Vaughn v. Epworth Villa

• Decision Date: 19 August 2008
• Docket Number: No. 07-6005.,07-6005.
• Citation: 537 F.3d 1147
• Parties: Bernadine R. VAUGHN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. EPWORTH VILLA, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

537 F.3d 1147

Bernadine R. VAUGHN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. EPWORTH VILLA, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 07-6005.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

August 19, 2008.

Mark Hammons (Tamara Gowens with him on the briefs), Hammons, Gowens &

Associates, Oklahoma City, OK, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Gayle Barrett (Adam W. Childers with her on the brief), Crowe & Dunlevy, P.C., Oklahoma City, OK, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before KELLY, EBEL, and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.

EBEL, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-Appellant Bernadine R. Vaughn ("Vaughn") appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee Epworth Villa. At issue is Vaughn's allegation that she was retaliated against by Epworth Villa for participating in the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") process. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Vaughn was employed by Epworth Villa as a Certified Nurses Aid/Certified Medication Aid from 1991 until 2005. "Epworth Villa is a not-for-profit, continuing care retirement community related to the Oklahoma Conference of the United Methodist Church."

On April 28, 2004, Vaughn alleged that Epworth Villa discriminated against her and filed a complaint to this effect with the EEOC. According to Vaughn's complaint, she was discriminated against because of her age (49) and her race (black). Vaughn alleged that this discrimination occurred when she was disciplined for making errors with respect to a patient's medical records, while a younger, white employee was not disciplined for making the same errors.

At some point after filing her complaint with the EEOC, Vaughn provided the EEOC with several pages of unredacted medical records concerning an Epworth Villa patient. These records included a "medication sheet," which detailed the patient's medication regimen, and "an individual patient's narcotics record," which detailed the patient's medication schedule. Vaughn provided these records to the EEOC believing they would bolster her discrimination claims. To that end, Vaughn asserted that the records contained errors similar to those for which she had been disciplined, but because the errors were committed by a younger, white employee, that employee had not been disciplined for the same conduct.

On May 23, 2005, over a year after Vaughn had filed her charge of discrimination with the EEOC (which remained pending), Epworth Villa learned about Vaughn's disclosure of the unredacted medical records. Shortly thereafter, Epworth Villa reported the incident to the Oklahoma Department of Health, which advised Epworth Villa to open an investigation into the matter.¹ Vaughn ultimately admitted that she copied and released the unredacted medical records and that one of her responsibilities at Epworth Villa was "practic[ing] confidentiality concerning residents' records, care and activities."

On June 1, 2005, Epworth Villa terminated Vaughn's employment. A subsequent letter from Epworth Villa to the Department of Health indicated that Vaughn was "[t]erminated . . . for cause because she, without authorization and against policy and procedure, copied and removed from the property confidential document[s]; i.e. medical records of [an Epworth Villa resident] and staff pay records, then disclosed said records to a third party."

Following Vaughn's termination, the Department of Health also investigated Vaughn's conduct. After a hearing on the matter, an Administrative Law Judge concluded that Vaughn "violated [Oklahoma] law when she copied [the] records, in essence taking the information, which is a property right, without permission, and therefore is guilty of the act of misappropriation of property belonging to a Resident." An annotation to this effect was made in Vaughn's official record with the Oklahoma Nurse's Aide Registry.

In response to her termination, Vaughn filed suit against Epworth Villa, asserting among other actions, that she was terminated in retaliation for her participation in the EEOC process. The district court granted Epworth Villa's motion for summary judgment with respect to Vaughn's retaliation claim. In doing so, the district court concluded that Vaughn had failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. The court also noted, however, that even if Vaughn had established a prima facie case of retaliation, she had not established that Epworth Villa's purported non-retaliatory reason for terminating her was pretextual. At Vaughn's request, the district court thereafter dismissed with prejudice her remaining causes of her action, thus resulting in a final judgment for purposes of appeal. Vaughn now appeals the district court's dismissal of her retaliation claim.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

"This court reviews the district court's summary judgment decision de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party; in this case, in [Vaughn's] favor." Herrera v. Lufkin Indus., Inc., 474 F.3d 675, 679-80 (10th Cir.2007). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "Finally, we may affirm on any basis supported by the record, even though not relied on by the district court." Seegmiller v. LaVerkin City, 528 F.3d 762, 766 (10th Cir.2008).

B. Title VII Retaliation

"In analyzing retaliation claims, we apply the three-part test established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973)." Somoza v. Univ. of Denver, 513 F.3d 1206, 1211 (10th Cir.2008). Pursuant to this test, Vaughn "bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of retaliation." Metzler v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Topeka, 464 F.3d 1164, 1170 (10th Cir.2006). If Vaughn meets this burden, then Epworth Villa "must offer a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for [its] employment action" against Vaughn. Id. Should Epworth Villa satisfy this burden, Vaughn "bears the ultimate burden of demonstrating that [Epworth Villa's] proffered reason is pretextual." Id.

1. Prima Facie Case of Retaliation

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Vaughn "must show that: (1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action." Timmerman v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 483 F.3d 1106, 1123-24 (10th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). In this case, it is undisputed that Vaughn suffered an adverse employment action: she was terminated. See, e.g., Fye v. Okla. Corp. Comm'n, 516 F.3d 1217, 1228 (10th Cir. 2008) (stating "termination . . . is clearly an adverse employment action."). Similarly, it is undisputed that Epworth Villa premised Vaughn's termination on her disclosure of the unredacted medical records to the EEOC. Thus, in determining whether Vaughn has established a prima facie case of retaliation, this court need only consider whether Vaughn's disclosure of the unredacted medical records was a protected activity.

The district court concluded that Vaughn did not engage in a protected activity when she supplied the unredacted medical records to the EEOC. In reaching this conclusion, the district court used a "rebuttable presumption" test. Under this test, the court reasoned that an employee's "dishonest or disloyal conduct" while participating in a Title VII proceeding was presumptively unreasonable and an unprotected activity unless the employee had no other reasonable choice in order to advance the EEOC claim. Thus, in this case, the court specifically considered whether Vaughn had no other choice but to submit "a patient's confidential personal health information . . . to the EEOC." The district court answered this question negatively, concluding that a variety of more sensible choices were available to Vaughn: "Plaintiff could have easily redacted the patient's name from the records. She could have obtained the patient's consent. Plaintiff could have simply prepared an affidavit attesting to what she believed were charting errors by other employees and defendant's failure to discipline those employees." With these potential alternatives in mind, the district court concluded "as a matter of law that [Vaughn's] copying and disclosure of the confidential personal health information in defendant's records was not `protected activity.'" We disagree with the district court's utilization of this analysis under the participation clause.

"Protected activities fall into two distinct categories: participation or opposition." Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 259 (4th Cir. 1998). The "participation clause" provides that an employer may not retaliate against an employee "because [the employee] has . . . participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under" Title VII. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a) (§ 704(a)) (emphasis added). "The participation clause is designed to ensure that Title VII protections are not undermined by retaliation against employees who use the Title VII process to protect their rights." Brower v. Runyon, 178 F.3d 1002, 1006 (8th Cir.1999).

The "opposition clause," meanwhile, provides that an employer may not retaliate against an employee "because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice" by Title VII. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a).

The distinction between participation clause protection and opposition clause protection is significant because the scope of protection is different. Activities under the participation clause are essential to the machinery set up by Title VII. As such, the scope of protection for activity falling under the participation clause is broader than for activity falling under the opposition clause.

Laughlin, 149 F.3d at 259 n. 4 (citations, quotations omitted). In this case,...