff testified that "[e]verybody was subjected to [Mueller's] harassment and verbal abuse" on almost a daily basis.

Plaintiff again spoke with the plant manager who, in turn, spoke with Mueller on June 5 about his "use of abusive language when directing his subordinates." Mueller rejected the plant manager's offer of professional assistance to help him change his attitude and behavior towards his coworkers.

On June 14, 1986 plaintiff was wiring a new motor. While he was waiting for the power to be disconnected, Mueller told him that if he could not wire the motor, he should "get the hell out of here." Plaintiff walked off the job and called the plant manager, who told him that he would try and remedy the situation. When plaintiff reported to work the next day, there was a note on his timecard telling him to turn in his tools. Plaintiff thought he was fired.

On June 16 plaintiff met with the plant manager and Mueller. Mueller apologized to plaintiff who was then offered his job back. Despite assurances from the manager that Mueller's behavior would improve, plaintiff refused to return to Ag if he had to continue to work under Mueller. There were no other positions available. A few days later plaintiff was again asked whether he was willing to return to work. On June 25, following an investigation to determine whether "there was sufficient evidence to prove improper behavior," the plant manager gave Mueller a written deficiency letter and told him that any "reoccurrence of inappropriate behavior toward the personnel" would result in his discharge. The Ag corporate office in Omaha was notified of the problem and a copy of the deficiency letter placed in Mueller's file.

On June 27 plaintiff was informed that his job was still open and assured that Mueller's inappropriate behavior would not be tolerated. Plaintiff did not reply until August 5 when he was again told that his position was still open. Plaintiff refused to work with Mueller despite being told that Mueller's behavior had improved since he had left in June. The plant manager felt that he need not replace Mueller as long as his behavior was improving, and he had received no additional complaints.

Plaintiff's initial action was the filing of a claim for unemployment benefits on July 3. While he claimed harassment by his supervisor, these allegations were based on coarse and abusive language with no religious implications. On September 29 he filed the civil rights complaint that eventually formed the basis for this appeal. Following a trial to the court, judgment was entered against defendant for compensatory and punitive damages.

Defendant appeals, claiming that the court erred in (1) finding that Ag discriminated against plaintiff on the basis of his religion, (2) finding plaintiff was constructively discharged, (3) finding that Ag's offers of reinstatement did not toll plaintiff's damages, (4) finding intentional infliction of emotional distress, (5) awarding excessive emotional distress damages, and (6) awarding punitive damages. Plaintiff's cross-appeal alleges that the trial court erred in striking his demand for a jury trial, in ruling that some of his causes of action were preempted by the Iowa Civil Rights Act, and in not awarding front pay. We first address defendant's claims.

I. Religious harassment. Defendant makes two preliminary points which we briefly address. First, it notes that plaintiff did not specifically plead this case as a "hostile environment case" but rather as an action based on religious discrimination. We believe that our liberal rules on notice pleading are broad enough to allow a claim of religious discrimination to encompass a cause of action based on religious harassment. See Iowa R.Civ.P. 69; Adam v. Mt. Pleasant Bank & Trust Co., 355 N.W.2d 868, 870 (Iowa 1984) (petition need not identify specific legal theory). It is also apparent that this case was tried without objection from defendant as an action based on religious harassment. The theory under which a case was tried will be the theory upon which an appeal is based. Shill v. Careage Corp., 353 N.W.2d 416, 420 (Iowa 1984).

Second, defendant points out that we have never recognized a cause of action based on religious harassment. We have, however, recognized that the Iowa Civil Rights Act protects employees from both racial and sexual harassment. See Lynch v. City of Des Moines, 454 N.W.2d 827 (Iowa 1990); Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local Union No. 238 v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 394 N.W.2d 375 (Iowa 1986). Section 601A.6(1)(a) prohibits discrimination in employment based on religion as well as on sex and race. We therefore find no reason why this protection should not similarly apply to victims of religious discrimination and now hold that a hostile work environment based on religious harassment is a form of religious discrimination prohibited by section 601A.6(1)(a) of the Iowa Civil Rights Act.

A hostile work environment is caused by discriminatory conduct or harassment which " 'has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.' " Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 2405, 91 L.Ed.2d 49, 58-59 (1986) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (1985)). The trial court correctly set out the elements of a prima facie case of religious harassment. They are:

(1) the plaintiff belongs to a protected class;

(2) the plaintiff was subject to unwelcome religious harassment;

(3) the harassment was based upon religion;

(4) the harassment affected a term, condition or privilege of employment, and;

(5) the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action.

Cf. Lynch, 454 N.W.2d at 833; Chauffeurs, 394 N.W.2d at 378. Accord Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1013 (8th Cir.1988); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903-05 (11th Cir.1982). See also Weiss v. United States, 595 F.Supp. 1050, 1057 (E.D.Va.1984) (in religious harassment case, plaintiff must establish employer had actual or constructive knowledge of harassment and took no prompt and remedial action).

A district court's finding of discrimination is a finding of fact. Ways v. City of Lincoln, 871 F.2d 750, 754 (8th Cir.1989); Smith v. ADM Feed Corp., 456...

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