Vaughn v. State, 4 Div. 901.

• Decision Date: 10 May 1932
• Docket Number: 4 Div. 901.
• Citation: 25 Ala.App. 226,144 So. 458
• Parties: VAUGHN v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Court of Appeals

144 So. 458

25 Ala.App. 226

VAUGHN v. STATE.

4 Div. 901.

Court of Appeals of Alabama

May 10, 1932

Rehearing Denied June 30, 1932.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Houston County; H. A. Pearce, Judge.

Jake Vaughn was convicted of assault with intent to murder, and he appeals.

Affirmed.

Certiorari denied by Supreme Court in Vaughn v. State (4 Div 670) 144 So. 460.

L. A Farmer, of Dothan, for appellant.

Thos E. Knight, Jr., Atty. Gen., and Jas. L. Screws, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

BRICKEN P.J.

The indictment in this case charged this appellant with the offense of assault with intent to murder. And the evidence disclosed that Ethel Vaughn, the alleged injured party, was his wife from whom he had been separated for about for years. Upon the trial, in the court below, he was convicted as charged in the indictment, and was duly sentenced by the court to serve an indeterminate term of imprisonment in the penitentiary of not less than seven years nor more than ten years.

For a conviction the state relied principally upon the testimony of the wife of the accused. She testified, among other things, that upon the occasion complained of, at about "dusk dark," she was walking on the sidewalk in front of the Junior High School on South Dusy street, in the city of Dothan, and she testified:

"A car drove up by the side of me, and the defendant asked me where I had started. I told him I had started to spend the night with Mrs. Hackney. Mrs. Hackney lived right back of the court house. Defendant said he would bring me. I told him no, I did not want him, for him to go on with Mae Cherry, I was not going with him. He drove on a piece further and stopped again, and said to me 'Ethel, come here and lets talk things over, quit living like we are, lets settle this.' I walked around on the side to him. The car was traveling North, in the same direction I was going. I walked around the car on the back end and he grabbed me, pulled me up there, and the car made off. I was not in the car when he hit me. He hit me with a hammer. *** I went around the back end of the car, and that put me out in the street. When I got around there, he never said anything. He caught hold of my left arm and pulled me in there. He never said a word. I saw the hammer. It was an automobile hammer, a hammer with a round face to it. *** I recognized the defendant, and know he is the man who hit me. *** The defendant and I have been separated four years the 11th of last March. Since that time he has filed two suits against me for divorce, and one of those suits is still pending. We have also had some litigation over some land. *** Before he hit me he opened the door of the car, but did not pull me inside. He opened the door as quick as I walked around there. I don't know where I fell. He did not hit me but one time, and at the time he hit me were on Dusy Street. **

"I was unconscious from Monday until Friday night week following. I was unconscious two weeks lacking from Friday night until Monday. I do not remember the day of the month I regained consciousness."

The defendant, appellant, denied that he was the person who struck his wife and insisted he was at another place some distance away, when the crime complained of was committed. He denied all knowledge of or participation in the assault.

From the foregoing, the principal inquiry upon this trial in the court below was the identity of the person who committed the murderous attack upon the wife of the accused. The conflict in the evidence, of course, presented this question of fact for the determination of the jury. Naturally, if this appellant was not the...