Vaughn v. Sizemore, Inc.
| Decision Date | 13 November 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 5:17-cv-1528-LCB |
| Parties | JOLANDA VAUGHN, Plaintiff, v. SIZEMORE, INC., HYOSUNG USA, INC., AND MIKE GRAHAM, INDIVIDUALLY, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
This is an employment discrimination case filed pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"), and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. ("ADA"). This matter is presently before this Court on two motions for summary judgment filed by (1) Defendant Sizemore, Inc. (Sizemore), and (2) Defendants Hyosung USA, Inc. (Hyosung) and Mike Graham (Mr. Graham) (docs. 24, & 21). Additionally, two motions to strike are also before the Court filed by (1) Defendant Sizemore, and (2) Defendants Hyosung and Mr. Graham (docs. 37, & 39). This case was filed on September 8, 2017 (doc. 1) and reassigned to this Court on October 4, 2018 (doc. 31).
In this action, Plaintiff Jolanda Vaughn alleges that while employed by Sizemore as a janitorial supervisor, she was assigned to Hyosung's facility in Decatur, Alabama. During her assignment at the Hyosung facility, Plaintiff had an altercation with Mr. Graham, a Hyosung employee, which culminated in Mr. Graham allegedly striking Plaintiff's hand and pushing Plaintiff, resulting in injuries to her back and requiring her to take time off from work. Sizemore terminated Plaintiff for making a false report regarding the altercation. Yet, Plaintiff argues that Sizemore actually terminated Plaintiff for discriminatory reasons based on her gender and a disability.
Plaintiff filed a five count Complaint against Defendants alleging claims for: (i) disability "discrimination and failure to accommodate under the ADA [, Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et. seq.]" against Sizemore; (ii) sex-discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, against Hyosung and Sizemore; (iii) retaliation under Title VII and the ADA against Hyosung and Sizemore; (iv) negligent and/or wanton hiring, training, supervision and retention against Hyosung and Sizemore; and (v) assault and battery against all Defendants. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 7-14.)
Upon review and for the reasons stated below, the Court sustains in part and overrules in part the Defendants' objections as to Plaintiff's evidence in opposition to Defendants' motions for summary judgment. Additionally, Defendants' motions for summary judgment are due to be granted in part and denied in part.
Defendants' ask the Court to strike the same four (4) documents: (i) "[t]he July 27, 2014 email regarding the advance inquiry"; (ii) "[t]he June 2, 2014 email to Catherine Perkins, Mike Eley, and Marc McClain regarding a back injury"; (iii) "[t]he February 8, 2016 email from [Plaintiff] to Herman Marks regarding reinstating criminal charges against Mike Graham"; and (iv) the state court order approving "[t]he Workers' Compensation Settlement Agreement." (Doc. 37 at 2-5; Doc. 39 at 3-6.) Hyosung and Graham also ask the Court to strike "[t]he September 18, 2015 email from [Plaintiff] to Mike Eley and Andrea Skywark." (Doc. 39 at 4.)
The Court construes Defendants' motions to strike as an objection under Rule 56(c)(2). See Taylor v. City of Gadsden, 958 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1291 (N.D. Ala. 2013), aff'd, 767 F.3d 1124 (11th Cir. 2014) ().
Objections under Rule 56(c)(2) function like trial objections adjusted for the pretrial setting, and "[t]he burden is on the proponent to show that the material is admissible as presented or to explain the admissible form that is anticipated." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2), advisory committee note (2010 amends). Rule 56(c)(2) enables a party to submit evidence that ultimately will be admissible at trial in an inadmissible form at the summary judgment stage. See Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283, 1293-94 (11th Cir. 2012). A district court has broad discretion to determine at the summary judgment stage what evidence it will consider pursuant to Rule 56(c)(2). See Green v. City of Northport, No. 7:11-CV-2354-SLB, 2014 WL 1338106, at *1 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 31, 2014).
Defendants raise the same objections to the July 27, 2014, and June 2, 2014 emails: the emails were not produced during discovery and the emails are "irrelevant and/or immaterial." (Doc. 37 at 2-4; Doc. 39 at 3-5 (emphasis omitted).)
