Vaughn v. Willis, s. 87-1698
| Decision Date | 22 July 1988 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 87-1698,87-1762,s. 87-1698 |
| Citation | 853 F.2d 1372 |
| Parties | 26 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 423 Terry VAUGHN, Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, v. Henry WILLIS, Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee, and Richard DeRobertis, Chief Administrative Officer (Warden), Stateville Correctional Center, Salvadore Godinez, Assistant Warden for Programs, Stateville Correctional Center, Michael O'Leary, Assistant Warden for Operations, Stateville Correctional Center, and Travis Wheaton, Cellhouse Superintendant, Stateville Correctional Center, Defendants, Cross-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Bret A. Rappaport, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, Ill., for defendant-appellant, cross-appellee.
Gail A. Niemann, Jenner & Block, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff-appellee, cross-appellant.
Before CUMMINGS, CUDAHY and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges.
The defendant-appellant, Henry Willis, a guard at the Stateville Correctional Center (Stateville) in Joliet, Illinois, seeks review of a jury verdict in the amount of $125,000 for the plaintiff-appellee, Terry Vaughn, an inmate at Stateville. In April 1983, several other Stateville inmates brutally raped Mr Vaughn. It was alleged that Mr. Willis affirmatively aided and abetted these prisoners in their assault. Mr. Vaughn's complaint alleged a deprivation of his federal civil rights, as well as injury under Illinois negligence law. An independent claim against various Stateville supervisors was dismissed at trial on a motion for directed verdict. On appeal, Mr. Willis raised two issues. First, he contends that the trial judge's instruction in directing a verdict in favor of the supervisory defendants substantially prejudiced his own case. Second, he asserts that the trial judge erred in admitting an unavailable witness' deposition into evidence, and excluding a subsequent letter from the same witness that allegedly impeached the deposition. For the reasons set forth in the following opinion, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
Prior to the incidents giving rise to this action, Mr. Vaughn had been incarcerated at Centralia Correctional Center (Centralia). He had been sentenced to seven and one-half years imprisonment for forging his separated wife's signature on a check to purchase gasoline for his automobile. After he had engaged in a fight with another prisoner at Centralia, the state transferred Mr. Vaughn to Stateville. Apparently, the other Centralia prisoner, a member of the Black Gangster Disciples gang, threatened Mr. Vaughn by stating that his "people" at Stateville would "deal[ ] with" him upon his transfer. Tr. at 65. Mr. Vaughn interpreted this threat to mean "[t]hat I would be stabbed or assaulted." Id. at 66. Fearing for his safety, Mr. Vaughn informed a lieutenant at Stateville about the threat and asked to be placed in protective custody. The prison official granted his request. However, shortly after being transferred to the protective unit on April 2, 1983, Mr. Vaughn was raped and otherwise sexually abused by four inmate-members of the "Mickey Cobras street gang." R.1 (complaint at 5). Mr. Vaughn testified, over Mr. Willis' denial, that Mr. Willis forced him into a cell where two inmates raped him. Mr. Willis then returned Mr. Vaughn to his own cell and allowed two other inmates to rape him. A subsequent medical examination confirmed that Mr. Vaughn had been sodomized.
Mr. Vaughn commenced this action by filing a pro se complaint. He alleged, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, a violation of his rights under the eighth and fourteenth amendments. In his second amended complaint, the operative pleading at this stage of the litigation, Mr. Vaughn alleged that Mr. Willis had violated his federal constitutional rights by "intentionally or recklessly ... exposing [him] to four sexual assaults in one day." R.39 at 6. He further alleged that Richard DeRobertis, the warden at Stateville, and several supervisors deliberately failed to protect him from sexual assaults at Stateville. In a second count, Mr. Vaughn alleged that Mr. Willis caused him injury under Illinois negligence law. He sought one million dollars in compensatory damages plus reasonable attorneys' fees.
A jury trial followed. At the close of Mr. Vaughn's case, all of the defendants moved for a directed verdict on the section 1983 claim. Mr. Willis also moved for a directed verdict on the state law negligence claim. The district court reserved judgment on the motion concerning the federal claim until after Mr. Willis testified. Ultimately, on January 29, 1987, the court granted the four supervisory defendants' motion for a directed verdict on the section 1983 claim. At the same time, the district court granted Mr. Willis' motion for a directed verdict on the pendent state law claim. Accordingly, the only claim that survived was the section 1983 claim against Mr. Willis.
