Vaughn v. Mobil Oil Corp., 86 Civ. 5257 (JMW).
| Decision Date | 17 March 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 86 Civ. 5257 (JMW).,86 Civ. 5257 (JMW). |
| Citation | 708 F. Supp. 595 |
| Parties | Dorothy VAUGHN and Josephine Sanchez Johnson, Plaintiffs, v. MOBIL OIL CORPORATION, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
David B. Goldin, Vladeck, Walman, Elias & Engelhard, P.C., New York City, for plaintiffs.
Daniel F. Murphy, Michael T. McGrath, James E. McGrath, Putney, Twombly, Hall & Hirson, New York City, for defendant.
Plaintiffs Dorothy Vaughn ("Vaughn") and Josephine Sanchez Johnson ("Sanchez Johnson") allege that Mobil Oil Corporation ("Mobil") discriminated against them on account of their race and age, in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the New York Human Rights Law § 296 subd. 1(a). Defendant Mobil moves for summary judgment, requesting that this Court: (1) dismiss plaintiffs' complaint on the grounds that plaintiffs have failed to sustain their burdens of proof and/or on the ground that the claims asserted therein have been released and discharged; and (2) award damages to Mobil for plaintiffs' breach of contract. For the reasons set forth below, this Court denies defendant's motion in its entirety.
In considering a summary judgment motion all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party and all ambiguities and differences must be resolved to that party's benefit. Patrick v. LaFerve, 745 F.2d 153, 161 (2d Cir.1984); Poklitar v. CBS, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1023 (S.D.N.Y.1987). Thus, this Court takes the facts from parties' submissions in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, which in this case is the plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs Vaughn and Sanchez Johnson were employed by defendant at its corporate headquarters until November 30, 1984. Both Vaughn and Sanchez Johnson are black women, aged 57 and 61 respectively when the cause of action arose. Defendant Mobil is a corporation engaged in all aspects of the petroleum industry.
As a result of economic dislocations occurring in the petroleum industry in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Mobil decided to consolidate its personnel. This type of reorganization is commonly referred to as a reduction-in-force. Mobil transferred large numbers of employees to a different locale, reduced external recruitment and implemented a comprehensive cost containment program. To facilitate this internal restructuring, in March of 1983 Mobil undertook an Administrative and General Study ("A & G"). This study included a detailed comparison of the organizational structures of Mobil and three of its competitors. The study also expanded upon cost containment methods and suggested ways in which each department could be streamlined without disrupting the level of service. In conjunction with this effort, Mobil merged its Personnel Development Unit ("PDU") with its Employment Office. That merger led to the present suit.
Prior to and immediately after the Merger, Vaughn was the supervisor of the Employment Office, an office primarily concerned with external recruiting. Vaughn was responsible for supervising the staff, conducting external recruiting, coordinating and monitoring Resource Group participants, and directing and participating in community outreach programs. Sanchez Johnson was a Placement Representative in the same department and was responsible for external recruiting through employment agencies and community organizations, and assistance in the Summer Job Program and the Co-op Program. The following chart represents the Employment Office as it existed prior to the merger:
VAUGHN (b. 1927)1
Supervisor, Employment Office
. .
SANCHEZ JOHNSON CRITCHLEY JOHNSON GODINO
(b. 1923) (b. 1958) (b. 1941)
Placement Rep. Personnel Services Admin. Admin. Assistant
In contrast to the Employment Department's focus upon external placement, the PDU's primary responsibility was internal placement through promotions and transfers. The following chart represents the PDU as it existed prior to the merger:
BLICKSTEIN (b. 1932)
Manager, Personnel Development Unit
.
.
.
.
.
..................................................................................
. .
RUSSI (b. 1943) MALONE (b. 1951) TAVIANINI (b. 1937)
Personnel Dev. Personnel Dev. Admin. Assistant
When the two departments were merged in March of 1984, the positions occupied by Thomas Malone, a white male, aged 32, and Mary Tavianini, a white female, aged 46, were eliminated. Malone was given other employment by Mobil while Tavianini left the defendant's employ. The duties of the six remaining employees remained essentially unchanged.
Also in the spring of 1984, Jennie Blickstein, manager of the merged department, was instructed by her immediate supervisor Robert Lauchner to determine if further reductions were possible. Blickstein recommended that the positions held by plaintiffs be eliminated. Having so concluded, Blickstein analyzed the strengths and weaknesses of each of candidate. Blickstein Dep. at 42.2 Blickstein ranked the candidates — first through fifth — in accordance with their suitability for the remaining jobs. In addition, Blickstein utilized a "placement summary," a ready list of replacements of potential replacements for vacancies.3 Among the relevant information set forth in that listed was the ages of all department employees.
On September 4, 1988, plaintiffs were advised that their positions would be eliminated as of November 30, 1984. Mobil officers told plaintiffs that efforts would be made to place them in other positions within Mobil, but that if those efforts were unsuccessful, their employment would terminate as of November 30, 1984.
Mobil did not successfully locate other positions within the company for plaintiffs. Vaughn was considered for the position of Supervisor, Clerical Services, but that position was given to another candidate who had superior qualifications and experience, a fact which Vaughn does not dispute. Vaughn was offered but refused to accept an eight month position with an independent organization which places minority students in corporations. Sanchez Johnson was neither considered for, nor offered, another job within Mobil.
On November 26, 1984 and October 29, 1984, respectfully, Vaughn and Sanchez Johnson accepted Mobil's standard early retirement package of benefits for employees who were terminated pursuant to a reduction-in-force. In addition, they signed a standard pre-printed form which stated:
I further understand that these special early retirement allowances can only be made upon my representation and agreement (a) that I have no claim of any kind against Mobil, (b) that I will not make or authorize a claim of any kind against Mobil as my employer arising during the period I was employed by Mobil and (c) that my election of early retirement is voluntary and of my own choice. Upon any breach of the foregoing representations and agreements, I understand that I will forfeit all future payments of such special allowances and I agree to repay the amount of any payments made by Mobil.
Prior to signing this form, plaintiffs expressed concern about the language to employees in Mobil's Employee Benefits Department. They were allegedly reassured that the form was a bureaucratic necessity, that it had no legal effect and that a failure to sign it would mean a forfeiture of all their already guaranteed retirement benefits.
Shortly after plaintiffs' release, Blickstein, a black woman born in 1932, voluntarily retired, leaving the merged department with only younger white women.
On November 7, 1985, Vaughn and Sanchez Johnson filed complaints with the New York State Division of Human Rights (the "State Division") alleging that Mobil had discriminated against them on the basis of their race, age, and sex, in violation of the New York Human Rights Law. Mobil denied plaintiffs' allegations and maintained that the complaints were time barred because they had not been filed within one year of the alleged unlawful discriminatory practice.
In response, plaintiffs requested that the State Division dismiss their complaints for administrative convenience under Section 297 of the New York Human Rights Law. The State Division granted plaintiffs' request.
In July, 1986, plaintiffs filed the instant complaint. This complaint sets forth two claims: (1) Mobil violated the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 19814 by "intentionally terminating the employment of plaintiffs and failing to place them in other positions within Mobil because of their race." Com. ¶¶ 16-17, and (2); Mobil discriminated against plaintiffs in violation of Section 296 subd. 1(a) of the New York Human Rights Law5 by "intentionally terminating the employment of plaintiffs and failing to place them in other positions within Mobil because of their age." Com. ¶¶ 18-19.
A court may grant summary judgment only where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact...." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A genuine issue exists if "a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc....
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