Plaintiff does not dispute that she always had possession, custody, or control over the emails (see Doc. 42 at 1-6; Doc. 43 at 1-5), and Plaintiff uses these emails to support her claims (see Doc. 42 at 3, 5; Doc. 43 at 3, 5). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 requires Plaintiff to produce: "a copy - or a description by category and location - of all documents, electronically stored information, and tangible things that the disclosing party has in its possession, custody, or control and may use to support its claims . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii). Plaintiff does not dispute that these materials were encompassed by Sizemore's requests for production (see Doc. 42 at 1-6), and the Court finds that the materials were encompassed by Hyosung and Graham's requests for production.1 Plaintiff does not argue that she failed to produce or identify the documents in her original or supplemental response as required by Rule 26(a). (See Doc. 42 at 1-6; Doc. 43 at 1-5.)
Rule 37 provides that "[i]f a party fails to provide information . . . as required by Rule 26(a) . . . , the party is not allowed to use that information . . . to supply evidence on a motion . . . unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless." Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). "The burden of establishing that a failure to disclose was substantially justified or harmless rests on the nondisclosing party." Mitchell v. Ford Motor Co., 318 Fed. App'x. 821, 824 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
This Court has held that "a failure to disclose is 'substantially justified' when there is a 'justification to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person that parties could differ as to whether the party was required to comply with the disclosure request.'" Little v. City of Anniston, No.: 1:15-CV-954-VEH, 2016 WL 7407094, at *3 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 22, 2016) (citations omitted). In addition, this Court has held that "failure to comply with the mandate of the rule is harmless 'when there is no prejudice to the party entitled to the disclosure.'" Id. (citations omitted).
Plaintiff makes four arguments why her failure to provide the requested emails should not result in the Court sustaining Defendants' objections to Plaintiff's use of the challenged emails.
First, Plaintiff argues that "it was unnecessary to exchange [the July 27, 2014 email], as it was already in the possession of the Defendant [Sizemore]" and Sizemore "has had [the June 2, 2014] email in its possession, custody and control . . . ." (Doc. 42 at 1, 4; see Doc. 43 at 2, 4.) Plaintiff provides no case authority, and the Court's research has not disclosed any cases for the proposition that a party is justified in failing to produce or identify a document because an opposing party (or one defendant among a group of defendants) possessed that document.
Additionally, Plaintiff's argument does not demonstrate Plaintiff's failure to provide the emails did not prejudice Defendants. Plaintiff conflates Sizemore's knowledge that the emails exist with all of the Defendants' knowledge that Plaintiff intends to use the emails to support her claims. "The purpose of requiring the Plaintiff to at least identify these documents as part of his initial disclosures is to avoid surprise and minimize prejudice." Little, 2016 WL 7407094, at *4 (emphasis omitted). Plaintiff's failure to produce or identify the emails contradicts the purpose of disclosure.
If Plaintiff had produced or identified the emails, then Defendants would have had an opportunity to investigate, prepare, and conduct discovery regarding Plaintiff's anticipated use of these emails. Plaintiff fails to show how her failure to produce or identify the emails did not prejudice the Defendants.
Second, Plaintiff argues that "this e-mail would have been responsive to Plaintiff's Request for Production, but Defendant [Sizemore] failed or refused to provide it." (Doc. 42 at 2, 4.) Plaintiff's argument is irrelevant. A defendant's failure's to produce discovery does not mitigate an opposing party's obligation to produce or identify documents.
Third, Plaintiff argues that "she only discovered [the emails] in her possession after the dispositive motion deadline." (Doc. 42 at 2, 3, 5; Doc. 43 at 2, 4.) Plaintiff's argument does not raise a dispute as to whether she was required to comply with Defendants' disclosure requests. Plaintiff has not explained the delay in finding the document. Additionally, if the Court were to accept Plaintiff's excuse as sufficient justification, then future litigants would have little incentive to thoroughly comply with discovery requests.
Fourth, Plaintiff argues that should the Court strike the document Plaintiff "would suffer substantial prejudice . . . ." (Doc. 42 at 3, 5; Doc. 43 at 2, 5.) Plaintiff's argument shows that the emails support her claims, and that Plaintiff should have disclosed the emails to Defendants. Regardless, a court evaluating a motion to strike does not consider whether the non-producing party will suffer harm as a result of that party's inability to use documents that were not produced in discovery. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1).
Thus, the Court sustains Defendants' objections regarding the July 27, and June 2, 2014 emails and the Court grants the motions to strike with respect to these emails.2
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