MEMORANDUM OPINION
Freda
L. Wolfson, U.S. Chief District Judge
Plaintiff
Lamont Vaughn, who is currently confined at Essex County
Correctional Facility, in Newark, New Jersey, seeks to bring
this civil action in forma pauperis, without
prepayment of fees or security, asserting claims pursuant to
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403
U.S. 388 (1971).[1] The Court previously administratively
terminated this case because Plaintiff did not submit an
application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP
application”); Plaintiff subsequently submitted the
required IFP application. See ECF Nos. 2-3. As this
time, the Court will reopen this matter, grant the IFP
application, ECF No. 3, and screen the Complaint for
dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Federal
law requires the Court to screen Plaintiff's Complaint
for sua sponte dismissal prior to service, and to
dismiss any claim if that claim fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)
and/or to dismiss any defendant who is immune from suit.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). “The legal
standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a
claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the
same as that for dismissing a
complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 Fed.Appx
120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Allah v. Seiverling
229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)).
Plaintiff
has sued Magistrate Judge Kiel, Margaret Ann Mahoney
(“AUSA Mahoney”), Patrick Hattersley of the
United States Probation Office (“Probation Officer
Hattersley”), and the United States of America
(“United States”), alleging violations of his
civil rights in connection with the delay of his preliminary
hearing in his then-pending criminal case in this District.
See USA v. Vaughn, Crim. No. 20-803 (KM).
Plaintiff's criminal matter was assigned to the Honorable
Kevin McNulty (“Judge McNulty”), and the Court
the relies on Judge McNulty's decisions dated October 2
2020, and October 5, 2020[2] for the relevant factual and legal
background:
. . . .On August 30, 2020, a criminal complaint was filed,
charging the defendant with possession with intent to
distribute oxycodone, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1) and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). (DE 1) On August 17,
2020, he had an initial appearance before Magistrate Judge
Waldor. (DE 3) She entered an order of temporary detention.
(DE 6) On August 20, 2020, he had a detention hearing before
Magistrate Judge Waldor, who entered an order of pretrial
detention. (DE 8)
The defendant declined to waive a preliminary hearing.
Because the defendant is in custody, Fed. R. Crim. P. 5.1(d)
requires that a preliminary hearing ordinarily be held within
14 days after arrest. Accordingly, Judge Waldor scheduled a
preliminary hearing for August 28, 2020.[3]
On August 24, 2020, the government filed a motion to extend
the deadline for a preliminary hearing. Such an extension is
permitted, but “the magistrate may extend the time
limits only on a showing that extraordinary circumstances
exist and justice requires the delay.” Fed. R. Crim. P.
5.1(d); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3060(c)
(“the judge or magistrate judge may extend the time
limits only on a showing that extraordinary circumstances
exist and justice requires the delay”). As
“extraordinary circumstances, ” the government
cited such factors as the COVID-19 pandemic and the attendant
difficulties, which are well known to all; the state of
emergency declared in New Jersey, requiring, e.g., that
citizens shelter in place; and the standing orders of this
Court, suspending certain deadlines under the Speedy Trial
Act, including the 30-day deadline to obtain an indictment
under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b).
The government offered generalities about the difficulties of
travel, unavailability of those responsible for child care,
limitations on prison visits, the health risks of in-person
proceedings, and difficulties in “bringing in witnesses
to prepare for and testify at a preliminary hearing.”
It offered no specifics about any particular witness who
would be unavailable or any particular person whose
child-care responsibilities would bar an appearance before
but not after August 28, 2020. Nor did the government address
the obvious alternative procedure of conducting proceedings
by video-as has been done in many cases, including this very
case.
The only specific basis for an adjournment cited by the
government was the inability to obtain a grand jury quorum.
“Ordinarily, ” said the government, “this
would be a case the government would seek to indict in order
to protect witness statements in open court, and to avoid the
possible identification of such witnesses at this early stage
of the litigation However, COVID-19 pandemic and the
inability to obtain a grand jury quorum has prevented the
government from proceeding by indictment by August 28, 2020.
