Vaughtman v. The Town of Waterloo

• Decision Date: 27 March 1896
• Docket Number: 2,028
• Citation: 43 N.E. 476,14 Ind.App. 649
• Parties: VAUGHTMAN v. THE TOWN OF WATERLOO
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

43 N.E. 476

14 Ind.App. 649

VAUGHTMAN v. THE TOWN OF WATERLOO

No. 2,028

Court of Appeals of Indiana

March 27, 1896

From the De Kalb Circuit Court.

Judgment affirmed.

J. E Rose, J. H. Rose and C. M. Phillips, for appellant.

J. F Shuman and C. A. O. McClellan, for appellee.

OPINION

ROSS, J.

In the year 1890, the appellee had in force an ordinance to regulate and control the driving of hacks and other vehicles over and upon the streets of said town, and making it a misdemeanor for the owner of any hack or other vehicle to carry passengers for hire within the incorporated limits of said town without first procuring a license so to do. Said ordinance also made it the duty of the marshal of said town to arrest all persons found running hacks or other vehicles and carrying passengers for hire within said limits who had not first procured such license. The appellant, who was the elected and acting marshal of said town, in October, 1890 arrested one Joseph Crayes, for a violation of said ordinance, and subsequently said Crayes sued and recovered judgment against appellant for false imprisonment on account of such arrest. The appellant brought this action against appellee to recover back from it the amount of said judgment, which he was compelled to pay. In his complaint, after alleging the passage of the ordinance and the terms of the same, he avers that before making the arrest he reported to the appellee that said Crayes would resist the enforcement of the ordinance upon the theory that the town had no authority to pass such an ordinance and that thereupon appellee, "by her board of trustees, duly promised and agreed" with appellant that if he would make the arrest, appellee would prosecute said Crayes and would save appellant "harmless and would pay him for all costs, trouble and expense which he might be put to by reason of commencing said action; that if said Crayes would sue him for making said arrest, the defendant (appellee) would defend" him and pay all costs and damages which he might incur by reason of said arrest; that in consideration of and relying upon said promise and agreement of appellee, appellant made the arrest on a warrant duly issued by one Oliver P. Smith, a duly qualified justice of the peace, etc.

A municipal corporation is a body corporate and politic, created by the law and invested with special powers relating particularly to the government of its own local affairs. East Tennessee University v. Mayor, etc., 6 Baxt. (Tenn.) 166; Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. 169; Mayor of Nashville v. Ray, 19 Wall. (U. S.) 468, 22 L.Ed. 164.

Judge Dillon in his work on Municipal Corporations (4th Ed.), section 20, defines them to be "the incorporation by the authority of the government of the inhabitants of a particular place or district, and authorizing them in their corporate capacity to exercise subordinate specified powers of legislation and regulation with respect to their local and internal concerns. This power of local government is the distinctive purpose and distinguishing feature of a municipal corporation proper.'

And in Board, etc., v. Mighels, 7 Ohio St. 109, the court says: "Municipal corporations proper are called into existence, either at the direct solicitation or by the free consent of the persons composing them, for the promotion of their own local and private advantage and convenience."

In many jurisdictions the word "municipal" is applied to any and all subdivisions of the State without any distinction, and for that reason expressions of the courts in cases where all of such subdivisions are recognized simply as political subdivisions of the State, are inapplicable whereas, in this State, cities and towns are bodies corporate and politic with many of the general powers of private corporations. Their powers are not inherent, but are such only as are specially granted by the law under which they are created. And their liability, while greater than that of a county, which is merely an involuntary subdivision of the State itself, is not as great as that of an individual, or of a private corporation. They are created mainly for the interest, advantage and convenience of the locality and its people, and they have both duties and privileges, and for negligence in the performance of any duty whether legislative, judicial or discretionary in its nature, or for a failure to perform such duty, no liability attaches, but for negligence, resulting in injury, arising from the exercise of the privileges granted, or from neglect to perform a duty ministerial in its nature, they are liable in damages. Faulkner v. City of Aurora, 85 Ind. 130; City of...