At the close of all evidence, the jury returned its verdict in favor of Mr. Vaughn and against Mr. Willis in the amount of $125,000. On January 30, 1987, the district court entered judgment on the jury's verdict. Mr. Willis then filed a motion for a new trial. He contended that the district court's remarks to the jury explaining the directed verdict on the federal claim against the supervisory defendants were prejudicial to him. The district court denied the motion. Mr. Willis then filed a timely notice of appeal. Subsequently, Mr. Vaughn filed a notice of cross-appeal. On cross-appeal, Mr. Vaughn raises two issues in the event that we reverse the judgment and remand for a new trial. First, he contends, the trial judge erred in directing a verdict in favor of the supervisory defendants. Second, he asserts that the district judge erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the pendent state law negligence claim.
Mr. Willis contends that the district court abandoned its duty of impartiality when, in granting a directed verdict in favor of the supervisory defendants, it made the following statement to the jury:
I am entering judgment in favor of the supervisory defendants because there is no evidence sufficient to establish their liability that has been presented.
The evidence in the case indicates that certain precautions were customarily taken in regard to the custody of inmates and the protection of inmates from each other. There is no evidence that any of the supervisory defendants, for instance such as Mr. DeRobertis, the warden, or Mr. Godinez, the assistant warden, or Mr. O'Leary or Mr. Wheaton, did or failed to do anything that was a cause of the occurrence.
The plaintiff's evidence indicates, rather, that the occurrence was the result of a failure on the part of the defendant Willis to follow the established procedures; and there's no evidence from which you could find that the supervisory defendants had any reason to anticipate that Willis would not follow the established procedures.
So in short, the plaintiff's theory as to the supervisory defendants was, not that they were directly involved in the occurrences, but rather that they were deliberately indifferent to the danger that plaintiff might be sexually attacked. There is no evidence that they were deliberately indifferent to that danger, because there is no evidence that they were aware of that specific danger which in fact arose, if at all, only because of the unanticipated conduct of the Defendant Willis.
Tr. at 366-67 (emphasis supplied). Mr. Willis contends that these remarks substantially prejudiced the jury, and thereby deprived him of a fair trial. He also argues that this alleged error was not cured by the district court's cautionary instruction made immediately thereafter:
Now, I've gone on at some length to explain why I'm directing a verdict, as we say, in favor of the supervisory defendants.
I want to make it perfectly clear that I am not expressing any opinion whatsoever as to the liability of the Defendant Willis. All I'm saying is that there is evidence in the case which, if believed by you, would justify a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against the Defendant Willis. There is no such evidence as to the other defendants, and that is the distinction.
Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover against Willis is entirely a factual matter, resting largely upon the credibility of the witnesses. And that is entirely a matter for you to determine.
Id. at 367 (emphasis supplied).
In contrast, Mr. Vaughn characterizes this instruction as an explanation as to why the supervisory defendants no longer would be at the trial. He contends that the district court did not abuse its discretion in so advising the jury. Rather than constituting reversible error, Mr. Vaughn asserts that the district court should be commended for explaining to the jury exactly what the consequence was of granting the directed verdict. He also argues that the court properly cautioned the jury that it was expressing no opinion whatsoever as to the liability of Mr. Willis. Finally, Mr. Vaughn contends that, even if we do find that the district court committed error here, it was harmless.
We review a challenge to a jury instruction "both in the context of the other instructions given and in light of the allegations of the complaint, opening and closing arguments and the evidence of record." General Leaseways v. National Truck Leasing Ass'n, 830 F.2d 716, 725 (7th Cir.1987); see United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 674, 95 S.Ct. 1903, 1912-13, 44 L.Ed.2d 489 (1975). This inquiry must be undertaken " 'in a common sense manner, avoiding fastidiousness, [and] inquiring whether the correct message was conveyed to the jury reasonably well.' " General Leaseways, 830 F.2d at 725 (quoting Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 719 F.2d 207, 218 (7th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1210, 104 S.Ct....
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