Vaughn v. Russell
| Decision Date | 23 December 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:13-CV-452 (CEJ),4:13-CV-452 (CEJ) |
| Parties | DEMETRIUS D. VAUGHN, Petitioner, v. TERRY RUSSELL, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
This matter is before the Court on the petition of Demetrius Vaughn for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Petitioner Demetrius Vaughn is presently incarcerated at the Eastern Reception Diagnostic and Correctional Center pursuant to the sentence and judgment of the 22nd Judicial Circuit Court (St. Louis City). Petitioner was charged with robbery first degree and armed criminal action. On October 15, 2009, a jury found petitioner guilty of first-degree robbery, but acquitted him of the armed criminal action charge. Petitioner was sentenced as a prior and persistent offender to twenty-five years of imprisonment. Judgment, Resp. Ex. 1 at 142-44. Petitioner appealed the judgment and, on December 28, 2010, the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed. State v. Vaughn, No. ED93945 (Mo. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2010), Resp. Ex. 3.
Petitioner filed a timely motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Rule 29.15, which the post-conviction court denied without holding an evidentiary hearing. On June 12, 2012, the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief. Vaughn v. State, No. ED97196 (Mo. Ct. App. June 12, 2012) Resp. Ex. 6. On March 3, 2013, petitioner timely filed this petition for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
On October 10, 2005, petitioner and Ronald Duff entered the offices of Missouri Title and Loan in St. Louis. Employee Angelo Washington was working with a customer at the counter. He spoke briefly to the two men, saying he would be with them shortly, but neither man responded. Petitioner leaned against the counter with only his left hand visible, and Duff walked behind the counter, saying, "I used to work here." When Mr. Washington turned toward Duff, he heard a noise from behind him that sounded like a gun cocking. Petitioner said, "Don't be stupid." Even though he did not see a gun and petitioner did not make any reference to a gun, Mr. Washington believed that petitioner was holding a gun in his right hand and that he "meant business." Petitioner testified at trial that the "don't be stupid" comment was directed to Duff, not Washington. Duff opened the cash register and removed about $600 in cash, and he and petitioner left the building.
Additional facts will be included as necessary to address petitioner's claims.
When a claim has been adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings, habeas relief is permissible under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), only if the state court's determination:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1)-(2).
A state court's decision is "contrary to" clearly established law if "it applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court's] cases, or if it confronts a set of facts that is materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] but reaches a different result." Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). "The state court need not cite or even be aware of the governing Supreme Court cases, 'so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them.'" Brown v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 458, 461 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002)). "In the 'contrary to' analysis of the state court's decision, [the federal court's] focus is on the result and any reasoning that the court may have given; the absence of reasoning is not a barrier to a denial of relief." Id.
A decision involves an "unreasonable application" of clearly established law if "the state court applies [the Supreme Court's] precedents to the facts in an objectively unreasonable manner," Payton, 125 S. Ct. at 1439; Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000), or "if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply." Id. at 406. "Federal habeas relief is warranted only when the refusal was 'objectively unreasonable,' not when it was merely erroneous or incorrect." Carter v. Kemna, 255 F.3d 589, 592 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 410-11).
To preserve a claim for relief, "a habeas petitioner must have raised both the factual and legal bases" of his claim to the state court, and afforded that court a fair opportunity to review its merits. Abdi v. Hatch, 450 F.3d 334, 338 (8th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). Where a claim is defaulted, a federal habeas court will consider it only if the petitioner can establish either cause for the default and actual prejudice or that failure to consider the claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Id. To establish "cause" for the default, a petitioner generally must "show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule." Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). To establish prejudice, the petitioner "must show that the errors of which he complains 'worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.'" Ivy v. Caspari, 173 F.3d 1136, 1141 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982)) (emphasis omitted).
Petitioner asserts that there was insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for first-degree robbery because there was no evidence that he displayed or threatened the use of a deadly weapon.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, the court asks whether "after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original). In applying this standard, the scope of review Whitehead v. Dormire, 340 F.3d 532, 536 (8th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). "[I]t is the responsibility of the jury—not the court—to decide what conclusions should be drawn from evidence admitted at trial." On habeas review, Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, 4 (2011) (citations omitted).
Under Missouri law, a person commits the crime of first-degree robbery when "he forcibly steals property and in the course thereof he, or another participant in the crime, . . . [u]ses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous instrument against any person." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 569.020. "What is distinctive about the crime of robbery is the taking of the property of another by violence or by putting the victim in fear." State v. Simrin, 384 S.W.3d 713, 719 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012) (internal quotation and citation omitted). "Robbery in the first degree may be found where the victim is in fear even though there was no real possibility of injury." State v. Belton, 949 S.W.2d 189, 192 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (citation omitted). "The fact that a victim perceives there to be a weapon that remains unseen is sufficient whether or not, in fact, such a weapon exists." Id. at 192-93 (citation omitted). "Whether or not the object that is perceived as a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument is in fact capable of producing harm is unimportant." Simrin, 384 S.W.3d at 719 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012) (citation omitted). A conviction for first-degree robbery will be sustained even though the defendant did not directly threaten or display a dangerousinstrument to the victim so long as "there was evidence from which the fact finder could reasonably conclude that the victim believed that the defendant was threatening its use." Lewis v. State, 24 S.W.3d 140, 144 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
In this case, petitioner's hand was out of sight and no gun was visible, but Mr. Washington heard a clicking noise that sounded like a gun being cocked and he thought petitioner "meant business." The Missouri Court of Appeals determined that this evidence, coupled with petitioner's words, "Don't be stupid," and Duff's actions in taking money from the cash register, "was sufficient evidence to instill fear in Washington," and a rational jury "could infer that [petitioner] was threatening Washington not to resist as he and Duff robbed the store." State v. Vaughn at 8. Petitioner has failed to state a claim for relief and his first ground will be denied.
Under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), an accused is to be brought to trial within 180 days of a properly-filed request for a disposition of detainers. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 217.490. Petitioner contends that the state courts erred in denying his motion to dismiss for violation of the IAD.
While petitioner was awaiting trial on the charges in the underlying Missouri case and in another state case,1 he pleaded guilty to a felon-in-possession charge in a federal district court. On August 21, 2008, he was sentenced to 30...
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