Vaughn v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.

• Decision Date: 23 May 1980
• Docket Number: No. 79-1561,79-1561
• Citation: 620 F.2d 655
• Parties: 22 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1044, 22 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 30,874 Christine VAUGHN and Marion Gee, Appellees, v. WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 655

620 F.2d 655

22 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1044,

22 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 30,874

Christine VAUGHN and Marion Gee, Appellees, v. WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION, Appellant.

No. 79-1561.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Feb. 12, 1980.

Decided April 23, 1980.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied May 23, 1980.

James W. Moore, Friday, Eldredge & Clark, Little Rock, Ark., for appellant.

Zimmery Crutcher, Jr., Little Rock, Ark. (argued), and John W. Walker, Little Rock, Ark., on brief, for appellees.

Before GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge, and HEANEY and STEPHENSON, Circuit Judges.

STEPHENSON, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal by defendant-appellant, Westinghouse Electric Corporation (Westinghouse), from the district court's ¹ finding of racial discrimination by Westinghouse against plaintiff-appellee, Christine Vaughn. The district court held Vaughn prevailed on her claim of disparate treatment because of her race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. On appeal Westinghouse alleges (1) the district court misapplied the appropriate burden of proof standards and (2) the district court's factual findings are clearly erroneous. We affirm.

I. Background

The district court found against two other plaintiff employees in this case and found against Vaughn on all claims except her claim that Westinghouse was guilty of race discrimination when it disqualified her as a sealex machine operator. Vaughn v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 471 F.Supp. 281 (E.D.Ark.1979). Neither Vaughn nor the other plaintiffs have filed a cross-appeal concerning these findings. Therefore, the only issue before us is whether the district court properly found Westinghouse had discriminated against Vaughn because of her race in disqualifying her as a sealeax machine operator.

Vaughn, a black, was hired by Westinghouse on July 13, 1970, as a sealex machine operator, labor grade 4, at $2.20 per hour. On November 16, 1970, she was transferred to a second shift section under the supervision of O. D. Brazil as a sealex machine operator and was earning $2.54 per hour. On January 25, 1971, she was changed from second to third shift due to a reduction in force, though she testified she preferred the second shift. She continued as a sealex operator under C. T. Turnage on the third shift and was earning the top wage rate of $2.69 per hour for sealex operators. On April 19, 1971, she was disqualified as a sealex operator by Turnage and placed on an open labor grade 1 job of bulb-loaderhand earning $2.45 per hour. She has continued to work at Westinghouse and at the time of trial was working as a packing operator-sleeving, labor grade 3, at the rate of $5.40 per hour.

At the time Vaughn was transferred from sealex operator on the second shift, Brazil, as her supervisor, completed an employee evaluation form concerning Vaughn's performance. It was dated January 20, 1971, and stated her quality and quantity of production were poor, and that he would not rehire her because of her problems making production. On the other hand, it stated she got along well with others and presented no supervisory problems. Additionally, a form dated January 18, 1971, and signed by both Brazil and Vaughn, stated she had had previous satisfactory experience as a sealex machine operator under Brazil on the second shift. Thus the district court concluded her work under Brazil did not present serious enough problems to label it unsatisfactory.

Under Turnage's jurisdiction, Vaughn was verbally warned on March 9, 23, 24, 30 and April 15, 1971, that she was having production problems, including what Turnage felt was an inadequate number of lamps sealed, and too many burnt wires. Turnage made notes of these verbal warnings, which were introduced at trial. During his talk with Vaughn on April 15, 1971, he apparently informed her that if she did not improve, he would have to use "stronger disciplinary action." On April 19, 1971, she was disqualified from her job as sealex operator. Vaughn disputed that she had prior warnings of this action, and testified she felt she was disqualified under orders from the front office, and was unsure of the reasons why. Turnage's notes from the meeting indicated it was due to her dislike for the job and the number of burnt wires. The disqualification form noted she could not hold this job in the future and stated that although she got along well with others and had good attendance, he was unable to motivate her and she showed no interest in the job as sealex machine operator.