However, the Government anticipated being able to present the
case to the Grand Jury on September 11, 2020.” (DE 9 at
4)
The Magistrate Judge accepted the lack of a grand jury quorum
as the primary basis to grant an extension of the preliminary
hearing deadline:
4. The government has proffered that the COVID-19 pandemic
and resulting government restrictions have prevented it from
obtaining a grand jury
quorum so it can present the charges to a grand jury....
6. The COVID-19 pandemic continues and social-distancing
regulations have prevented a quorum of the grand jury....
Extraordinary circumstances exist and the interests of
justice would be served by extending the time for a
preliminary hearing.
(Order of Magistrate Judge dated Aug. 27, 2020, DE 12) That
order adjourned the deadline for a preliminary hearing until
September 18, 2020. (Id.).
On August 28, 2020, the defendant filed an appeal from the
Magistrate Judge's order extending the preliminary
hearing date. (DE 15).
United States v. Vaughn, 492 F.Supp.3d 336, 339-40
(D.N.J. 2020).
In his
decision dated October 2, 2020, Judge McNulty determined that
the Magistrate Judge Kiel granted the extension in error, as
the government had made no specific showing that a
preliminary hearing, as opposed to an indictment, could not
be obtained before August 28, 2020; however, Judge McNulty
also determined that dismissal of the indictment was not
required because the indictment cured the defect in the
preliminary hearing process. See Id. at 341-344.
After
issuing that decision, however, Judge McNulty “received
a letter from the First Assistant U.S. Attorney, conceding
that the basis on which the government had obtained the
adjournment of the preliminary hearing date was
incorrect.” United States v. Vaughn, Crim. No.
20-803 (KM), Crim. No. 20-782, 2020 WL 5902614, at *1 (D.N.J.
Oct. 5, 2020). That letter read in relevant part:
The United States apologizes for failing to submit the letter
the Court requested before it issued today's memorandum
opinion and order. The reason for the delay is that, in
reviewing the letter submitted in support of the application
to extend the deadline for conducting a preliminary hearing
in this case, Docket Entry [“DE”] 9, the
Government grew concerned that certain statements in that
letter were inaccurate or misleading. That required a careful
review of the letter against the relevant facts. Having
conducted that review, the Government has concluded that its
concerns were well-founded. We are reassigning this case to a
different Assistant U.S
Attorney and taking other remedial measures, as explained in
greater detail below.
As Your Honor is aware, and as detailed in the opinion, after
Defendant Lamont Vaughn stated at his Wednesday, August 20
detention hearing that he wanted a preliminary hearing, DE12,
¶ 2, the Honorable Edward S. Kiel, U.S.M.J., scheduled a
preliminary hearing for Friday, August 28, at 11:00 a.m. On
August 24, the Government requested an extension under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5.1(d) and asked Judge
Kiel to adjourn the hearing until after September 11, 2020.
DE9, at 4. After considering the Government's letter and
Vaughn's opposition, DE10, Judge Kiel granted the
extension and adjourned the preliminary hearing until
September 18 at 10:00 a.m., DE12. Relying on the
Government's letter, Judge Kiel found
“[e]xtraordinary circumstances exist[ed] and the
interests of justice would be served by extending the time
for a preliminary hearing” because the “COVID-19
pandemic continues and social-distancing regulations have
prevented a quorum of the grand jury.” DE12, ¶ 6.
Regrettably, this Rule 5.1(d) extension request never should
have been made, and certainly not on the grounds advanced in
the Government's letter. To begin with, the letter stated
that the “COVID-19 pandemic and the inability to obtain
a grand jury quorum has prevented the government from
proceeding by indictment by August 28, 2020.” DE9, at
p.4. As of the date of the letter, that was both incorrect
and misleading. Newark grand juries were expected to (and in
fact did) form quorums on Thursday, August 27 and Friday,
August 28. Had the letter expressly acknowledged that Newark
grand juries were convening on August 27 and August 28, Judge
Kiel likely would not have granted the extension. In
addition, the letter represented that the Government
“anticipate[d] being able to present this case to the
Grand Jury on September 11, 2020.” Id. This
representation implied that no grand jury quorum could be
reached prior to that date. Had Judge Kiel known that a
Newark grand jury was expected to (and in fact did) form a
quorum on September
...
