Vaughn v. Neal.
| Decision Date | 01 July 1948 |
| Docket Number | No. 613.,613. |
| Citation | 60 A.2d 234 |
| Parties | VAUGHN v. NEAL. |
| Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from the Municipal Court for the District of Columbia Civil Division.
Action by Gladys Byrd Vaughn against Alice Neal to recover possession of a room. From a judgment for defendant notwithstanding the verdict, plaintiff appeals.
Reversed with instructions.
Margaret A. Haywood, of Washington, D. C., for appellant.
Jack Politz, of Washington, D. C., for appellee.
Before CAYTON, Chief Judge, and HOOD and CLAGETT, Associate Judges.
This was a suit for possession of a room in a rooming house, based on the charge that the tenant was disorderly in behavior, and was disorderly and was committing a nuisance by refusing to admit plaintiff for purposes of cleaning, papering and painting, and by refusing to furnish plaintiff a key to the room. There was a complete failure to prove disorderly behavior and so we are here concerned only with the latter charge.
Plaintiff operated a rooming house in which defendant had rented a furnished room. Just above the room there was an unoccupied attic to which access could be had only through defendant's room. In September 1947, plaintiff desired access to defendant's room for the purpose of painting and papering. Having no key to the room she gained entry by removing a side door. This resulted in a dispute between the parties, the details of which we need not narrate here. Plaintiff contended that her rooming house license was endangered by defendant's refusal to comply with the D. C. Rooming House Regulations, which require rooming house operators to have keys to all rooms. Defendant contended that hers was an apartment, that she was not required to furnish a key to plaintiff but was willing to do so on certain terms stipulated by her. The jury returned a verdict awarding possession to plaintiff. On defendant's motion the trial judge set aside the verdict and ordered judgment for defendant, notwithstanding the verdict.
In judging the correctness of the decision we must apply the same tests as are employed as to a motion for directed verdict. 1 Neither of such motions can properly be granted unless, viewing the evidence and all inferences reasonably deducible therefrom in a light most favorable to the opponent of the motion, only one result can be reached. 2 By this test we must rule there was error in granting the judgment n.o.v.
Among the facts the evidence for plaintiff tended to establish were these: that defendant occupied a single furnished room and an alcove for cooking; that plaintiff originally installed a lock on defendant's door, retaining a key thereto, but that defendant had later put another lock on the door, to which lock she had persistently refused to give plaintiff a key; that plaintiff had in previous years several times encountered difficulty in getting approval of her rooming house license because District Government inspectors could not get into defendant's room; that access to the attic could only be gained through defendant's room; that defendant had said she would never give plaintiff a key to the room and would not cooperate in giving her access to the room for purposes of repair. It is true that much of this evidence was contradicted or explained by defendant. But the weight to be given such contradictions and explanations was a matter for the jury. The trial judge could not properly override the jury's decision thereon.
It is plain that the basic issue concerned the refusal of defendant to give plaintiff a key. The jury having found (as apparently they did) that there was such a refusal and the trial judge being without power to disturb that finding the next question is whether such refusal constituted grounds for a suit for possession.
In this connection the D. C. Rooming House regulations are significant, though perhaps not controlling. Such regulations give the Health Officer power of inspection of all rooming houses and require that the entrance door to each room shall be provided with a lock, a key thereto furnished to the roomer and a duplicate key furnished to the proprietor ‘who shall have access to all rooms at all reasonable hours.’ It is important to note that the regulations also require operators of rooming houses to keep them in repair. Without the right of inspection the...
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...apply to landlord and tenant cases, see Levy v. Bryce, 46 A.2d 765 (D.C.1946) (behavior of tenant in a rooming house), Vaughn v. Neal, 60 A.2d 234 (D.C.1948) (refusal of tenant to give landlord a key), and Reese v. Wells, 73 A.2d 899 (D.C.1950) (tenant departed home and left gas stove on). ......
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