Vaughn v. Love
| Decision Date | 23 November 1936 |
| Docket Number | 214 |
| Citation | 324 Pa. 276,188 A. 299 |
| Parties | Vaughn, Appellant, v. Love et al |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Argued October 12, 1936
Appeal, No. 214, March T., 1936, by plaintiff, from judgment of C.P. Allegheny Co., July T., 1935, No. 1338, in case of J W. Vaughn v. E. M. Love et al. Appeal quashed without prejudice.
Petition and rule to set aside service and quash return of summons.
The opinion of the Supreme Court states the facts.
Answer filed by plaintiff. Order entered making absolute the rule to set aside service and quash the summons, opinion by ROWAND J. Plaintiff appealed.
Error assigned was action of court in making absolute the rule to set aside service and quash the summons.
Appeal quashed without prejudice.
S. C. Pugliese, of Margiotti, Pugliese, Evans & Reid, with him D. H. Kramer, for appellant.
John G. Buchanan, of Smith, Buchanan, Scott & Ingersoll, with him David B. Buerger, for appellee.
Before KEPHART, C.J., SCHAFFER, DREW, LINN and STERN, JJ.
The summons in assumpsit and statement of claim were returned by the sheriff "Served W. H. Robinson . . . by leaving a . . . copy . . . with Catherine Giel, maid, an adult member of his family at his residence, 1432 Beechwood Boulevard, Pittsburgh. . . ." The service was attacked by the defendant through his counsel appearing d.b.e., who asked that it be stricken off. The reasons assigned were that defendant was not a resident of Pittsburgh but of Florida; that he was not present in Pennsylvania when the writ and statement were served, and had not maintained a dwelling or residence at 1432 Beechwood Boulevard for the past four years; that he was not engaged in business in this State and Catherine Giel had never been a member of his family, nor an agent or employee thereof; and that any Act of the legislature authorizing such service was without effect under the Federal Constitution and the laws of this State.
To the petition to strike off the return of service, plaintiff filed an answer which the court below treated as a demurrer and as raising no issues of fact. We are unable to agree with its conclusion in this respect. While it is true that the answer is not as specific in its denials as is desirable, nevertheless, after setting forth the sheriff's return, plaintiff does assert that the sheriff's return "contains the truth." As the return, which is made part of the answer, in effect controverts every essential averment of the petition, we deem the assertion of its truth a sufficient denial to place these matters in issue. Until resolved, an appeal to this court is premature, unless the issues were abandoned, which, apparently, they were not. The record, therefore, must be remitted to the lower court so that the factual questions may be disposed of. But, to avoid the necessity of a second appeal on the legal issues now raised, they are here taken up.
This proceeding was under the Act of March 5, 1925, P.L. 23, to test the jurisdiction of the court below over the person of the defendant. The Act was passed to meet situations such as this (Lackawanna County v. James, 296 Pa. 225, 227; Hughes v. Hughes, 306 Pa. 75, 79) and, when invoked, the procedure there outlined must be followed. The petition raises two questions. Is the return of the sheriff under the facts here admitted by the answer conclusive on the defendant, and would such a return, if held conclusive, violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution as to one who is not a resident of this State and has not otherwise submitted himself to the jurisdiction of its courts?
It scarcely needs any citation of authority to show that in this State, in the absence of fraud, a sheriff's return, full and complete on its face, is conclusive upon parties resident in the state and cannot be set aside on extrinsic evidence. [1] The early history of the rule is clouded by contradictions. [2] Because of its strictness, all but eight states, of which Pennsylvania is one, have thrown off the old idea that the return of a sheriff must be accepted as verity. There is some merit, however, in the rule of conclusiveness, for a default judgment would have a precarious existence in many instances if its foundation, service of the writ, could be attacked many years later. While the rule tends to the security of the record, at times it imposes exceeding hardship. The attention of the legislature has been called to this fact and occasionally we have been somewhat inconsistent in our rulings relating to the return and the immutability of a record. [3] But we need not concern ourselves any further with the question of the conclusiveness of the returns of service on residents of the state in the state, for the proposition involved in this case concerns the application of the principles to a nonresident of the state.
The right of a citizen to be sued in the courts having jurisdiction over his domicile and the right of personal service of process or its equivalent is elementary, though laws have invaded this right and subjected persons to suits in places other than their domicile and courts have sustained statutes providing for constructive service in an action in personam to be noted later. Service of process is for the purpose of notifying a defendant of the claim or charge against him so that he may properly prepare himself to answer it. It has long been held that service of process must occur within the borders of the state which issued it. That the defendant's presence there may be temporary or transitory is of no import; but the life or force of a process in personam is limited to the territorial jurisdiction of the court that issued it, not beyond. The authority of state courts and their processes cannot be extended beyond the borders of the state and when a court or its officers seek to expand the reach of process beyond this, it is a nullity and judicial action may not be predicated thereon. Where a suit is purely in personam to determine personal rights, constructive service upon a nonresident is ineffectual for any purpose. [4] : Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 727.
Within the jurisdiction of the court which issues it, a writ will bind the party served therewith. A resident of one state may, therefore, be subjected to the jurisdiction of the courts of another while temporarily in the latter. His bodily presence in a state may be taken for jurisdictional purposes equivalent to residence. All persons found within limits of a government, whether the residence be permanent or temporary, are to be deemed subjects thereof for this purpose. When an alien or nonresident is present in a state, whether abiding there temporarily or traveling, a writ will confer on its courts complete jurisdiction over his person. This is the general rule.
There are exceptions to the rule which concern the presence of nonresidents within the state under circumstances which exempt from the service of process. But, where a proceeding is strictly in personam, brought to determine the personal rights and obligations of the parties, personal service in the state or a voluntary appearance in the cause is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction: [5] D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. 165; Webster v. Reid, 52 U.S. 437; Pennoyer v. Neff, supra; St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 353; Pana v. Bowler, 107 U.S. 529, 545; Hart v. Sansom, 110 U.S. 151; Grover, etc., Sewing Mach. Co. v. Radcliffe, 137 U.S. 287; Wilson v. Seligman, 144 U.S. 41.
It has been stated that the rule which confines a state to jurisdiction of persons and things within its territorial limits belongs to international law, and that the principles of natural justice which require notice or hearing or an opportunity to be heard before condemnation are as inherent in international law as they are in due process: Pennoyer v. Neff, supra, at 715. We may take it as settled that it is beyond the power of the people of one state to give validity to a judgment in personam or a process served on a nonresident in another state. It is wrong in principle that a defendant should, by the process of any court, be compelled to appear and answer a complaint in another state in order to protect himself from the consequences of a personal decree founded upon such process. See McEwan v. Zimmer, 38 Mich. 765; 59 How. P.R. 512.
We have held in equity proceedings that no form of constructive service can give a court jurisdiction to make a binding decree in personam on a nonresident even though there was property located in this State, an important factor in the litigation: Atlantic Seaboard v. Whitten, 315 Pa 529, 531, 535. To the same effect is Hughes v. Hughes, supra, and the authorities noted therein. In the recent opinion of Mr. Justice STERN, where the service was set aside, it was stated that the mere presence of property within the jurisdiction of the county where the writ issued, would not permit the bringing in of its owner resident of another county of the state, where the decree sought is in personam: Gallagher v. Rogan, 322 Pa. 317, 320. We have consistently held that a foreign corporation cannot be compelled to submit to the jurisdiction of another state unless it was present in the state by the act of someone authorized to represent it: Shambe v....
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