Vaugilan v. Hollingsworth

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Idaho
• Writing for the Court: DUNN, J.
• Citation: 208 P. 838,35 Idaho 722
• Decision Date: 02 August 1922
• Parties: FRANK VAUGILAN, Appellant v. ALFRED P. HOLLINGSWORTH, WILLIAM A. HOLLINGSWORTH, E. C. HOLLINGSWORTH, SARAH J. DARRAH, and MARY L. COOK, Respondents; ARIZONA MITCHAM, JOHN CARLYLE MILLER and ELLA RILEY, Cross-plaintiffs and Respondents

208 P. 838

35 Idaho 722

FRANK VAUGILAN, Appellant
v.
ALFRED P. HOLLINGSWORTH, WILLIAM A. HOLLINGSWORTH, E. C. HOLLINGSWORTH, SARAH J. DARRAH, and MARY L. COOK, Respondents;

ARIZONA MITCHAM, JOHN CARLYLE MILLER and ELLA RILEY, Cross-plaintiffs and Respondents

Supreme Court of Idaho

August 2, 1922

COMMUNITY PROPERTY-DEED TO HUSBAND-CONSTRUCTION-INTENTION AND CONDUCT OF GRANTEES-ADVERSE POSSESSION.

1. All property acquired by either spouse during coverture is presumed to be community property and the burden is upon him who asserts it to be separate property to show such fact by a preponderance of the evidence.

2. The main purpose in the construction of deeds, as of other contracts, is to give effect to the intention of the parties, and this intention is gathered from the language of the deed as such language is explained by the attendant circumstances and the relation of the parties.

3. Before adverse possession by one tenant in common against another can begin, the one in possession must, by acts of the most open and notorious character, clearly show to the world, and to all having occasion to observe the condition and occupancy of the property, that his possession is intended to exclude, and does exclude, the rights of his cotenant.

APPEAL from the District Court of the Tenth Judicial District, for Nez Perce County. Hon. Wallace N. Scales, Judge.

Action to quiet title. Judgment for cross-plaintiffs Mitcham, Miller and Riley. Plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Judgment of the district court affirmed, with costs to cross-plaintiffs.

Eugene A. Cox and Noel B. Martin, for Appellant.

The deed from Oylear to Alfred P. Hollingsworth and his heirs by Mary E. Hollingsworth, his wife, conveys title of the whole estate to the grantee named and the grantees designated. (Bodine's Admr. v. Arthur, 91 Ky. 53, 34 Am. St. 162, 14 S.W. 904; Sullivan v. McLaughlin, 99 Ala. 60, 11 So. 447; Fanning v. Doan, 128 Mo. 323, 30 S.W. 1032; Reeves v. Cook, 71 S.C. 275, 51 S.E. 93; Fletcher v. Tyler, 92 Ky. 145, 36 Am. St. 584, 17 S.W. 282; Smith v. Upton, 12 Ky. Law Rep. 27, 13 S.W. 721; Tinder v. Tinder, 131 Ind. 381, 30 N.E. 1077; Cullens v. Cullens, 161 N.C. 344, 77 S.E. 228, L. R. A. 1917B, 64.)

The parties, having by their acts, silence and acquiescence placed a construction on the deed from Oylear, the construction, not being repugnant to any rule of law, will be followed by the court. (Dakin v. Savage, 172 Mass. 23, 51 N.E. 186; Huff v. Miniard, 24 Ky. Law Rep. 2272, 73 S.W. 1036; Kamer v. Bryant, 103 Ky. 723, 46 S.W. 14.)

The Oylear deed shows on its face that the property did not vest in the community, and the estate conveyed passed to the grantee named and grantees designated. No evidence was introduced to rebut this presumption or show a different intention. (McCutchen v. Purinton, 84 Tex. 603, 19 S.W. 710; Baker v. Baker, 55 Tex. 577; Morrison & Hart v. Clark, 55 Tex. 437; Hatchett v. Conner, 30 Tex. 104; Swain v. Duane, 48 Cal. 358; Sanchez v. Grace Methodist Episcopal Church. 114 Cal. 295, 46 P. 2; Letot v. Peacock (Tex.) 94 S.W. 1121.)