The district court held that plaintiffs had established a prima facie case of racial discrimination under the rationale of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Vaughn v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., supra, 471 F.Supp. at 286. It then held that Westinghouse failed to demonstrate proof sufficient to overcome plaintiffs' prima facie case with respect to Vaughn's disqualification. Id. at 289-90. It awarded Vaughn back pay of $1,696.25, to continue to run in her favor until she was given an opportunity to bid on a sealex machine operator job. Id. at 291.

II. Analysis

Under McDonnell Douglas, a Title VII case is divided into three phases. First the plaintiff must demonstrate a prima facie case of racial discrimination. Then the defendant has the burden of "articulating" or "proving" a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its action. If this is done, plaintiff is afforded an opportunity to show that the proffered reason is a pretext for what is in fact illegal discrimination. Clearly the burden on the defendant is one of production; the ultimate burden of persuading the fact-finder that there has been illegal discrimination resides always with the plaintiff. This court has recently clarified its understanding of the order and allocation of proof in a disparate treatment situation, see Kirby v. Colony Furniture Co., 613 F.2d 696 (8th Cir., 1980).

Westinghouse expresses some dissatisfaction with the district court's finding that the plaintiffs demonstrated a prima facie case but does not appeal from that portion of the lower court's decision.

The requirements for demonstrating a prima facie case of disparate treatment were stated in McDonnell Douglas to be (i) that (the employee) belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, supra, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824.

The Supreme Court noted that the proof required to establish a prima facie case will necessarily vary in different factual situations. Id. at 802 n. 13, 93 S.Ct. at 1824. In analyzing the case the district court applied the McDonnell Douglas approach to the disqualification situation. It found a prima facie case to be demonstrated because (1) Vaughn belonged to a racial minority; (2) she was employed as a sealex operator having been originally qualified; (3) she was disqualified; and (4) following the disqualification Westinghouse employed another person (in fact a white person) to occupy her former position. The district court relied on statistics indicating disparate treatment in the employment of blacks at the Little Rock plant, see Vaughn v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., supra, 471 F.Supp. 284-85; on the testimony of the parties; and on the specifically credited testimony of a plant worker, Wilma Donley, who testified to individual instances of discriminatory treatment. Id. at 285-86.

Having conceded the plaintiffs have demonstrated a prima facie case, the first contention of Westinghouse on appeal is that the district court applied an incorrect standard to defendant's burden in response to the prima facie case. The burden placed on the employer to meet plaintiffs' prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas analysis was further explained in Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978), and Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 99 S.Ct. 295, 58 L.Ed.2d 216 (1978). In Furnco, the Court stated:

When the prima facie case is understood in the light of the opinion in McDonnell Douglas, it is apparent that the burden which shifts to the employer is merely that of proving that he based his employment decision on a legitimate consideration, and not an illegitimate one such as race. * * * To dispel the adverse inference from a prima facie showing under McDonnell Douglas, the employer need only "articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." McDonnell Douglas, supra, 411 U.S., at 802, (93 S.Ct. at 1824).

Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, supra, 438 U.S. at 577-78, 98 S.Ct. at 2950. The Court further defined "articulating some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" in Sweeney. In that case the court of appeals had stated McDonnell Douglas required defendant to prove absence of discriminatory motive. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of Furnco, noting that "articulating some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" did not require proof of the absence of discriminatory motive.

Westinghouse contends that there is language in the district court opinion which is similar to that disapproved in Sweeney. The district court at one point stated it was "not persuaded that the defendant has borne its burden of proving that this disqualification was not motivated in substantial part by racial reasons." Vaughn v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., supra, 471 F.Supp. at 289-90. The court also concluded:

In short, this is a case where the McDonnell Douglas rules as to burden of proof are dispositive. Defendant's position is by no means without support, but it has simply failed to...