De Vaughn v. Hutchinson
Decision Date | 01 March 1897 |
Docket Number | No. 114,114 |
Citation | 41 L.Ed. 827,165 U.S. 566,17 S.Ct. 461 |
Parties | DE VAUGHN et al. v. HUTCHINSON et al |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Samuel De Vaughn, a resident of the District of Columbia, died on the 5th day of July, 1867, leaving a last will and testament dated April 20, 1861. This will was admitted to probate September 1, 1867, and was, as to those of its provisions which are involved in the present litigation, as follows:
'I give and bequeath unto my sister Susan Brayfield all my personal property, of whatever description.
'I also desire that square four hundred and eighty-three shall be subdivided at the death of my sister Susan Brayfield, and distributed as follows: Mary Rebecca Brayfield shall have the whole front on K street, ninety feet deep to a ten-foot alley, which comprises lots one and two, with all improvements on the same; Martha Ann Mitchell shall have ninety feet on Sixth street, running that breadth through the square to Fifth street; and Catharine Sophia Harrison shall have the remainder north portion of said square four hundred and eighty-three,—during their natural lives, and at their death to be equally divided among the heirs of their bodies begotten, share and share alike, and to their heirs and assigns, forever.
'I give and bequeath to my mother during her natural life, out of the rents of lots No. twenty, twenty-one, and part of twenty-two in square three hundred and seventy-eight, and also the whole of square four hundred and eighty-three, devised to my sister Susan Brayfield, the sum of twenty-five dollars per month; or, if properly provided for by my said sister, then only five dollars per month for her own use as she may think proper.
Martha Ann Mitchell, one of the devisees named in the will, died in the year 1866, before the death of the testator, Samuel De Vaughn, leaving, as her only children and heirs at law, Benjamin D. Mitchell, Richard R. Mitchell, and Sarah W. Hutchinson. Mrs. Susan Brayfield, the tenant for life, died in December, 1891.
In May, 1892, James H. De Vaughn, Emily De Vaughn, and Rebecca J. Kirk, as heirs at law of Samuel De Vaughn, brought, in the supreme court of the District of Columbia, a bill in equity against William H. De Vaughn and others, also heirs at law of Samuel De Vaughn. The purpose of the bill was to have a declaration that, by reason of the decease of Martha Ann Mitchell during the lifetime of the testator, the devise to her lapsed and became void, and that thereupon, upon the death of the testator and of Susan Brayfield, the real estate described in said devises became vested in the heirs at law of the said testator, as if the said testator had died intestate as to said real estate; and, upon such declaration, that the said real estate should be sold, and the proceeds of such sale should be distributed among the parties lawfully entitled thereto, as heirs at law of the said Samuel De Vaughn.
To this bill appeared Benjamin D. V. Mitchell and others, the children of the said Martha Ann Mitchell, who were living at the death of the said testator, and who filed a demurrer to said bill. Upon argument in the supreme court of the District of Columbia, the demurrer was sustained, and, the complainants electing to stand on their said bill, a final decree was entered, dismissing the bill, and awarding an account of rents and profits.
From this decree an appeal was taken to the general term, but the cause was thereafter transferred to and heard in the court of appeals of the District of Columbia, and on April 2, 1894, the decree of the supreme court was affirmed. From the decree of the court of appeals an appeal was duly prayed and allowed to this court.
H. O. Claughton, for appellants.
J. M. Wilson, for appellees.
Mr. Justice SHIRAS, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the court.
It is a principle firmly established that to the law of the state in which the land is situated we must look for the rules which govern its descent, alienation, and transfer, and for the effect and construction of wills and other conveyances. U. S. v. Crosby, 7 Cranch, 115; Clark v. Graham, 6 Whear. 577; McGoon v. Scales, 9 Wall. 23; Brine v. Insurance Co., 96 U. S. 627.
Accordingly, in the present case, we are relieved from a consideration of the innumerable cases in which the courts in England and in the several states of this Union have dealt with the origin and application of the rule in Shelley's Case. We have only to do with that famous rule as expounded and applied by the courts of Maryland while the land in question formed part of the territory of that state, and to further inquire whether, since the cession of the lands forming the District of Columbia, there has been any change in the law by legislation of congress.
We learn from the reported cases that the rule, as established in the jurisprudence of England before the American Revolution, was introduced into Maryland as part of the common law, and has been constantly recognized and enforced by the courts of that state. Horne v. Lyeth, 4 Har. & J. 435; Ware v. Richardson, 3 Md. 505; Shreve v. Shreve, 43 Md. 382; Dickson v. Satterfield, 53 Md. 317; Holstead v. Hall, 60 Md. 209.
But we also learn from those cases and other Maryland cases that might be cited that, though the rule is recognized as one of property, yet if there are explanatory and qualifying expressions, from which it appears that the im- port of the technical language is contrary to the clear and plain intent of the testator, the former must yield, and the latter will prevail.
Thus, in the case of Shreve v. Shreve, 43 Md. 382, where there was a devise to named children of the testator, for and during their natural lives, and on the death of said children, or either of them, to his or her issue lawfully begotten, and their heirs or assigns, forever, it was held that the word 'issue,' used in the clause cited, was a word of purchase; and in the opinion it was said: 'Again, there are words of limitation superadded to the gift to the issue; it is to them and their heirs forever. Now, in the wellknown case of Luddington v. Kime, 1 Ld. Raym. 203, the devise was in very nearly the same terms, viz. to A. for life without impeachment of waste, and, in case he should leave any issue male, then to such issue male and his heirs, forever, with a limitation over in default of such issue; and the court held the testator intended the word 'issue' should be designatio personae, and not a word of limitation, 'because he added a further limitation to the issue, viz. and to the heirs of such issue forever.' The principle deduced from this case is thus stated in 6 Cruise, Dig. (3d Am. Ed.) p. 259: 'Where an estate is devised to a person for life, with remainder to his issue, with words of limitation added, the word 'issue' will in that case be construed to be a word of...
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