The extent of the estate purported to be conveyed characterizes the entry and subsequent possession, and shows that they were made under claim to the whole of the estate and with intent to oust others asserting an interest. (Wilson v. Linder, 21 Idaho 576, Am. Cas. 1913E, 148, 123 P. 487, 42 L. R. A., N. S., 242; Elder v. McClaskey, 70 F. 529, 17 C. C. A. 251; Hall v. Law, 102 U.S. 461, 26 L.Ed. 217; Christie v. Gage, 71 N.Y. 189; Greenhill v. Biggs, 85 Ky. 155, 7 Am. St. 579, 2 S.W. 774; Little v. Crawford, 13 Idaho 146, 88 P. 974.)

A tenant in possession may disseise his cotenants either by direct notice of adverse claim or by unequivocal acts from which notice will be presumed. (Parsons v. Sharpe, 102 Ark. 611, 145 S.W. 537; Allen v. Morris, 244 Mo. 357, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 1310, 148 S.W. 905; Clarke v. Dirks, 178 Iowa 335, 160 N.W. 31; Smith v. Barrick, 41 Cal.App. 28, 182 P. 56; Hahn v. Keith, 170 Wis. 524, 174 N.W. 551; Hynds v. Hynds, 253 Mo. 20, 161 S.W. 812; Mathews v. Baker, 47 Utah 532, 155 P. 427; Carr v. Alexander (Tex. Civ.), 149 S.W. 218; Wilson v. Hoover, 154 Ky. 1, 156 S.W. 880; Winterburn v. Chambers, 91 Cal. 170, 27 P. 658.)

Benjamin F. Tweedy and E. W. Stephens, for Respondents.

The heir clause in the deed merely attempts to limit the inheritance or succession to the land, and in no way prevents the whole fee-simple title vesting in the named grantee by force of the deed itself. The fact that the word "heirs" immediately follows the named grantee conclusively proves that a limitation was only intended, and nothing more. (C. J., sec. 279, p. 300; Howe v. Howe, 94 Kan. 67, 145 P. 873; Lane v. Utz, 130 Ind. 235, 29 N.E. 772; Tipton v. La Rose, 27 Ind. 484; Bonnell v. McLaughlin, 173 Cal. 213, 159 P. 590; McNeer v. Patrick, 93 Neb. 746, 142 N.W. 283; Cox v. Newby, 101 S.C. 193, 85 S.E. 369; Garrett v. Wiltse, 252 Mo. 699, 161 S.W. 694.)

The clause, as a limitation of the inheritance, is absolutely void, and cannot set aside the Idaho statutes. (Howe v. Howe, supra.) Mary E. Hollingsworth and her heirs cannot be affected at all by the heir clause, for she is not named as a grantee in the Oylear deed. She gets her title to one-half of the land by the law vesting it, and not the deed. (Ewald v. Hufton, 31 Idaho 373, 173 P. 247.)

It requires very strong evidence and facts and circumstances to establish adverse possession against tenants in common, especially where they are related to each other by blood or by marriage as in the instant case. (1 Cyc. 1071, 1080.)

Cross-plaintiffs accepted their distributive part of the effects of their mother on her death in accordance with the memorandum left by her, and, having so accepted, and having failed to probate their mother's estate, they cannot be now heard to assert their stale claim. (Ryan v. Woodin, 9 Idaho 525, 75 P. 261.)

DUNN, J. Rice, C. J., and McCarthy, J., concur.

OPINION

[35 Idaho 725] DUNN, J.

In December, 1903, Alfred P. Hollingsworth and his wife Mary E. Hollingsworth purchased from Louis L. Oylear the N. 1/2 of the NW. 1/4 of sec. 24 and the SE. 1/4 of the SW. 1/4 of sec. 13, T. 37 north, range 2 west, B. M. Pursuant [208 P. 839] to agreement between the purchasers and by their direction the said Oylear and his wife executed a deed for said tract, the granting clause of which read to "Alfred P. Hollingsworth and his heirs by Mary E. Hollingsworth, his wife." The habendum clause of said deed read, "unto the said Alfred P. Hollingsworth and his heirs by Mary E. Hollingsworth, his wife, and assigns forever," and further, "grantors above named do covenant to and with the above named grantees and assigns."

In January, 1905, Alfred P. Hollingsworth and his wife conveyed to William A. Hollingsworth by warranty deed the W. 1/2 of the N. 1/2 of the NW. 1/4 of said sec. 24. In December, 1909, Mary E. Hollingsworth died and in January, 1916, Alfred P. Hollingsworth conveyed the remainder of said land to William Hollingsworth, his son, William Hollingsworth and William A. Hollingsworth being the same person. In September, 1916, Sarah J. Darrah, a sister of William Hollingsworth, executed a quitclaim deed to him for the NE. 1/4 of the NW. 1/4 of said...